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Neuroscience makes use of many metaphors in its attempt to explain the relationship
between our brain and our behaviour. In this thesis I contrast the most commonly used
metaphor - that of computation driven by neuron action potentials - with an alternative
view which seeks to understand the brain in terms of an agent learning from the reward
signalled by neuromodulators.
To explore this reinforcement learning model I construct computational models to
assess one of its key claims — that the neurotransmitter dopamine signals unexpected
reward, and that this signal is used by the brain to learn control of our movements and
drive goal-directed behaviour.
In this thesis I develop a selection of computational models that are motivated by
either theoretical concepts or experimental data relating to the effects of dopamine.
The first model implements a published dopamine-modulated spike timing-dependent
plasticity mechanism but is unable to correctly solve the distal reward problem. I anal-
yse why this model fails and suggest solutions.
The second model, more closely linked to the empirical data attempts to inves-
tigate the relative contributions of firing rate and synaptic conductances to synaptic
plasticity. I use experimental data to estimate how model neurons will be affected by
dopamine modulation, and use the resulting computational model to predict the effect
of dopamine on synaptic plasticity. The results suggest that dopamine modulation of
synaptic conductances is more significant than modulation of excitability.
The third model demonstrates how simple assumptions about the anatomy of the
basal ganglia, and the electrophysiological effects of dopamine modulation can lead
to reinforcement learning like behaviour. The model makes the novel prediction that
working memory is an emergent feature of a reinforcement learning process.
In the course of producing these models I find that both theoretically and empiri-
cally based models suffer from methodological problems that make it difficult to ade-
quately support such fundamental claims as the reinforcement learning hypothesis.
The conclusion that I draw from the modelling work is that it is neither possible,
nor desirable to falsify the theoretical models used in neuroscience. Instead I argue
that models and metaphors can be valued by how useful they are, independently of
their truth.
As a result I suggest that we ought to encourage a plurality of models and metaphors
in neuroscience.
i
In Chapter 7 I attempt to put this into practice by reviewing the other transmitter
systems that modulate dopamine release, and use this as a basis for exploring the con-
text of dopamine modulation and reward-driven behaviour. I draw on evidence to sug-
gest that dopamine modulation can be seen as part of an extended stress response, and
that the function of dopamine is to encourage the individual to engage in behaviours
that take it away from homeostasis. I also propose that the function of dopamine can
be interpreted in terms of behaviourally defining self and non-self, much in the same
way as inflammation and antibody responses are said to do in immunology.
ii
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In this thesis I examine the models and metaphors that are used in neuroscience. In
particular I am interested in a recently introduced model — that of the brain as a rein-
forcement learning circuit. In this introductory chapter I attempt to motivate why this
model is interesting, and how it differs from the models and metaphors we currently
use.
1.2 Models and metaphors in neuroscience
1.2.1 Introduction
To explain the motivation behind my thesis topic, I first need to explain why I, or
why neuroscientists as a whole choose to study the brain at all. Why is the brain so
intrinsically interesting to scientists?
It is interesting because since Descartes it has been thought to be the seat of the
mind — the physiological home of our identity, and place from where our thoughts,
and decisions are initiated (for a review see (Lokhorst, 2009)). Our desire to understand
the brain reflects our desire to understand ourselves, and why we do what we do. Many
scientists choose to understand the relationship between mind and brain in different
ways — some study perception, some the process of decision making, while others
focus on learning and memory. What unites these different approaches, is that they
all attempt to use processes in the brain to explain human behaviour and our first-
person experience. In fact Eric Kandel, a nobel prize-winning neuroscientist defines
1
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neuroscience as the scientific attempt to explain the relationship between the brain and
our behaviour (Kandel et al., 2000).
If our aim as neuroscientists is to explain this relationship, then I will start out by
looking at how this is usually done in neuroscience.
1.2.2 The metaphor : Computation
Historically there have been many different metaphors used to explain how processes
in our brain relate to our behaviour, but the most common metaphor in use today is the
computational metaphor.
The use of metaphors is more common amongst theoretical neuroscientists than
experimentalists or clinicians, but these metaphors are important as they effect the
explanations that we create, the experiments we design, and the clinical interventions
that we attempt.
The computational metaphor compares processes in the brain to those of a com-
puter — information arrives from the periphery as input, undergoes some process of
computation in our brain, and is output as motor signals to our muscles. In this frame-
work our role as neuroscientists is to examine the brain in much the same way as a
computer scientist would reverse-engineer a computer. If we control the input to the
brain and observe its output, then we can try to deconstruct the internal processes and
determine what caused the ouput that we observe.
1.2.3 The model : Computation using spikes
When we look at the brain one of the most significant things that we observe are the
millions of action potentials that occur every second. In most cases action potentials
are all-or-nothing phenomena, and it is often assumed that these binary signals are the
mechanism by which our brain transforms input into output. The presence of these
action potentials is often inferred as evidence of computation. Like the binary signals
in a computer, spikes are though to form the basis of a digital computation that happens
between input (our senses) and output (our actions).
One example of how this metaphor of computation is applied to spiking neurons
is the neural coding hypothesis — a claim that the action potentials and spike rates of
neurons in the brain represent our internal states during the process of computation (for
examples of the neural coding hypothesis see (Dayan and Abbott, 2001)). The impli-
cation here is that neuroscience should proceed by observing the patterns of spikes in
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neurons, and decode these patterns to find the algorithms that generate our behaviour.
This view is widespread in neuroscience, particularly among theorists, and it is
not uncommon to hear experimentalists inadvertently talk about their results in terms
of information transfer, encoding, and storage. In fact this hypothesis is so well ac-
cepted in the theoretical community that theoretical neuroscience and computational
neuroscience are often treated as synonymous.
But where does this view come from? Is it reasonable to try to explain all of our
behaviour in terms of neural codes?
1.2.4 A brief history of spike-based models in neuroscience
As is often the case in science, the models and metaphors we use in neuroscience relate
to the kind of measurements we have historically been able to make. The belief that
the neuron is the most significant unit in the nervous system stems in part from the ob-
servations of Luigi Galvani in 1786, who discovered that electrical charge could cause
the movement of a pair of frogs legs (for a review, see (Piccolino, 1998)). Galvani’s
discovery led to the development of Galvinism, or as it known today — electrophysi-
ology, and in the intervening 200 years our understanding of bioelectricity has led to
the development of ever more sophisticated ways of detecting and measuring it. As a
result we have an advanced ability to measure electrical activity in the brain, but still a
comparatively poor ability to detect other processes such as gene expression, calcium
dynamics, or neurotransmitter levels. One neuroscientist has gone as far as to suggest
that if we had developed calcium imaging before micro-electrode recording then our
theories in neuroscience would look very different (Katz, 1999).
But there is plenty of evidence that neural action potentials do correlate with be-
haviour — some of the most striking comes from experiments done by Wilder Penfield
and Herbert Jasper on epileptic patients during surgery (Penfield and Jasper, 1954). By
keeping patients under only local anaesthetic they were able to electrically stimulate
parts of the cortex to determine which regions were involved in seizure generation.
From their patient’s reports they were able to sketch out maps of the cortex indicating
which regions were involved in which behaviours, and in the process they demon-
strated that electrical stimulation was capable of generating first-person perceptual
experience. This evidence seemed to provide very strong support for the notion that
action potentials were the cause of sensory experience, and as a result this work influ-
enced much of what was to follow.
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Later work by Mountcastle, and then Hubel and Wiesel appeared to add further
support for the belief that sensory perception had its roots in the spikes of neurons.
Mountcastle demonstrated by careful recordings that neurons in the cat somatosensory
cortex appeared to be organised into microcolumns according to their response prop-
erties (Mountcastle, 1957). The fact that neurons were organised in a systematic way
seemed to indicate that they were laid out in this way for a purpose, as if the neurons act
as components of our perceptual machinery. Nowadays with new recording techniques
we know that the same is true of other cells, such as cortical astrocytes (Schummers
et al., 2008), but it is easy to see how at the time the evidence seemed to be pointing
towards the neuron being the functional unit of the nervous system.
This work was followed upon by Hubel and Wiesel, who went on to receive the
Nobel prize for their work on ocular dominance columns in the visual cortex. Hubel
and Wiesel discovered that neurons in the primary visual cortex of a cat appeared to be
selective for patterns of light and dark in particular orientations. Some neurons, which
they termed complex cells, selectively fired action potentials when the stimuli were
moving in a particular direction (Hubel and Wiesel, 1962). After their discovery it was
proposed that our visual experience is constructed of the collective response of many of
these simple and complex cells across the entire visual field. Together these discoveries
seemed to pave the way for applying the computational metaphor in neuroscience,
using the spiking of individual neurons as the functional unit of computation.
But it is not just experimental observations that have led to the view that spike based
models are the most appropriate basis for explaining behaviour — the idea that neuron
action potentials are responsible for our perception and action has long been popular
amongst theoreticians and empirically minded psychologists. The most famous exam-
ple of this viewpoint comes from Donald Hebb, who in 1949 proposed a view of the
nervous system centred around the function of neurons (Hebb, 1949). He suggested
that neurons could act together as cell-assemblies to represent stimuli, and that the re-
lationship between stimulus and response was dictated by the connections between the
neurons in these cell-assemblies. He also famously suggested that the relationships be-
tween stimulus and response could be learned and remembered according to persistent
changes at the synapses between neurons.
This work was of course highly influential, and much of what he proposed in his
overarching theory of neuroscience is still assumed to be broadly correct today by ex-
perimental and theoretical neuroscientists. The beauty of Hebb’s grand theory was that
it offered neuroscientists a unifying framework within which all of the experimental
Chapter 1. Introduction 5
data known at the time could be interpreted and understood.
Since the time Hebb made his prediction about the synaptic basis of memory there
has been an ongoing effort to test his ideas experimentally. One particular piece of
work which has lent strong support to Hebb’s ideas about synaptic plasticity was that
done by Eric Kandel on the gill withdrawal reflex in Aplysia. By choosing the simplest
possible model organism that demonstrated classical conditioning, Kandel was able
isolate the physiological changes involved in the learning process, and demonstrate
that learning occurred by synaptic changes (Kandel and Tauc, 1965).
With these pieces of the jigsaw complete, we can now see why spike-based models
of behaviour are so widely accepted in theoretical neuroscience. The results of these
seminal experiments allow computational neuroscientists to argue that
1. Neural computation implemented by spiking neurons correlates with or is the
cause of perceptual experience (Penfield and Jasper, 1954), (Hubel and Wiesel,
1962).
2. we learn stimulus-response or input-output relationships by means of persistent
changes at synapses (Kandel and Tauc, 1965).
Together these two observations form the basis for a description of perception, motor
control, and learning, which to some is a complete view of human behaviour.
This view, which can be traced back to Hebb’s overarching theoretical model, has
support from the results of Penfield, Mountcastle, Hubel and Wiesel, and Kandel. To-
day much of what we take for granted about neuroscience comes from this work, and
it isn’t always recognised that much of this particular model of behaviour is a result
of the historical development of the field rather than a reflection of the current state
of knowledge. Although this model has proved incredibly useful in the past 60 years,
there are reasons to believe that this is not the only model which can be used in neuro-
science to explain the relationship between the brain and behaviour. Since this work
was published our knowledge about other non-neural processes has increased, as has
our ability to record and relate non-neural processes to behaviour.
The development of spike based models of behaviour has been particularly suc-
cessful in short-timescale models of early-stage perception and action (for example
visual perception (Marr, 1983), or place perception (Burgess et al., 2007)), but we
have not yet been able to relate spike-based models to high level behaviour and moti-
vational states that are observed over longer periods. Even so many theoreticians still
use neurocomputational models to explain high-level psychological phenomena such
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as schizophrenia (Olney et al., 1999), motor learning (Marr, 1969), (Albus, 1971), (Ito,
1984), recognition memory (O’Reilly et al., 1998), language (Pulvermüller, 1999),
(Smolensky and Legendre, 2006), and attention (Ardid et al., 2007).
60 years on from the publication of Hebb’s framework for neuroscience, does it
still make sense to use his model to explain the relationship between brain and be-
haviour? Is there evidence that we have found in the meantime that might suggest an
alternative model which could help us make more progress? Should spikes and neu-
ral computation remain our biological basis for talking about psychological concepts?
Can we use this framework of neurons and spikes to explain the relationship between
brain and behaviour?
1.2.5 Summary
In this section I have argued that our choice of models and metaphors in neuroscience
has been shaped by the historical development of the field. I have suggested that re-
cent discoveries in neuroscience, and our changing expectations of what neuroscience
should do, has not been reflected in the development of new theoretical models. In the
next section I will discuss specific evidence which indicates where and how we might
want to change our models.
1.3 Beyond neural computation
In the last 20 years theoretical and computational neuroscience has proved quite suc-
cessful in providing accounts of psychological processes. Computational neuroscience
has been most successful in explaining low-level perceptual and motor phenomena, but
as yet this has not been followed up with quantitative predictions of higher-level psy-
chological phenomena. Why is this?
During the early stages of developing my thesis I was interested in the question
of how processes in the brain relate to executive behaviour, such as decision making
and learning from reward. The more deeply I researched these topics, the more facts I
learned about neurophysiology that didn’t make sense if we took the view that spike-
based neural computation was the basis of executive behaviour. In this section I will
discuss a few of these pieces of evidence that indicate the need for models that go
beyond current models of behaviour based upon neural computation. I will first discuss
evidence that suggests a need for models that go beyond those based upon neurons and
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action potentials (Section 1.3.1). I will also make a separate argument as to why we
may want to consider the use of metaphors other than computation (Section 1.3.2).
1.3.1 Beyond spike-based models
1.3.1.1 The diversity of neurotransmitters
To start with a basic observation that has been made before (Edelman, 1993), (Leng
and Ludwig, 2006) - if it is the patterns of spikes in the brain which are significant, then
why is there such a diversity of structures and neurotransmitters in the human brain?
When we quantify our models in terms of spike counts we effectively assume that the
neurotransmitter involved is unimportant. If glutamate alone can potentially cause any
pattern of spikes which code for perceptual stimuli, then why do we need such a zoo
of signalling molecules in our brains?
Perhaps the answer to this question is in the ways these signalling molecules differ
in their properties and timescales. By introducing a myriad of levels of complexity in
the diffusion, binding dynamics, and intracellular cascades that happen simultaneously
at multiple timescales, the brain has potentially a much richer way of representing
information than if it was only reliant upon point-to-point synaptic transmission.
It is occasionally claimed that diversity of neurotransmitters is a hangover from
our evolutionary past, and not actually functionally relevant — this argument will be
discussed in section 1.3.1.6.
1.3.1.2 Correlations between neuromodulators and behaviour
Following on from this, it has been known for many years that non-glutamatergic neu-
rotransmitters such as dopamine, noradrenaline, and serotonin are particularly strong
correlates of our behavioural state (Carlsson et al., 1957), and have significant effects
upon high level behaviour (Schildkraut, 1965). Theories like the monoamine theory of
depression have been influential in biological psychiatry since the 1960s, but have had
surprisingly little impact in theoretical neuroscience.
Significantly, the same neurotransmitters which appear to have a strong effect upon
behaviour are also evolutionary conserved, and re-occur or have close analogues in
vertebrate and invertebrates. This seems to indicate that it is the properties of the
neurotransmitters that are functionally important, and not only only the patterns of
spikes in which they are released.
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1.3.1.3 Behaviour without spikes
Recent research into simple organisms like Caenorhabditis elegans seem to indicate
that neuronal action potentials may not even be necessary for behaviour to occur at
all. C elegans is able to demonstrate recognisable behaviour despite the fact that its
neurons do not fire action potentials (Lockery et al., 2009).
1.3.1.4 The importance of non-classical neurotransmission
At present much of the work in computational neuroscience is based upon classical
neurotransmission, whereby an all-or-nothing action potential causes the release of
neurotransmitter vesicles into the synaptic cleft. There the neurotransmitter binds to
the post synaptic terminal and causes a depolarisation or hyperpolarisation of the post
synaptic neuron. Since this simple model of neurotransmission was developed, neuro-
scientists have made many observations that appear to contradict it:
1. action potentials are not all or nothing (Alle and Geiger, 2006)
2. where synapses occur, the interactions are often tri-partite rather than bi-partite
(Araque et al., 1999)
3. the terminals of many neurotransmitters do not form synapses, and instead rely
upon volume transmission (Vizi et al., 2004).
The evidence that has accumulated in recent years for volume transmission does seem
to form a challenge to the view that we can understand the brain in terms of all-or-
nothing action potentials at synapses. If a neurotransmitter is released into the extra-
cellular space rather than a synaptic cleft then it indicates that the diffusion, reuptake,
and binding dynamics are likely to have effects upon postsynaptic neuron responses
which could not be captured in spike counts alone. Herkenham (1987), in his survey
of neurotransmitter release sites found that co-localisation of release sites and recep-
tors was the exception rather than the rule. This is particularly significant in the case
of noradrenaline, acetylcholine, serotonin, and dopamine, where 70-90% of varicosi-
ties do not make synaptic contacts despite having the necessary machinery to do so
(Vizi et al., 2004). In addition to the complications added by the monoamines, re-
cent years has seen the discovery of nonconventional transmitters such as nitric oxide,
carbon monoxide, and hydrogen peroxide. These gaseous molecules can cross biolog-
ical membranes and diffuse large distances from the site of production making it very
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difficult to relate their effects to classical forms of communication within the nervous
system (Vizi et al., 2004).
1.3.1.5 The role of non-neural cells
In section 1.2.4 I discussed the historical reasons as to why there is a focus in neu-
roscience upon neurons as a functional unit of the nervous system. Since those sem-
inal experiments were done, we have gradually accumulated evidence which high-
lights the importance of non-neural cells in brain function. Despite the strong focus
in neuroscience upon neurons, these cells make up only 50% of the cells in the brain
(Azevedo et al., 2009). Today there is an increasing awareness of the active roles that
glial cells play in learning and behaviour. However, this knowledge has not yet had an
effect upon our theories or computational models.
Recent developments in calcium imaging have shown that astrocytes can be more
tightly selective for perceptual stimuli than neurons (Schummers et al., 2008). And
the astrocytes that form a part of the tri-partite synapse can have a modulatory effect
upon neuron-neuron transmission. Glial cells play an important role in responding to
inflammation, and the cytokines that they synthesise and release (Hanisch, 2002) can
have a significant effect upon neural behaviour and synaptic plasticity (Schneider et al.,
1998). It has even been argued that due to their important role in neural homeostasis,
glial cells are the fulcrum of brain pathology (Giaume et al., 2007), as glial cells, when
failing to function, determine the degree of neuronal death. If much of the funding
for basic neuroscience research is eventually intended to solve public health problems,
then perhaps our models should be more focussed towards understanding the role of
glial cells in generating behaviour.
1.3.1.6 Evolutionary perspectives on neuroscience
As discussed in section 1.2.4, one of the major reason we believe that spike-based
models are a good means for explaining behaviour is that neural activity seems to
correlate well with perceptual experience (Penfield and Jasper, 1954), (Mountcastle,
1957), (Hubel and Wiesel, 1962). But it is important to realise that many of the record-
ings that have confirmed this view were performed in the cortex. Being on the outer
surface of the brain the cortex has historically been easier to record from, and this may
have affected the type of data neuroscientists have been able to gather.
Also, the cortex is one part of the brain which is thought to be relatively enlarged
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in our species (see (Azevedo et al., 2009) for evidence to the contrary), and so has been
assumed to be the structure that distinguishes apparently intelligent homo sapiens from
other apes and vertebrates.
If these two claims are true, then it suggests that both our data and our motives
contain biases, and we should be aware of this when constructing models.
From an evolutionary point of view, constructing a model of behaviour based upon
activity observed in the cortex is an unusual way to build a model of high level be-
haviour. Unlike human designed artefacts, organisms that have developed by evolution
are constrained in their function by the biological machinery that was present while
they evolved. This would imply that models of high level behaviour ought to be de-
veloped within the constraints of our understanding of the most primal, basic parts of
our nervous system, rather than beginning with the neuroanatomy which appears to be
most different in our species. If we examine the brain in its evolutionary context we
can see that the evolutionary conserved behaviours that we share with other species
are primarily regulated by systems in the brainstem and hypothalamus. If high level
behaviour is constrained by these systems rather than the other way round, then this in-
dicates that we should first aim for an understanding of how these basic circuits work,
before moving on to relate their activity to other, more recently developed regions of
the brain.
1.3.2 The computational metaphor
To propose a metaphor is to suggest that there is a one-one mapping between a subject
and the object of the metaphor. For the metaphor to be apt, the characteristics and
properties of subject and the target must be similar.
Computation as is most often described is a rational, rule-based process which
takes one from state A to state B. This would make computation a suitable metaphor
for explaining the rational processes, but not such a good metaphor for describing the
non-rational or unconscious processes which account for a significant proportion of our
behaviour (the exact proportion is an ongoing debate (Freud, 2005), (Skinner, 1976)).
If computation is necessarily rule based, then it makes the computational metaphor a
weak metaphor for talking about certain regimes of behaviour, such as emotion, where
the rational account only comes after an intuitive response. It is notable that computa-
tional neuroscience is lacking a good model of these kind of phenomena despite their
important role in human psychology. Could it be that the metaphors that we choose
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can both help and limit us in developing models of behaviour?
A computer (and by extension, computation) is a man-made artefact, and in a sense
was designed to mimic a particular view of human psychology. As a result, the perfor-
mance of a computer represents a particular regime of rational human behaviour, and it
is not appropriate to apply it as a metaphor in other regimes of behaviour. Computation
represents a school of psychology, and as such should not be used as a metaphor for
psychology itself.
To date the computational metaphor has been most useful in neuroscience when
describing psychological processes that can be achieved by computation - for example
memory storage, rule-governed behaviour, and feature detection. But there are other
important aspects of psychology that do not figure in our normal conception of a com-
putation or a computer - Why do we want or like things? (our drives), and Who/Why
am I? (our sense of self). The models that I will develop and explore in this thesis are
models that I believe are better suited to answering these important questions.
1.4 A separation of timescales
The previous section highlighted empirical and conceptual arguments as to why we
might want to explore alternative models and metaphors in neuroscience, but there are
also a priori reasons why we might want to reconsider the idea of relating behaviour to
neuronal action potentials.
It may seem strange to suggest that there are a priori reasons why we ought to
avoid using neural computation as a model for explaining behaviour. How can we use
a priori arguments in empirical science?
The argument that I want to make use of is referred to as the “separation of timescales”
principle, and is used routinely in the physical sciences as a technique for prioritising
the components of a system that are most likely to cause its macroscopic behaviour.
Physicists apply the separation of timescales principle when they have a system
with multiple variables changing on different timescales. For example, when trying to
explain the dynamics of a simple harmonic oscillator with a frequency of 1Hz, a noisy
driving force at 1Hz is much more likely to be causal than a driving force at 100Hz.
In this way physicists can disregard phenomena like the 100Hz driving force, and do
so in a systematic way, because we know from our intuitive metaphysics that variables
changing at microscopic spatial and temporal scales are unlikely to be the proximal
cause of macroscopic phenomena. A toy example of how the separation of timescales
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timescale phenomena
nanoseconds quantal release, ion channel events
microseconds synaptic proteins
milliseconds reflex behaviour, action potentials, local field potentials
hundreds of
milliseconds
neuromodulation, gene transcription, EEG, glial
metabolism
seconds behaviour, gene transcription, haemodynamics,
neurohormones, neuromodulation
minutes behaviour, gene transcription, neurohormones, stress
responses
longer behaviour, gene transcription, hormones, stress responses
Table 1.1: Timescales of behaviour in neuroscience
argument can be used in neuroscience is shown in Figures 1.1 and 1.2.
The reason why we can ignore these variables is not drawn from the empirical
data, but come from our intuitive metaphysical understanding of how scientific expla-
nations ought to look. We know that the principal component of the variation in our
data is always due to variables of a slightly smaller spatial or temporal scale than the
phenomena we are studying.
This principle is often applied in physics when deconstructing a natural system, but
the question I want to ask is “what would happen if we applied the principle to neuro-
science itself?”. What would it tell us about how we ought to construct a explanation
of the relationship between the brain and behaviour? Does the model that we currently
use in neuroscience — that of explaining behaviour in terms of the combined effect
of many action potentials — does this model make sense in terms of the separation of
timescales principle? Table 1.1 shows some examples of phenomena in neuroscience,
and the timescales at which they vary.
If we assume that the main behaviour of interest in neuroscience is that which
correlates with our subjective experience — such as perceptual experience, decision
making, etc. — then the small selection of phenomena included here indicates that
according to the separation of timescales principle, neural action potentials are a good
candidate to be the proximal cause of fast behaviours, and early-stage perception, but
not for psychological processes.
In fact there are many other variables we could measure that vary at a timescale
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Figure 1.1: A toy model designed to illustrate how the separation of timescales principle
can be used in practice. The conclusions drawn from this example are not meant to be
taken literally: Suppose we have a neuron which displays bursting behaviour, much
like the activity shown in the top graph. The activity of the neuron is governed by
two mechanisms - one a quickly varying synaptic input (bottom graph), and another
enabling variable, a slower process internal to the neuron (middle graph, think of this
as calcium build-up). Now suppose we want to answer the question — “What causes
the bursting?” Do we have any a priori reason to believe it is the calcium build-up rather
than the synaptic input which causes the spiking? Consult Figure 1.2 for an answer.
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closer to the timescales of the behaviour we are interested in (here I am assuming that
as neuroscientists we are most interested in psychological processes and their related
behaviour).
This argument would suggest that we would be better off constructing models of
behaviour from patterns in gene transcription, EEG signals, haemodynamics, or glial
dynamics, rather than spikes. The fact that we don’t reflects two things:
1. When viewed at the timescale of seconds, phenomena varying on the timescale
of milliseconds tend to appear as binary, all-or-nothing phenomena. Discrete,
binary variables are easier to quantify than those that change continously.
2. Because gene transcription, EEG signals, and haemodynamics tend to vary more
slowly than neural spikes they are difficult to quantify. As a result they are in
practice more difficult to measure, and therefore do not make their way into
computational models.
Although phenomena like gene transcription and haemodynamics are more awkward
to quantify, they are not intrinsically unsuitable components for a model. These kind
of phenomena are studied more frequently in subdisciplines such as cognitive neuro-
science, but they are often thought of as proxy variables for neural activity, rather than
causal in their own right.
There is one particular phenomenon in Table 1.1 which has recently begun to be
used as a basis for models in neuroscience - neuromodulation. Developments in the
last 40 years has made it possible to measure the concentrations of neurochemicals
in the brain in vivo (Robinson et al., 2008), and the data that has come from this is
beginning to have its effect on neuroscience, as theorists become more aware of the
behaviourally linked fluctuations of neuromodulators that occur in awake, behaving
animals.
When beginning this thesis my particular interest was in executive behaviour, de-
cision making, and goal directed behaviour. After spending months of reading the
literature it became clear to me that explaining the biological basis of this behaviour
in terms of the spikes and computations of individual neurons didn’t make much sense
from the perspective of the argument outlined above. There has been an awareness for
a long time that drugs which affect neuromodulation have a strong effect on executive
behaviour, and recent developments in experimental techniques are providing increas-
ing amounts of evidence that does not fit well with the view that executive behaviour
comes about as a result of neural computation.
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One example of these experiments is the discovery that dopamine neurons fire in
ways which correlate with theories about decision making. Recording of dopamine
neurons by Wolfram Schultz have shown that these neurons appear to fire en masse
when an animal encounters an unexpected reward, thereby simultaneously releasing
dopamine across disparate areas of the brain (Schultz, 1998). This is particularly in-
teresting as the unexpected reward signal closely mimics the reward prediction error
variable that had previously been proposed by abstract models of learning (Schultz
et al., 1997). Observations like these seem to point a way towards alternative models
of behaviour whereby the active components are neuromodulators rather than neurons.
This accumulation of evidence, and the difficulty in reconciling it with the way
in which most neuroscientific explanations are currently made led me to become in-
terested in the bigger question — is a model of behaviour based upon the actions of
neuromodulators a more appropriate framework than one based upon the neural com-
putations of spikes?
1.5 Neuromodulation as a means for explaining behaviour
1.5.1 A definition
Neuromodulation is the process by which a neurotransmitter released into extracel-
lular space affects the ongoing spiking activity of one or many neurons. This is in
contrast to classical neurotransmission whereby one presynaptic neuron directly in-
fluences a single postsynaptic partner. Dopamine, noradrenaline, and serotonin are
common examples of neurotransmitter than can act as neuromodulators, but there is
a huge number of lesser known signalling molecules and peptides that can modulate
neural activity.
Sherman and Guillery (1998) introduced a distinction between “drivers” and “mod-
ulators” — inputs to a cell that can either affect neuron activity on a short timescale (the
spiking activity in their example), or alter activity over longer periods (through changes
to the neuron excitability in their example). A more technical definition would state
that a “driver” tends to have a narrow peak in the cross-correlogram between the in-
put and the output, whilst a “modulator” may have a lower but wider cross-correlation
peak. An example of this is shown in Figure 1.3
In this sense any neurotransmitter or signalling molecule can be understood as a
modulator relative to any ongoing process that it affects — for example glutamate may
Chapter 1. Introduction 17
Figure 1.3: Adapted from (Sherman and Guillery, 1998). Graph A shows the cross-
correlogram typical of a driver input. In this case it is the activity of the retinal neurons
driving activity in the geniculate. Graph B shows the effect of cortical neurons upon the
geniculate. This cross-correlogram is characteristic of a modulator.
be considered a modulator of gap junction transmission in astrocytes. Defining neuro-
modulation with this degree of flexibility can be useful when we want to integrate neu-
romodulation with other important processes in neuroscience, such as those mediated
by the endocrine and immune systems. By defining neuromodulation in such a broad
sense we can describe endocrinological effects on the system using the same metaphor
— we can describe neurohormones as modulating the neuromodulators. For an ex-
amples of this, see the effect of steroid hormones or orexin on the firing of dopamine
neurons (Mesce, 2002), (Korotkova et al., 2003).
1.5.2 How do neuromodulators have a consistent effect on behaviour?
If neuromodulators are released into the extracellular space and allowed to diffuse
across the brain, you might wonder how such an apparently non-specific signal can
have such a reliable effect upon behaviour. This is a question that researchers have
been trying to answer for many years, and much of the work done to answer this
question has taken place in crustaceans.
Neuroscientists have chosen to focus their studies on neuromodulation in crus-
taceans because the neural wiring of these organisms is identical across different in-

















Figure 1.4: Figure adapted from (Goldman et al., 2001). Very small changes to ion-
channel parameters in a neuron model can result in dramatic changes to the spiking
behaviour. It has been proposed that neuromodulators might cause reliable changes
in neural behaviour by acting at such phase boundaries to trigger a bifurcation in the
dynamics of the neuron.
dividuals of the same species. This allows whole circuits to be mapped out, and the
effect of individual neuromodulators on specific cells to be assessed. In crustaceans
neuromodulation of central pattern generating circuits in the stomatogastric ganglion
have been studied in particular detail (Marder and Bucher, 2007).
It is thought that the ion channel-specific effect of some neuromodulators is enough
to allow them to affect neural circuits in a deterministic way. Small changes to a
specific type of ion channel in a circuit of interacting neurons can be enough to cause a
switch in the qualitative behaviour of a circuit (Goldman et al., 2001). For an example
of this see Figure 1.4
The authors also proposed that these small changes in ion channel parameters might
occur at boundaries in the neuron’s state space, such that the small change in parame-
ters triggered by the neuromodulator is enough to cause a bifurcation in the dynamics
of the circuit, and result in a switch to a qualitatively different pattern of firing. In this
way a single neuromodulator released by volume transmission and allowed to diffuse
across the brain can have a coherent and reliable effect each time it is released.
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1.5.3 The effect of neuromodulation upon behaviour
In the human brain most neuromodulators are synthesised by nuclei situated in the
midbrain and hypothalamus. Some of these nuclei such as the ventral tegmental area
(dopamine), the raphe nuclues (serotonin), or the locus coeruleus (noradrenaline), to
name but a few, contain neurons which project from the midbrain into the striatum and
cortex, and it is here they are thought to exert their influence on higher level behavioural
processes. From recent experiments we are now aware that there are precise patterns
of neuromodulator receptor distribution in the cortex and striatum (Hurd et al., 2001),
(Surmeier et al., 1996), and it may be that it is the degree of innervation of these axons
and the receptor distribution that combine to determine the firing patterns of cortical
neurons that we had previously thought was a result of the neurons’ intrinsic properties.
A good example of how strong an effect a non-specific neuromodulatory signal
can have on behaviour comes from studies on the pair-bonding behaviour of prairie
voles. A study by Winslow et al. (1993) found that it is the action of vasopressin which
causes the selective aggression and pair-preference behaviour of male prarie voles.
Male prairie voles that were injected with a vasopressin antagonist 24 hours before
sexual experience failed to demonstrate a partner preference or selective aggression
towards other males 48 hours later. Males that were injected with CSF or an oxytocin
antagonist showed no change from the normal behaviour. This experiment demon-
strates quite clearly that such psychologically fundamental behaviour as mate choice
and social bonding can be easier to explain using neuromodulation than it would be
using patterns of action potentials.
1.6 Using neuromodulation to explain decision making
As we can see, there is considerable evidence to suggest that neuromodulation might
be a reasonable framework for trying to explain the physiological basis of behaviour.
However, one of the major advantages of basing models upon neural action potentials
is that it is quite clear how they can be quantified and used to build computational
models. How can we describe the effects of neuromodulation in a quantitative way?
One option might be to use reinforcement learning.
As I mentioned in section 1.4, recent work by Montague et al. (1996) has shown
that dopamine neurons fire in ways that correlate with reinforcement learning theory
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- an abstract framework developed by engineers and mathematicians to describe the
optimal way to make decisions. In particular dopamine neurons correlate very well
with the reward prediction error signal proposed by the Temporal Differences (TD)
algorithm — an implementation of reinforcement learning that uses the differences in
prediction at successive timesteps to drive the learning process. The observation that
dopamine neurons correlate with with the reward prediction error is quite an incredible
discovery — that neurons in the midbrain precisely mimic the predictions of abstract
model of decision making.
But this raises and obvious question — why does this happen? One answer to this
question, and an answer that has generated much research interest is that the dopamine
neurons are firing in accord with the temporal differences algorithm, because they are
implementing the temporal differences algorithm1.
This claim, apart from its boldness, points a way towards how we might develop
quantitative models of neuromodulation: By attempting to find neural correlates of the
variables in the TD algorithm we can assess whether or not the brain really does use
dopamine to implement reinforcement learning.
Suppose for a minute that this dopaminergic reinforcement learning hypothesis is
true, how do we accommodate the fact that many other neuromodulators also seem
to affect decision making (Robbins, 2005)? How do we make sense of the fact that
dopamine neurons themselves are modulated (Korotkova et al., 2003) — what do these
meta-modulators represent in the Temporal Differences (TD) model?
One author has gone so far as to suggest that the major neuromodulators which
innervate the cortex act as the different parameters of the TD algorithm (Doya, 2002).
In Doya’s model he suggests that dopamine signals reward prediction error, serotonin
controls the timescale of reward prediction, noradrenaline the randomness in action
selection, and acetylcholine the speed of memory update.
The initial paper linking dopamine and the TD algorithm has had a significant
impact in the field, and since that time many others have built upon this model by
analysing the dynamics of a particular neuromodulator, and proposing a role for it
1The reader may have noticed that I described this implementation of reinforcement learning as the
temporal differences algorithm — the use of “algorithm” suggesting that it is a computational process.
It is true that that reinforcement learning is compatible with the computational metaphor and therefore
is not necessarily a replacement for it. In fact many of its proponents do describe it in terms of com-
putation. However, reinforcement learning need not be described in terms of computation, and it is for
this reason that I consider it a potential alternative model. Reinforcement learning can potentially be
interpreted using the metaphor of feedback described by cybernetics (Rosenblueth et al., 1943). Or it
could also be described in the language of autopoesis, as a system that creates its own environment in
which it is optimal (Varela et al., 1974).
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as a signal in a reinforcement learning circuit. These suggestions have ranged from
acetylcholine signalling expected uncertainty (Yu and Dayan, 2005), noradrenaline sig-
nalling unexpected uncertainty (Yu and Dayan, 2005), serotonin mediating behavioural
inhibition (Dayan and Huys, 2008), noradrenaline mediating the exploitation:exploration
trade-off (Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005), and dopamine signalling unpredicted sen-
sory events for which the organism is responsible (Redgrave et al., 2008).
This process is intriguing as theorists step in to fill in the gaps of a newly devel-
oping model. There is a clear similarity between this nascent model of behaviour and
drive theory in psychology (Hull, 1943) - rather than explaining behaviour in terms of
computation, neuroscientists are beginning to explain behaviour in terms of desire.
Together these developments indicate that a framework is shaping up to explain
behaviour (albeit decision making behaviour in this case), in terms of the action of
neuromodulators rather than patterns of action potentials. However, this is a relatively
new proposal, and it is unclear whether or not the model is supported by empirical
data.
At present we know that the firing pattern of dopamine neurons closely matches
the reward prediction error signal of the temporal differences algorithm when tested in
laboratory conditions, but how and why is dopamine released in this way? We believe
that this reinforcement learning model may map onto the actions of neuromodulators,
but at present we have no mechanistic model of how they might achieve this.
My aim in this thesis will be to explore the developing mechanistic models that at-
tempt to put flesh on the bones of this theory. Does what we know about the physiology
match up with how reinforcement learning models work?
In this thesis I will try to bridge the divide between belief in the theoretical model
and the evidence provided by the biological data. I will do this by constructing models
that allow us to compare how we think neuromodulation works, with what we find
when we do experiments. If I formalise these conceptual frameworks as computa-
tional models, will the models produce data that is consistent or inconsistent with the
hypothesis? Can I use computational models to support or refute this hypothesis?
1.7 The questions in this thesis
To summarise, in this thesis I will attempt to address 3 parallel questions:
1. Does dopamine release form part of a reinforcement learning circuit in the brain?
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2. Does the dopaminergic reinforcement learning model indicate that we can ex-
plain the relationship and behaviour better by looking at the brain from the per-
spective of drives and neuromodulation, rather than computation at the level of
single neurons?
3. Can we settle these empirical questions using computational models?
In each chapter I will formulate ways in which these high level questions can be
addressed using computational models (See sections 2.6, 4.2.3).
The reasons for asking the first two questions have already been covered in this
chapter, but I have added the last question because I believe that justifying my method-
ology is an important part of the thesis. I am sceptical about what computational
modelling can achieve, and this view is shared by many experimental neuroscientists.
Do these models tell us anything new, or are they just formalised thought experiments?
My hope is to justify (at least for myself), that these models can play a part in neuro-
science.
During the course of this thesis I will also describe the theoretical and practical
problems I encounter with the models I construct. Hopefully by the end of the thesis
I will have done enough to justify that my means of addressing this hypothesis, and
therefore that my conclusions regarding the first two questions, will be valid.
1.8 Thesis plan
Chapter 2 contains a literature review of the empirical evidence for the involvement
of dopamine in a reinforcement learning circuit. There is also some background on
reinforcement learning to provide some of the terminology that is used in later chapters.
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 make up the computational modelling work done during the
course of the thesis.
Chapter 3 covers work done to reimplement and analyse a model of dopamine-
modulated classical conditioning. In analysing the model it was found that some of its
behaviour was incompatible with it being a true model of classical conditioning. From
the analysis it is concluded that problems encountered in the model were a result of it
being constructed from theoretical models rather than empirical.
As a consequence, the aim of Chapter 4 is to develop an empirically derived model.
This model aims to investigate some of the assumptions of the model in Chapter 3
by constructing a data-driven model of dopamine modulation of synaptic plasticity.
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However, in the process it is found that even with this empirically based model it is
difficult to incorporate all the relevant observations. The model produces results which
suggest that the synaptic effects of dopamine are more significant than the effect of
dopamine on excitability.
Following Chapters 3 and 4 it is decided to make a third model which aims to be a
clear conceptual model, rather than one which is verifiable by the empirical data. This
model is described in Chapter 5 and is found to be able to successfully implement a
reinforcement circuit, and backpropagate reward prediction error.
Chapter 6 contains a discussion of the findings from the computational modelling
work. The findings from the models were inconclusive, and so I examine the remaining
motives for accepting the dopaminergic reinforcement learning hypothesis. To put the
results in a greater context I include some data which does fit well with the hypothesis.
In Chapter 7 I review the transmitter systems that modulate dopamine release and
use them as a basis for exploring the context of dopamine modulation and reward-
driven behaviour. I look at the function of dopamine from the context of stress and
immune responses, and suggest alternative ways of interpreting the function of the
dopamine system.
Chapter 8 contains the conclusions of the thesis.
Chapter 2
Dopamine and Reinforcement
Learning: A literature review
2.1 Novel contributions
This chapter reviews the literature on computational models of dopamine modulated
reinforcement learning. It also integrates the existing empirical data on the biophysical
effects of dopamine modulation from the anatomy and firing dynamics of dopamine
neurons, through to the diffusion and binding of dopamine, and the eventual intracel-
lular and electrophysiological effects of dopamine.
2.2 Introduction
This chapter begins with a brief historical account of how the neurotransmitter dopamine
came to be linked with reinforcement learning. After this historical account I will
review the literature that could be used to construct a computational model of how
dopamine might implement reinforcement learning.
2.3 The dopaminergic reinforcement learning hypothe-
sis
The neurotransmitter dopamine was first identified as a transmitter in its own right
by Arvid Carlsson and co-workers in 1957 (for a review see (Björklund and Dunnett,
2007b)). It was identified as a new neurotransmitter when Carlsson and his group
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found that dopamine was not merely a chemical precursor in the synthesis of nora-
drenaline, but was being produced and released by other neurons independently of
noradrenaline. They were also able to show that the pharmacological agent reserpine
worked in part by blocking dopamine receptors — they did this by demonstrating that
reserpine-induced cataplexy (a loss of muscle tone) could be recovered from by restor-
ing dopamine and not noradrenaline levels (Björklund and Dunnett, 2007b).
The similarity between reserpine-induced cataplexy and Parkinsonian akinesia, and
the fact that both could be reversed by an injection of dopamine precursor L-DOPA, led
some researchers to speculate that the new neurotransmitter dopamine was involved in
the initiation of movement and motor control. Later studies supported this view as it
became clear that dopaminergic cell death was a major factor in the development of
symptoms in Parkinson’s disease.
In the 1970s Wolfram Schultz set out to investigate why dopaminergic cell death
resulted in Parkinson’s disease. Schultz recorded from dopamine neurons in the brains
of monkeys, hoping to find cells involved in the production of movement, but he was
unable to find what he was looking for (Lehrer, 2008).
Initially he considered these experiments a failure, and it was only after years of re-
search that Schultz began to notice strange patterns in the way these dopamine neurons
fired. Rather than firing when the monkey began to initiate a movement, the neurons
seemed to fire just before the monkey was given a reward. At first these rewards had
just been used to encourage the monkey to move, but as it became clear that this was
what the neurons were responding to, he was able to set up more complex experiments
to tease apart how and why dopamine neurons were firing in this way.
Schultz found that the way these neurons fired changed over time as the animal
learned to complete the task for which it was rewarded. The way in which these neu-
rons fired was quite complex, and although Schultz realised he was unravelling the
brains reward circuitry, he did not know how and why the neurons fired in the pat-
terns they did. Schultz published his findings in late 80s and early 90s (Schultz, 1986;
Schultz et al., 1993), but at that time it was still not known why neurons in the mid-
brain appeared to represent such an abstract concept as reward. Some examples of how
dopamine neurons respond when presented with cues and rewards are shown in Figure
2.1.
It was 1991 before theorists working on the Temporal Differences (TD) formalism
of reinforcement learning came across Schultz’s results and were finally able to explain
the patterns he had observed. Reinforcement learning theory was developed by math-
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Figure 2.1: Spike raster plots of the effect of a reward (R) on the firing of dopamine
neurons across multiple trials. In the top plot, when an unexpected reward is presented,
dopamine neurons fire phasically 100ms after the reward delivery. In the middle plot,
when a cue (CS) that is known to predict a reward is presented, this triggers phasic
firing of the dopamine neurons shortly after the cue presentation. If a cue is presented
but no reward arrives the tonic firing of dopamine neurons is inhibited at the time the
reward was expected to arrive. Figure taken from (Schultz, 1998)
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ematicians, computer scientists, and engineers in response to the question — “What
is the optimal way for an agent to learn from interactions with its environment?” The
TD algorithm, which grew out of reinforcement learning, proposed that the optimal
learning signal would be one which signalled the error in the reward prediction. The
algorithm is described in more detail in section 2.4.1.
The theorists who made the connection between the firing of dopamine neurons
and the temporal differences algorithm published their model in 1996 (Montague et al.,
1996), and since then more data has been collected to support this basic observation
(Schultz, 2007, 2002).
But what is the significance of this apparent correlation between an abstract model
of learning and the firing patterns of dopamine neurons? How can neurons in the mid-
brain signal something as abstract as reward prediction error? In the last chapter we
looked at some of the many claims that have been made about neuromodulators that
play some role in TD (Doya, 2002), (Yu and Dayan, 2005), (Dayan and Huys, 2008),
(Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005), but none of these models explain how neuromodula-
tors achieve their purported function.
If dopamine does signal reward prediction error, where does it send this signal to?
And how does the recipient receive and act upon that signal? To answer this question
we need a mechanism.
The aim of this chapter will be to review the literature that could be used to build a
mechanistic model of how dopamine contributes to a reinforcement learning circuit in
the brain.
2.4 Reinforcement learning theory
2.4.1 The Temporal Differences algorithm
Before I begin to review the literature on dopamine modulation, I want to briefly out-
line the key features of the Temporal Differences (TD) algorithm, which dopamine
release is supposed to mimic. The temporal differences algorithm is an approach to
learning from reinforcement which uses the differences in prediction at successive
timesteps to drive the learning process. The algorithm can be described using the
following equation:
δ(t) = r(t)+ γV (t +1)−V (t) (2.1)
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Figure 2.2: A simple idealised schematic of the backpropagation process. In the first
trial, the peak in δ(t) or the RPE (Reward Prediction Error) occurs at the time the
reward is presented. With repeated trials the animal’s certainty about the reward arrival
propagates backward through the delay period (ie. to the left). When the task has been
learned the peak in reward prediction error will occur with the presentation of the first
cue, which signals without warning that a reward is coming.
Where δ(t) is the reward prediction error. r(t) is the actual reward at time t, γV (t +
1) is the reward predicted at the next timestep, and V (t) is the reward expected at this
timestep. In the temporal differences formalism the value of δ(t) is used to update the
internal model, and so it is error in the prediction of reward that drives learning. It is
this δ variable that dopamine neurons are thought to mimic. If a reward arrives that is
not predicted or expected δ will be high, triggering updates in the model.
This can be seen as a restatement of the Rescorla-Wagner learning rule (Rescorla
and Wagner, 1972).
If we implement this model in a predictable environment, then δ will equal zero
at each timestep as the prediction is cancelled out by an expectation. But if a reward
introduced to the environment, an unpredicted delivery of the reward will result in a
transient increase in δ. It is dopamine, or δ that triggers updates in the internal model
(ie. learning), and so if a reward is repeatedly presented it could lead to the model
predicting the reward based upon any cues that reliably precede it.
As the ability of the model to predict the reward gradually increases, so does an
expectation that the reward will arrive. This means that the peak in δ will gradually
move backwards in time to the time of the first predictive cue.
This process of the peak δ(t) moving backward from the time of reward to the time
of the first predictive cue is referred to as backpropagation of reward prediction error,
and is illustrated in Figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.3: A figure taken from (Komura et al., 2001), showing how the ramping activity
of neurons in the delay period can quickly adjust itself to reflect the expected time of
delivery of the reward. These results indicate that the activity we see in the delay period
is shaped by reward delivery, implying that some backpropagation of reward through the
delay period must occur.
2.4.2 Backpropagation of reward prediction error
Like the TD variable δ(t), dopamine neurons also appear to exhibit backpropagation,
and like δ(t) it is thought that dopamine has effects upon learning that cause the update
of the brain’s reward model. This process of backpropagation is significant because it
can potentially explain patterns of neural activity that are learned during the delay
period. It has been observed in many experiments that neurons do not only signal
information during the presentation of the stimuli, but they also appear to maintain
persistent or patterned activity during the delay period (Shuler and Bear, 2006). One
example of this is the ramping activity that adjusts itself to peak at the time of the
reward delivery (Komura et al., 2001).
Usually this phenomenon is treated separately, but these patterns of activity can be
easily explained if we assume that once a task has been learned, the neural activity
during the delay between cue and reward is just a consolidation of the activity which
was required during training to get the reward. If particular pattern of (motor) neuron
firing repeatedly occurred during the delay period of rewarded trials then it will come
to be the behavioural response. Often this will take the form of persistent cue-related
activity during the delay period ie. working memory (Fuster and Alexander, 1971).
Working memory is not often linked with reinforcement learning, but a key claim
I would like to explore in this thesis, is that algorithms like TD, may show how work-
ing memory may emerge from a reinforcement learning circuit. If true this would
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be a powerful result, as it demonstrates how both optimal motor control and flexible,
reward related working memory may emerge from a single theory. The obvious parsi-
mony of backpropagation suggests that any model of reinforcement learning ought to
implement it.
2.5 Existing biologically inspired models of reinforce-
ment learning
The first work that proposed a link between abstract models in machine learning and
the dopamine system was Houk et al. (1994), which suggested that dopamine mod-
ulated “striosomes” in the striatum formed part of a circuit that implemented TD-
like behaviour. In their model they mapped the actor-critic architecture from ma-
chine learning onto the basal ganglia, suggesting that the striatum performed as the
actor, and dopamine neurons, the critic. A later model by Suri and Schultz (1998)
also implemented this actor-critic architecture in the basal ganglia. A later paper has
more explicit predictions of the biological correlates (Suri, 2002), suggesting that re-
ward prediction occurs through corticostriatal transmission, in line with evidence from
Hollerman et al. (1998), who found reward expectation activity in the striatum.
Another biologically inspired models of reinforcement learning was proposed by
Contreras-Vidal and Schultz (1999) who based their model on Adaptive Resonance
Theory (ART), and claim to offer a fuller account than TD-like models. Berns and
Sejnowski (1998) offer a systems-level model of how the basal ganglia might imple-
ment an action selection circuit, and more recently Izhikevich (2007) claims to solve
the distal reward problem by a dopamine modulated spike-timing dependent plasticity
model.
2.6 Mechanisms underlying dopamine modulated rein-
forcement learning
Often when we build models of behaviour in neuroscience we start by examining the
dynamics of neurons. This is partly for historical reasons, as proposed in the introduc-
tion to this thesis, but also because crudely speaking, it is the firing of motor neurons
that determines whether or not an action will occur. If motor control is learned through
a process of reinforcement learning, then a mechanistic model of reinforcement learn-
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ing must at some point explain how dopamine affects (directly or indirectly) the neu-
rons that project to the muscles. There are of course many other processes that play an
important role in modulating motor control, but we are not focussing upon these here.
Alongside the need to characterise the effect of dopamine upon motor projecting
neurons, I also need to look at the effect of dopamine upon the systems that feed-
back to dopamine neurons, and are therefore capable of promoting or inhibiting future
dopamine release. Looking at how dopamine affects neuronal feedback to dopamine
neurons themselves is important because this effectively closes the circuit — if dopamine
really does signal reward prediction error, then the effect of dopamine should be to en-
sure that dopamine neurons signal reward prediction error - ie. the system must be
self-sustaining.
In summary, my mechanistic model of the effects of dopamine will take into ac-
count:
1. The effects of dopamine upon motor control neurons
2. The effects of dopamine upon neurons that feed back to dopamine neurons
In order to build this mechanistic model I will review the literature of what is known
about each step in the process — from the release of dopamine to its eventual effect
upon motor and feedback neurons. When dopamine is released, it diffuses and is
subject to reuptake mechanisms, before binding to receptors, influencing intracellular
cascades, and then finally affecting the electrophysiology of target neurons.
In this literature review I will focus in particular upon two regions innervated by
dopamine — the prefrontal cortex, and the striatum. Both of these areas are inner-
vated by dopamine axons, and contain the neccessary receptors and transporters for
dopamine to have a significant effect upon neurons in these regions. I will focus upon
the striatum because it contains the richest innervation of dopamine in the brain, is
rich in receptors, and most importantly projects back to dopamine neurons themselves.
The inhibitory projections that come from medium spiny neurons (MSNs) in the stria-
tum are uniquely placed to influence the firing of dopamine neurons through inhibition
and disinhibition. In addition I will also focus on the cortex because, although it has
a lesser innervation of dopamine in the striatum, it is known to be involved in motor
control, planning, and working memory. In this sense, the cortex may be a key region
in generating the behaviour that is to be learned. Neurons in the cortex also send in-
hibitory and excitatory projections back to the dopaminergic nuclei. Between these
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two regions, we potentially have the mechanisms we need to develop a model of how
a reinforcement learning circuit may be implemented in the brain.
It is important to note that by focussing upon the effect of dopamine on neurons
we may overlook other important non-neural mechanisms - if dopamine has an effect
on astrocytes which feedback to the dopamine neurons then this would not appear in
a model constructed from the current literature. This may sound a trivial point, but it
has recently been demonstrated that the effect of noradrenaline in the cortex is in part
derived from its direct effect upon calcium dynamics in astrocytes (Bekar et al., 2008).
It is possible that similar effects may also occur with dopamine. In summary, there are
enough unknowns about the effects of dopamine release that we should avoid making
models that are too dependent upon on only what is known in the present literature.
As a theoretical neuroscientist, by necessity I must make use of data that has al-
ready been collected. In the case of dopamine, the bulk of data that exists has been
collected to quantify the effects of dopamine release upon neurons.
In the next section I will review the literature and outline what is known about the
way in which the proposed reinforcement learning circuit works. The circuit can be
broken down into parts
1. The anatomy of dopamine neurons
2. The dynamics of dopamine release
3. Dopamine diffusion and re-uptake dynamics
4. Dopamine receptor binding dynamics
5. Intracellular cascades
6. Electrophysiological effects on neurons
2.7 Literature review
2.7.1 Dopamine anatomy
There are nine major dopaminergic cell types in the mammalian brain, distributed from
the mesencephalon to the olfactory bulb. The principle projection neurons of this group
are the retrorubral area (A8), the substantia nigra (A9), and the ventral tegmental area
(A10), which project to cortical, limbic, and striatal areas. An illustration of the main
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Figure 2.4: An illustration of the location and projections of dopaminergic nuclei in the
adult rat brain (Björklund and Dunnett, 2007a).
dopaminergic projections is shown in Figure 2.4. The system is considerably larger
in size and complexity as we move from rodents (20-30,000 in mice and 40-50,000 in
rats), to primates (160-320,000 in monkeys and 400-600,000 in humans) (Björklund
and Dunnett, 2007a).
Although the ventral tegmental area and substantia nigra pars compacta are often
described as anatomically distinct and projecting to separate areas, there is a large
degree of intermixing, with both the striatum and cortex receiving innervation from
the A9 and A10 (Björklund and Dunnett, 2007a). Dopaminergic axons innervate the
structures of the basal ganglia, with the striatum receiving by far the densest dopamin-
ergic input. Whilst in the cortex, dopamine axons innervate motor cortical, prefrontal,
and anterior cingulate areas, with lesser projections to the primary sensory cortices
(Seamans, 2007).
Dopamine neurons in the A9 and A10 regions are often described as showing tonic
and phasic modes. During normal waking behaviour in the absence of rewarding or
salient stimuli, dopamine neurons exhibit tonic pacemaking activity, with neurons spik-
ing asynchronously at around 5Hz (Arbuthnott and Wickens, 2007). When rewarding,
unexpected, or salient stimuli are present, dopamine neurons are capable of phasically
spiking en masse, with neurons firing at around 80Hz for 40ms (Arbuthnott and Wick-
ens, 2007). Phasic bursts, which are thought to signal a reward prediction error, can
be triggered by glutamatergic afferents from the cortex (Gariano and Groves, 1988), or
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by subcortical inputs such as the subthalamic nucleus (White, 1996). Input from the
lateral dorsal tegmentum and pendunculo-pontine tegmentum are particularly efficient
at triggering phasic bursts, and do so by releasing a combination of acetylcholine and
glutamate (Grace et al., 2007; Floresco et al., 2003).
Around 70% of the synaptic input to the substantia nigra is inhibitory, and this input
is capable of suppressing phasic bursts. This input comes from many sources, chief
among them the striatum and the substantia nigra pars reticulata (Diana and Tepper,
2002), (Celada et al., 1999).
It should be noted that the substantia nigra and ventral tegmental areas receive input
and project to a huge number of areas, and so the picture we have presented here is a
deliberately simplified one. Diana and Tepper (2002), and White (1996) describe how
serotonergic input from the dorsal raphe and noradrenaline from the locus coeruleus
can impact dopaminergic cell firing. An exhaustive list of regions with input to the
ventral tegmental area can be seen in Figure 2.5.
Alongside the ability of GABAergic input to silence phasic spikes, dopamine-
dependent autoinhibition can also act to decrease firing. As dopamine neurons fire
they release small amounts of the transmitter from their dendrites, which can bind to
D2 autoreceptors, and cause a decrease in the spike rate (Diana and Tepper, 2002).
Although dopamine neurons are so named because of their ability to synthesise
and release dopamine, it has recently been suggested that they also co-release sev-
eral neurotransmitters. Indeed dopamine neurons in the arcuate nucleus (A12) have
been shown to colocalise various neuropeptides, such as GHRH, neurotensin, galanin,
enkephalin, and dynorphin (Björklund and Dunnett, 2007a). There is also evidence
that A9 and A10 projection neurons also co-release CCK, neurotensin, cannabinoids,
serotonin, and glutamate in addition to dopamine (Seutin, 2005). The glutamate re-
lease from dopamine neurons is significant because it could explain some of the short-
latency effects of dopamine neuron firing, which are too fast to occur through dopamin-
ergic pathways (Lapish et al., 2007). In fact it may turn out that some of the most im-
portant properties of dopamine neurons needed for reinforcement learning are provided
by their release of transmitters other than dopamine.
Questions about neurotransmitter release aside, the key property of dopamine neu-
rons for our purposes is that they appear to fire in ways which mimic the reward pre-
diction error signal in reinforcement learning. The particular combination of afferents
shown in Figure 2.5 is somehow enough to cause the neurons to spike in a way which
obeys a huge range of well known observations in classical conditioning (Schultz,
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Figure 2.5: Regions of the brain providing input to the VTA, as determined by injection
of the retrograde tracer Fluro-Gold. This list should give some idea of the sheer diversity
of inputs to the dopaminergic nuclei. Table taken from (Geisler and Zahm, 2005).
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2007).
But once these neurons fire, how does this signal translate into a) the correct be-
haviour b) future learning by reinforcement?
2.7.2 Dopamine release dynamics
The first level of complexity in the dopamine reward prediction error signal comes
about because the release of dopamine is not completely predictable — the amount of
neurotransmitter released is dependent upon many factors including the presence of
neurotrophic factors and dopamine precursors (Pothos et al., 1998). A phasic burst of
dopamine neurons does not lead to the homogeneous increase in dopamine concentra-
tion as one might naively expect.
In the striatum it is estimated that only 7% of corticostriatal synapses receive
dopaminergic terminals (Arbuthnott and Wickens, 2007), the remainder are dependent
upon spillover and diffusion for dopamine modulation. Although we usually assume
that dopamine release is global, it is possible that there may be some topographic seg-
regation in the dopamine nuclei. If this is the case it could lead to regionally specific
dopamine release and learning. This is an issue which has not been explored in de-
tail for dopamine, but there is evidence for functional segregation in the serotonergic
nuclei (Jacobs and Fornal, 1995).
At this stage, after one phasic burst approximately 10,000 vesicles have been re-
leased at each axon terminal (Cragg and Rice, 2004). How this goes on to affect target
neurons will now be dependent upon diffusion and re-uptake.
2.7.3 Diffusion and re-uptake
When dopamine is released it must diffuse through the extracellular space to reach
its target. Because neurons and glia are tightly packed, the space is highly tortuous,
so transmitters diffuse more slowly than they would in free space (Cragg and Rice,
2004). It has been proposed by Cragg and Rice (2004) that dopamine diffusion can be










Where C(r, t) is the extra cellular dopamine concentration as a function of distance
r, and time t after release. Release is assumed to be instantaneous from a vesicle
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with a fill concentration of C f . Diffusion of dopamine molecules is governed by the
local extracellular volume fraction α, and the tortuosity of the extracellular media λ.
Tortuosity decreases the diffusion coefficient to D∗ (D∗ = Dλ2). The re-uptake of
dopamine via DATs and oxidisation via MAOs is incorporated by the uptake constant
k′.
While diffusion is taking place to extend the reach of dopamine modulation, there
are two processes which will decrease the concentration of dopamine - reuptake to
dopamine axons via dopamine transporters (DATs), and breakdown of the neurotrans-
mitter by monoamine-oxidase (MAO). DATs are richly concentrated in the striatum,
with lesser numbers in the cortex (Sesack et al., 1998; Lewis et al., 2001). MAO are
also found in large numbers in the basal ganglia and hypothalamus, with smaller con-
centration in the cortex (O’Carroll et al., 1983).
These two processes of diffusion and reuptake/breakdown compete to give the
overall concentration of dopamine. In general it has been proposed that DATs limit
the temporal, but not spatial extent of dopamine following a phasic burst (Cragg and
Rice, 2004). The precise dynamics of this is quite complex, so to understand it in
more detail, computational models have been constructed of the process. Prior to be-
ginning the computational modelling described later in this thesis I conducted prelim-
inary work to verify the results reported by Cragg and Rice (2004). I constructed a
model of diffusion and re-uptake in the striatum to quantify how transient and local
dopamine concentration peaks are relative to the background dopamine concentration
that results from the pacemaker activity of dopamine neurons. The aim of this was to
provide some quantitative figures of how dopamine concentration might look in vivo
given a particular spike train. This data could then be combined with in vitro electro-
physiological data to reconstruct the effects of a particular dopaminergic spike train
upon downstream neurons.
The model I constructed consisted of a 3D section of simulated tissue, complete
with dopamine terminals distributed throughout the space according to the empirical
values quoted by Cragg and Rice (2004). An example of the dopamine terminal dis-
tribution can be seen in Figure 2.6. These dopamine terminals released dopamine in
accordance with the known spiking dynamics. Within the 3D section I calculated the
resulting dopamine concentration in a 2D plane. The simulation consisted of 100ms
tonic pacemaking activity, followed by a simulated reward (40ms spiking at 80Hz),
and then a return to pacemaking activity. The mean concentration in the 2D plane dur-
ing the simulation is shown in Figure 2.7, and the concentrations in the plane during
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tonic and phasic firing are shown in Figure 2.8 and 2.9. The equations and parameters
used in the simulations are included in Appendix D.
In agreement with the original study I found that when modelled in 3D, phasic
dopamine release results in global, transient (70ms) increase in dopamine concentra-
tion to around 7µM. This rise in concentration takes around 20ms, and decays to base-
line in 30ms following the offset of the phasic firing. This compares with a relatively
constant background concentration of around 0.3uM.
The conclusion of these models is that during a phasic burst the whole of the stria-
tum is awash with a high level of dopamine irrespective of a synapse’s distance from
the dopamine axon terminals. For an illustration of this see the average dopamine con-
centration in Figures 2.8 and 2.9 — the few peaks that occur are very short lived. In
summary, the peak in dopamine concentration is diffuse in space, but selective in time.
There are many components in this model which are simplified or missing (for exam-
ple the transmitter pool dynamics), but this simple model does give us a preliminary
idea of what might be going on. Also it is not clear how these results will compare to
the prefrontal cortex where DATs and MAOs are distributed more sparsely.
However, using this model we are able to gain an foothold into how dopamine neu-
ron firing translates into global dopamine concentration. But before we can understand
how this translates into the modulation of neurons we must investigate the dynamics
of dopamine binding.
2.7.4 Binding dynamics
For dopamine release to have an effect upon neurons it must first bind to receptors
embedded in the neuron’s membrane. There are 5 distinct receptors that have been
identified for dopamine, all of which fall into two groups D1 type, or D2 type (Seeman
and Vantol, 1994). The D1 and D2 receptors are the most numerous (hence the names
of the groups), and the receptors are present in all regions of the brain where dopamine
is released. Dopamine receptors are metabotropic rather than ionotropic, so the effects
of binding occur upon the timescales of the intracellular cascades involved (hundreds
of ms), rather than the very fast effects that can occur via ionotropic receptors (ms).
The distribution of receptors varies from area to area, with some area such as the
striatum showing particularly high concentrations, see Figure 2.10.
As can be seen in Figure 2.10, the relative ratio of D1 and D2 type receptors varies
in different regions, and it is thought that the differing ratio of receptors will have func-
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Figure 2.10: D1 and D2 receptor mRNA expression levels in the human brain deter-
mined using sense (A) and antisense (B) riboprobes. Taken from (Hurd et al., 2001).
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tional consequences (Wang et al., 2004; Mehta et al., 2004). The precise cellular loca-
tion of the receptors in relation to synapses is not known, but it is thought that they are
situated both synaptically (Paspalas and Goldman-Rakic, 2005) and extrasynaptically
(Smiley et al., 1994). There is some debate as to whether D1 and D2 type receptors
are colocalised upon the same neurons. The evidence so far suggests that somewhere
between 20-50% of medium spiny neurons in the striatum colocalise D1 and D2 re-
ceptors (Surmeier et al., 1996; Tepper and Plenz, 2006). The rest of the medium spiny
neurons appear to act as indepedent pathways, with D1 expressing MSNs projecting to
the internal pallidum and substantia nigra pars reticula, whilst D2 expressing neurons
project to the external pallidum (Tepper and Plenz, 2006). The low rate of colocalisa-
tion may go some way to explaining the heterogeneous response that is observed with
in vitro preparations of cortical neurons under dopamine modulation. An example of
this can be seen in the in vitro results shown in Figure 4.8 in chapter 4.
Even after the complexities of diffusion and receptor distributions, another layer
of complexity is introduced by the varying binding affinities of the different receptor
types. D2 receptors have a stronger affinity for dopamine than D1 receptors (Richfield
et al., 1989), and so it is likely that these receptors will bind at differing rates during
the tonic pacemaking and phasic firing of dopamine neurons. It has been suggested
that dopamine that escapes the synaptic cleft will exert its effect mostly though high-
affinity D2 receptors (Schultz, 1998) - these kind of assumptions are ripe for testing
with a computational model.
In addition to binding dynamics there are also unbinding dynamics. A bound re-
ceptor cannot be stimulated, and even after it is unbound, the G-coupled protein must
be reset if the neuron is to become sensitive to dopamine again. Therefore, if dopamine
release occurs when the receptors are already bound, we would not expect there to be
any change to the behaviour.
2.7.5 Intracellular cascades
Once dopamine has bound to a receptor, the G-coupled protein becomes uncoupled,
triggering a cascade of intracellular reactions that may result in changes to the in-
trinsic excitability of the neuron, the synaptic dynamics, or somatic gene expression.
This happens at different rates for each receptor, and as we pass further along the cas-
cade it becomes increasing difficult to tease apart the specific effect of each individual
dopamine receptor.
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D1 type receptors act by stimulating adenyl cyclase and increasing cAMP. D2 re-
ceptors on the other hand inhibit adenyl cyclase and cAMP (Tepper and Plenz, 2006).
The concentration of cAMP in turn regulates the activity of receptors, ion channels,
and transcription factors inside the cell. D1 receptor activation is also capable of mo-
bilising intracellular calcium stores (Neve et al., 2004).
Dopamine also exerts its effect upon neurons via the DARPP-32 cascade, which
acts as a converging point for the action of many neuromodulators - dopamine, adeno-
sine, serotonin, GABA, opiates, glutamate, and NO (Svenningsson et al., 2004; Green-
gard et al., 1999). DARPP-32 is found in all regions with dopamine innervation. The
highest concentrations are found in the striatum and substantia nigra pars reticulata,
whilst moderate levels are found in the hypothalamus and cortex (Svenningsson et al.,
2004). The effects of DARPP-32 are as diverse as its many phosphorylation states, and
can manifest themselves in changes to synaptic plasticity or intrinsic excitability of the
neuron.
Each of these cascades is highly interconnected, and can be affected by neuromod-
ulators or intracellular calcium dynamics, so we can see it is going to be very difficult
to construct a computational model that can incorporate the whole cascade. However,
this has not stopped some researchers trying (Lindskog et al., 2006; Fernandez et al.,
2006).
2.7.6 Electrophysiological effects
So far we have examined the chain of mechanisms between the phasic firing of dopamine
neurons, and the resulting effect upon the neurons involved in and feedback to dopamine
neurons. The level of complexity described so far should give the reader a taste for how
difficult it will be to describe this process in full with a mechanistic model based upon
empirical data.
So far, characterising the electrophysiological effect of dopamine has only been
possible in vitro, which makes it difficult to know what additional effect release, dif-
fusion, and binding may have upon the results. It is possible that in the near future
techniques like dopamine caging, optogenetics, or voltage sensitive dye-imaging, and
pharmacological MRI may be able to help us isolate the effect of dopamine at each
step of the process in vivo, but at present we do not have the data available to construct
such detailed models.
Typically in vitro experiments are done in a bath of constant dopamine concen-
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tration, and so will show quite different behaviour to the in vivo case, where release
dynamics, diffusion, and binding will all come into play. However, slice prepara-
tions do allow neuroscientists to isolate the particular ion channels that are affected by
dopamine modulation, and thereby reconstruct how the spiking behaviour of the neu-
ron is changed by dopamine. This means that for now, any computational model we
construct will be largely reliant upon in vitro data for its parameter values.
Much of the electrophysiological work to isolate dopamine’s effects has been done
in the prefrontal cortex (Seamans and Yang, 2004) or striatum (Gonon, 1997; Calabresi
et al., 2007). Here the effects diverge slightly as MSNs in the striatum are inhibitory,
whilst pyramidal cells in the cortex are excitatory.
So far in vivo experiments have found that the effects of dopamine are complex.
Dopamine has different effects at different timescales (Lavin et al., 2005), and its ef-
fects can be inhibitory or excitatory depending upon neuron type and concentration.
In the prefrontal cortex the initial effect of dopamine is to increase inhibition due to
its effect upon fast-spiking interneurons via D2 receptors (Tseng et al., 2006), but it
can also induce upstates and increase evoked spiking in pyramidal cells (Lavin et al.,
2005).
In vitro dopamine appears to have a biphasic effect, initially (10-15 minutes) re-
ducing evoked spiking by a D2-dependent mechanism. This is followed by a longer
increase in evoked spiking lasting 30 minutes or more, which appears to act via D1
receptors (Seamans and Durstewitz, 2008) It is worth noting that experiments done
in vitro to isolate the effects of different receptors or receptor types are done using
agonists rather than dopamine itself. These artificial agonists have slightly different
binding dynamics than dopamine (Seeman and Vantol, 1994), and this may have some
effect upon the results.
In slices the effect of dopamine on synaptic currents can also be investigated. It
has been found that dopamine dose-dependently increase NMDA currents via D1 re-
ceptors, whilst D2 receptor activation decreases NMDA currents. D1 receptor binding
can also decrease presynaptic release probabilities, although this effect may be region
specific (Seamans and Durstewitz, 2008).
2.8 Summary
Now we have traced the mechanisms that underlies dopamine modulation, we can now
see what is required to verify whether or not the biological data does support or refute
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the hypothesis that dopamine is part of a reinforcement learning circuit.
At present there is lots of detailed data about each step of the process, but because
of the difficulty of performing in vivo experiments, it has proven impossible to link
all this evidence together. My aim in this thesis is to use computational models to
combine the evidence where possible into a single model which can be used to test the
assumption that the physiology does support a reinforcement learning circuit.
As I have outlined in this brief literature review, there is a huge amount of com-
plexity involved in this process, and so in at least the first iteration we will need to start
with a simple model and hope to iteratively introduce more detail. There is a wealth
of electrophysiological data on the effect of dopamine in slices, so this may offer us
a starting point for an empirically based model. If our model is successful, than there
will be the potential to quantify the effects of release, diffusion, and binding in a later
model.
Chapter 3
A dopamine-modulated STDP model
of Reinforcement Learning
3.1 Novel contributions
This chapter cover the reimplementation and analysis of a model of dopamine mod-
ulated reinforcement learning. The model, which is widely cited in the literature is
found to solve the distal reward problem in a way that is incompatible with a true
model of classical conditioning. The consequences of this are explained in five sec-
tions. Potential solutions to these problems are proposed, and the chapter closes with
a examination of why these problems were encountered.
3.2 Introduction
My aim in this thesis is to use computational models to examine whether or not
dopamine modulation serves to implement a reinforcement learning circuit in the brain.
3.3 Literature review : Existing models of dopamine
modulated reinforcement learning
The literature review in chapter 2 discussed the process of dopamine modulation from
release to intracellular dynamics, and served to demonstrate that dopamine modulation
is highly complex. Rather than start by trying to accomodate all of this complexity im-
mediately, I intend to start with a simple model and work towards one with increasing
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biological realism.
There are several models in the literature which attempt to describe how dopamine
modulation might underlie reinforcement learning. The earliest from Houk et al.
(1994), which made the link between dopamine and actor-critic models of reinforce-
ment learning. This model proposed that eligibility traces such as CAMKII or DARPP-
32 in the striatum could bridge the temporal gap between cue and reward, and be rein-
forcement by the later effects of dopamine. A more formal model by Suri and Schultz
(1998) later showed how the actor-critic model could be implemented computationally.
Using an implementation of the TD-algorithm they were able to show how phasic firing
of dopamine following a reward prediction error might lead to backpropagation of the
prediction. An additional model by Contreras-Vidal and Schultz (1999), based upon
Adaptive resonance theory offers another route to demonstrating TD-like behaviour
based upon the dopamine system.
More recently, a model by Izhikevich (2007) claimed to solve the distal reward
problem by dopamine modulated spike-timing dependent plasticity. This model is
of particular interest because it proposes microscopic phenomena as the cause of a
systems-level behaviour, and claims to successfully implement reinforcement learn-
ing. Because I am interested in the mechanics of how dopamine modulation could
achieve TD-like behaviour I will begin by reimplementing this model with a view to
incorporate more biological realism. The aim will be to establish if there is a mecha-
nistic basis for the claim the dopamine is implementing reinforcement learning.
3.4 Dopamine modulation of spike-timing dependent plas-
ticity
The original paper by Izhikevich (2007) claims to solve the distal reward problem
through the effect of dopamine on spike-timing dependent plasticity. The paper sug-
gests that the ability of a hypothetical dopamine-modulated STDP mechanism to link
rewards to temporally distant cues is enough to allow it to solve a simple classical
conditioning task when appropriate anatomical assumptions are made. The model is
particularly interesting because it suggests that low-level synaptic mechanisms are the
cause of systems level phenomena like reinforcement learning.
If the model is successful then I can use it as a basis for examining the key features
of dopamine modulation that are needed to implement reinforcement learning - if I
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gradually add more detail regarding the biological effects of dopamine can I verify the
original model’s assumptions about what dopamine does?
In the interests of clarity I will describe the paper as two models - the first model,
which shows in a simple way how a dopamine modulated STDP mechanism can solve
the distal reward problem, and the second model, which aims to show how this mech-
anism can be implemented to solve a classical conditioning task.
3.5 Model 1
3.5.1 Neuron dynamics
The first model is simple and easy to understand, which may be the reason why the
paper has provoked so much interest. The neurons are point neurons with no morpho-
logical extent, and the membrane potential is modelled using a quadratic integrate and
fire equation
vt+1 = vt + vt(0.04vt +5)+140−ut + Iin j/C + Isyn/C (3.1)
ut+1 = ut +a(0.2vt−ut) (3.2)
vt+1 represents the membrane potential in millivolts at the next timestep given the
synaptic input Isyn, and an external current injection Iin j. Variables u and a are arbitrary
values designed to capture the slower membrane dynamics of the neuron. Two sets
of these variables are used to represent the two types of neurons being modelled —
regular spiking pyramidal cells, and fast spiking interneurons. The parameter values
for variables used in this model are included in Appendix A. Code for both the models
is included in Appendix B. Details of the neurons, the learning rule, and the results of
Izhikevich’s simulation are shown graphically in Figure 3.1.
After a spike, neurons are reset to v = −65 and u = u + z. While the membrane
potential of the neuron is measured in millivolts, many of the terms in this model were
chosen arbitrarily to reproduce the qualitative dynamics.
3.5.2 Network and connectivity
The network consists of 1000 neurons, each on average synapsing on 100 postsynaptic
neurons. The postsynaptic neurons are chosen at random. 80% of the neurons are
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excitatory, whilst the other 20% are inhibitory and have synapses that do not show any
synaptic plasticity. Each neuron receives a small amount of external stimulation such
that the average firing rate of each neuron is 1Hz.
3.5.3 Dopamine and reward
Of the approximately 100,000 synapses in the network, one synapse is chosen at ran-
dom to be the rewarded synapse. In model 1 an increase in dopamine concentration
occurs with a delay of 1-3 seconds any time the neuron postsynaptic to the chosen
synapse exhibits a spike within 10ms of the presynaptic neuron spiking.
This dopamine release can be thought of as a delayed reward of the pre-post spike.








All excitatory synapses are subject to an STDP rule such that a pre-before-postsynaptic
spike will result in an increase in the eligibility trace for that synapse, whilst post-
before-presynaptic spikes will cause a decrease.
The original author proposed that the eligibility trace is “an enzyme important for
plasticity”, and suggested CAMKII, PKC, or PKA as candidates.
Without any stimulation the eligibility trace for the ith neuron will slowly decay at






The shape of the STDP curve is shown in Figure 3.1b. The area under the long-
term depression (LTD) portion of the curve is 1.5 times the area under the long-term
potentiation (LTP) portion. This is to ensure that randomly firing synapses tend to see
more depression than potentiation, leaving them with lower synaptic weights.
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The implication of this learning rule is that if a reward regularly happens shortly
after a pre before post event (when the eligibility trace will be high), then the synapse
will be potentiated. If this pre before post event happens with a frequency of 50% or
less before a reward is delivered, then the synapse will tend to be depressed because
the LTD region is greater than the LTP region.
When a presynaptic spike occurs, the synaptic current is the synaptic weight mul-
tiplied by the capacitance, which is taken to be one — the values here are arbitrary.
Isyn = sC (3.6)
The synaptic weight is bounded between 0 and 4.
3.5.5 Results
The aim of the simulation in this example is to show that dopamine modulation of a
simple STDP rule can result in distal cues becoming linked to a reward.
The result reported in the paper is that synapse reaches the maximum allowable
value (within a 1 hour period in 42 out of 50 trials).
An example trial is shown in Figure 3.1d.
Figure 3.1d indicates that the model is capable of solving the distal reward prob-
lem, but how does it do this? Figure 3.1c shows how pre before postsynaptic activity
results in an eligibility trace which slowly decays. If a reward arrives and dopamine
concentration increases while the eligibility trace is greater than zero, then the weight
will increase, as can be seen in Figure 3.1c. If a pre before postsynaptic spike at a
particular synapse is repeatedly rewarded, then an accumulation of these events will
lead to the rewarded synapse becoming strong, thereby successfully linking a distant
cue with the reward delivery.
The chosen synapse is potentiated more than the others because synaptic change
only happens when dopamine is present, and dopamine is present every time there
is a pre before postsynaptic spike at the chosen synapse. Other synapses may also
demonstrate pre before postsynaptic spikes, but the chances of them doing this while
dopamine is present are smaller.
It is important to note that although the eligibility trace is maintained during the
delay period, the spikes themselves are not.
Let us assume that when a cue predicts a reward, a chunk of working memory
corresponding to that cue stays active during the delay period. This memory trace trig-
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Figure 3.1: The Figure, taken from the original paper shows the model in 4 parts. Part
(a) shows schematically that synaptic weights are determined by the interaction of pre
and postsynaptic neurons under the influence of a dopamine modulated eligibility trace.
Part (b) shows the form of STDP used by this model. LTD is 1.5 times stronger than
LTP to encourage random neurons to maintain small synaptic weights. Part (c) shows
how the relative timing of presynaptic and postsynaptic spikes interacts to produce the
eligibility trace (itself a product of the STDP rule). The increase in dopamine concentra-
tion after the reward allows the eligibility trace to have an effect on the synaptic weight.
Part (d) shows the results of a typical trial. After many rewarded spikes the chosen
synapses tends to increase its weight much higher than other synapses, indicating that
the credit assignment problem has been solved.
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gered by the cue represents the knowledge that because the cue occurred, a reward is
coming. If this is the case, then in this model the memories are stored in the eligibility
traces and dopamine concentrations, and not the spikes themselves. This is significant
because if we aim to explain patterns of delay period activity then we ought to choose
a model in which the cue trace is represented by activity rather than synaptic eligibility
traces.
Overall the model appears to solve the problem quite well, though it does require
a large number of rewards before the synapse is significantly stronger than the others.
However, this is just a single synapse, and learning at this synapse cannot be expected
to correspond to the learning of high level cues in a conditioning task.
Although this model does successfully link a distal cue and reward, it does not
implement backpropagation because the dopamine release does not occur earlier in the
trial with each progressive cue-reward pairing. Instead a second model, Model 2, is
implemented to show how backpropagation could occur, and how this could be used
to solve a classical conditioning task.
3.6 Model 2
The fourth model in the paper, which we will refer to as model 2, builds upon the
learning mechanisms described in section 3.5 to implement a model of classical con-
ditioning. In a classical conditioning task an arbitrary stimulus such as a bell is paired
with an intrinsically rewarding stimulus (such as food) following a short delay. After
multiple pairings of the two stimuli, the animal begins to demonstrate a reward re-
sponse after the presentation of the arbitrary stimulus alone. The classical example of
this is Pavlov’s dog — when Pavlov rung a bell on repeated occasions a few seconds
before feeding a dog, the dog learned to salivate at the sound of the bell alone. In this
case the bell constitutes the conditioned stimulus (CS), and the food the unconditioned
stimulus (US).
In Izhikevich’s model the author attempts to show how the repeated pairing of a
CS and a US can lead to a reward response following a presentation of the CS only.
In order to make the analogy between Pavlov’s dog and this model clear, we should
interpret the firing of VTAp neurons in the model as a correlate of a behavioural reward
response, as shown in Pavlov’s experiment by the salivation. Comparisons between
this model and Pavlov’s famous experiment are shown in Table 3.1.
Model 2 functions in the same way as model 1, only in this case some of the 1000
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Pavlov’s dog Model 2
food represented by US neuron firing
bell represented by CS neuron firing
salivation triggered by VTAp neuron firing
Table 3.1: An analogy between Model 2 and Pavlov’s original conditioning experiments
neurons are separated into groups and labelled as anatomical entities. These anatomical
groups are stimulated as a whole when their corresponding stimuli are presented in the
task. Stimuli consist of a 20mV injection to each neuron in the chosen group. The
anatomical groups in the model are
• The VTAp which represents a cortical area with projections to the VTA. The
firing rate of the VTA is assumed to be proportional to the activity of VTAp
neurons. Each time a VTAp neuron fires, the dopamine concentration increases
by 0.005microM.
• The US which represents the unconditioned, intrinsically rewarding stimulus.
• CS1 and CS2 which represent two different conditioned stimuli
These different anatomical groups are shown in Figure 3.2a. Each anatomical
group consists of 100 neurons chosen at random. The US to VTAp synapses are set
to the maximal allowable value to represent the strong ability of a primary reward to
trigger dopamine release.
3.6.1 Phase 1 : The bell (US)
During the first 100 trials the US alone is presented, which means the 100 US neurons
are injected with a superthreshold current. Due to the strong links with the VTAp
neurons, this results in an increase in dopamine concentration. Figure 3.2b shows the
response of the VTAp neurons during trial 100, and the spike raster plot in the lower
part of figure 3.2b shows the response of a typical neuron in the VTAp group in each
of the 100 trials.
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3.6.2 Phase 2 : The bell then the food (CS1→ US)
During trials 101-200 the neurons in the CS1 group are stimulated and after a random
delay of 1±0.25s the US neurons are stimulated. This is intended to mimic a classical
conditioning experiment where a CS and US are repeatedly paired with some short
interval. In Figure 3.2c we can see that by the final trial, the VTAp response to CS1 is
increased.
3.6.3 Phase 3 : Bell 2, then Bell 1, then the food (CS2 → CS1 →
US)
In trials 201-300 the CS2 stimulus is introduced before CS1, and again in Figure 3.2d
we can see that the response of the VTAp shifts to CS2.
This behaviour, where the earliest informative cue triggers dopamine release rather
than the reward is similar to what is observed in experiments, and has been described
by theorists as a backpropagation of reward prediction error. The author uses these
results to conclude that the model is a successful implementation of Pavlovian and
instrumental conditioning.
3.7 The practicalities of extending upon model 2
The initial aim of this chapter was to extend upon model 2. However, when I tried to
reproduce the results, I came across several problems, which I will discuss briefly here.
At first I attempted to reproduce the model myself based upon the description in
the paper, but was unable to obtain the same results. I consulted the published code
and found that this only included a cleaned up version of the code for model 1, and not
the actual code that was used to generate all of the results in the paper. I contacted the
author who agreed to email me the code that had been used to generate the data. There
were some minor discrepancies between what his code did and what was described in
the paper, but the basic result stood. After reading the original code I discovered that
I had been unable to reproduce the results due to some ambiguities in how the model
was described in the paper. There was also a misunderstanding about what was being
shown in one of the diagrams, and I was only able to resolve this after studying the
original code.
On further study of the code I discovered that there was a lot more going on than
was evident from the original paper. The next section will go into detail on this. I used
Chapter 3. A dopamine-modulated STDP model of Reinforcement Learning 57
Figure 3.2: The figure, taken from the original paper shows model 2, the results, and
an explanation of how these results come about. Part (a) shows the anatomical group-
ings in the model and how they are interconnected. Parts (b), (c), and (d) show the
results for trials 1-100, 101-200, and 201-300. In each set the upper graph shows the
total VTAp responses in the last trial, and the lower graph shows the VTAp responses
over the whole range of trials. Part (e) attempts to explain how the apparent backprop-
agation occurs. The arrows suggest that learning of the CS → VTAp synaptic link is
bootstrapped by the initially strong CS→ US→ VTAp link.
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a modified version of the code for the analysis in the following sections, and that code
is included in Appendix B.
3.8 Problems with the model
As described in section 3.6, the paper claimed that the model was capable of com-
pleting a simple classical conditioning task, and indeed it was capable of producing
the graphs in Figure 3.2. However, after analysing the original code I discovered that
the model displayed certain behaviours that were incompatible with a true model of
classical conditioning. In addition some of the explanations given in the paper were
misleading or incorrect.
The author does describe some limitations of the model in the original paper, but
these do not relate to the fundamental problems that were found in my analysis. While I
could attempt to address each of the original caveats individually, I feel that the severity
of the problem explained in section 3.8.1 renders such a discussion unneccessary.
3.8.1 The US is not necessary for learning the CS
The model will learn anything, irrespective of whether or not it is paired with a US. A
set of simulations designed to illustrate this are shown in Figure 3.3.
To highlight how critical a problem this is, we could compare this to the famous
Pavlov’s dog experiment — it is as if the dog is learning to salivate at the sound of the
bell even if it is never paired with the food. As long as stimulus is presented enough
times, the dog will learn to salivate when it occurs — clearly if the model does this
then something is fundamentally wrong. If the US is not necessary for learning the
CS, then the explanation shown in Figure 3.2e is incorrect because the CS → US →
VTAp link is not involved in the process.
3.8.2 Learning is too quick
If we examine the synaptic strength between groups at the end of each trial we might
get the impression that learning is happening gradually. However, if we plot what is
happening within trials as in Figure 3.4, we will see quite a different story.
The synaptic changes that do occur are not a result of gradual learning at a be-
havioural timescale, but are due to almost instantaneous changes that happen at synapses
when the neurons are artificially stimulated. This means that synaptic weights are
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Strength of CS−>VTA synapses when CS is paired with US
















Strength of CS−>VTA synapses when CS presented without US

















Strength of CS−>VTA synapses when CS is presented 
without US and US−>VTA synapses are set to zero
Figure 3.3: The upper graph shows the strength of CS→ VTA synapses starting from
when the CS is first presented. As we can see the strength of these synapses increases
initially and then stabilises. Izhikevich (2007) suggests that this process is aided by the
presence of strong US→ VTA links. However, if we do not present the US at all (the
middle graph), or we do not present the US AND lower US→ VTA synapses to zero,
the CS is still learned. This indicates that the explanation given in the paper is incorrect
— in this model, feeding the dog is not necessary for learning for the dog to learn to
salivate at the sound of the bell.
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synaptic weight change viewed over a long timescale




















synaptic weight change as it happens
 
 
mean CS−>VTA synapse strength
CS presentation
US presentation
Figure 3.4: The upper graph shows the mean CS→ VTA synaptic weight as sampled at
one point during each trial. This gives the impression that the synaptic weight changes
are taking place gradually over the course of a few trials. However, the lower graph
shows the synaptic weight change as it happens (10ms resolution). Here we can see
that synaptic weight change is taking place rapidly within trial, and the largest changes
occur when the external stimuli are injected into the network.
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changing rapidly during the trial. This kind of behaviour is not desirable because we
are implicitly assuming that synaptic weights represent the animal’s belief about the
probability of a reward following a particular cue. Our belief about the probability of
a cue signalling a reward is something which changes slowly, over the course of many
trials, and ought not to change significantly during a single trial.
When I state that learning is too happening too quickly I am not referring to the
number of trials that are required for learning, but the fact that rapid synaptic change
is happening within trials .
3.8.3 Learning is indiscriminate
Figure 3.2e in the original paper is misleading because it appears to show that the CS
comes to trigger dopamine release through a specific CS->US->VTA pathway. In fact
the stimulation that occurs when the CS is presented is so strong that all synapses
post-synaptic to CS neurons will see their synapses potentiated, and not just CS->US
synapses (a schematic of this process is shown in Figure 3.6). In fact all synapses
from the CS are enhanced, not just CS-US or CS->VTA (see Figure 3.5). In this sense
learning is indiscriminate.
3.8.4 US response is depressed by an unrealistic mechanism
In the previous section I demonstrated that the potentiation of responses to the CS is
happening for different reasons than is suggested in the paper. But what about the de-
pression of the US response following CS presentation that occurs in phase 2? (shown
in Figure 3.2c). If this is not happening due to a backpropagation of a prediction error,
then how is it happening?
Figure 3.2c shows that once the CS is presented, the response of the VTA neurons
to US stimulation is decreased. In experiments with animals this is thought to happen
because the conditioned stimulus, such as the bell in the case of Pavlov’s dog, comes
to give all the information about whether the reward is due to arrive or not. If the bell
is rung then the dog knows with 100% certainty that the food will arrive, and therefore
there is no reward prediction error when the reward does arrive — it was expected.
But if we look at how this process happens in the network in model 2 we can see that
it is not due to a gradual backpropagation of certainty as the dog becomes more sure
that the bell predicts the food. In the model this process happens by two mechanisms:
one a side effect of how the neurons work, and the other an unintentional consequence
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Figure 3.5: The graph shows synaptic weight change over the course of many trials
for a selection of synapses postsynaptic to CS neurons. As we can see the synaptic
weight changes are very similar, irrespective of their relationship to reward. It appears
that when a strong external stimulus is applied, all neurons are potentiated, and not just
those connecting to the VTA.
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Figure 3.6: In the original paper the author suggests that the increase in synaptic weight
of the CS → VTA pathway (labelled in the figure as pathway 2) is initially due to its
indirect links to the VTA via the US (pathway 1). However, in Figure 3.5 we can see that
all synapses are potentiated at the same rate irrespective of their links to the VTA via
the US. Also, Figure 3.3 shows that if the US is not presented at all and the US→ VTA
synapses are weak, then the synapses on pathway 2 are still potentiated at the same
rate. This indicates that the explanation given in the paper is incorrect.
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of stimulating the network too hard when the CS is presented. What happens in the
network can be seen in Figure 3.7.
To summarise, the US is depressed when the CS is presented because:
1. The US stimulus is less able to cause postsynaptic neurons to spike because so
many neurons have been reset following the CS stimulus. This results in a lower
dopamine concentration, and a smaller eligibility trace.
2. The feedforward activation of US neurons that occurs after a CS stimulation
causes many US neurons to spike just after dopamine has been released. Due
to the way the STDP rule has been set up, this causes strong depression of US
synapses after a CS stimulation
Although both these mechanisms produced the desired result — that is a depression
of the US response as the CS is learned, neither of these mechanisms is supported
by empirical evidence, particularly the second. The first mechanism is sensitive to the
time delay between the CS and the US, and is only likely to be effective when there is a
very short gap between the cue and the reward — longer than one second and the effect
is likely to disappear. The second mechanism suggests that mere presentation of a CS
causes unconditioned rewards to become less rewarding. This would be problematic
because over an animal’s lifetime it is exposed to a continuous stream of stimuli, and
only some (the reward predicting ones) ought to have the effect of reducing the ability
of the unconditioned stimulus to elicit reward.
3.8.5 Dopamine release is happening in an artificial way
A fundamental problem I encountered with this model is that learning is occurring
at the time of the cue due to the cue related dopamine release that is caused by the
artificial stimulation of the network. During the first pairing of the CS and US, the
presentation of the CS causes greater dopamine release than the delivery of the reward
itself, and this does not fit any known experimental data (see VTA spikes in trial 101
of Figure 3.7). Although particularly salient cue stimuli are known to cause the release
of dopamine in experiments, it is not of the same magnitude as the phasic dopamine
release that occurs when there is an unexpected reward.
This CS-related dopamine release allows learning to occur immediately following
the cue presentation, which is why the bell can be learned as a predictor of reward,
even when no reward is presented. If dopamine is released after the cue, then there is
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no incentive for the stimuli to stay active, and therefore this mechanism cannot explain
patterns of activity during the delay period.
3.8.6 Reward prediction error is not backpropagated
Although the model does appear to solve the distal reward problem, it does not do this
by propagating certainty from the time of the reward back to the cue. Learning in this
model occurs immediately at the time of cue presentation due to feedforward activation
following a stimulus. It is not a result of bridging the temporal gap between the cue
and reward. Izhikevich (2007) alludes to this in his comment that CS-VTA learning
occurs ’on a compressed timescale’. Although this may appear to be a subtle point, it
does have significant consequences.
If learning occurs through backpropagation then this may lead to persistent activity
during the delay period, which, as we explained in chapter 2, is known to happen in
working memory and reinforcement learning experiments. If learning occurs due to
feedforward activation, as it does in this model, then an additional mechanism will be
required to explain the persistent activity during the delay period.
Another well known feature of neurons shaped by reinforcement learning tasks is
that they begin to show ramping activity that conveys information about the timing of
various actions during and at the end of the delay period. Again, this is something that
might occur if learning is backpropagated across the delay period, but will need an
additional mechanism if the synaptic changes are due to feedforward activation.
3.9 Potential Solutions
This section covers potential solutions to the problems outlined in the previous section.
3.9.1 Novelty
The CS can be learned without the US because the external stimulation of the CS is
strong enough to release dopamine, without a reward (US) ever being presented.
The significance of using a CS is that it is a stimulus that is not intrinsically re-
warding in itself, so the fact that it can be learned as a predictor of reward represents a
problem. One solution to this problem could be to decrease the original strength of the
external stimulations by including a mechanism to reduce the ability of cues to induce
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Figure 3.8: A novelty mechanism would mean that a new stimuli would elicit a diminish-
ing release of dopamine with each presentation
dopamine release as they become less novel. An example of what this would mean in
terms of dopamine release is shown in Figure 3.8.
It is known from experiments that particularly salient or strong stimuli that do not
in themselves lead to reward, can often cause the release of dopamine — for example
switching on a light, or introducing a new object to the animal’s surroundings. It is
thought that this dopamine release is due to the novelty of the stimulus, rather than any
link between the stimulus and reward.
So, rather than weaken the stimulations in the model and thereby decrease the level
of dopamine release following a stimulus (which might stop the other results working),
we could introduce a mechanism which would decrease the salience of the cue stimuli
as they become less novel
It is possible, that if set up the right way this would prevent CS being learned as
predictors of reward without the US present
3.9.2 Implementing backpropagation of reward prediction error
Unfortunately the other problems in the model are not easy to solve. The fact that the
model is solving the distal reward problem through feedforward activation, rather than
backpropagation is a fundamental problem — it isn’t something quantitatively wrong
which can be fixed by tweaking parameters, it is a qualitative problem with how the
model solves the problem. I outlined in section 2.4.2 the reasons why backpropagation
is a suitable mechanism for solving the distal reward problem — it can potentially
explain many phenomena in one fell swoop. If we were committed to using the current
learning mechanism for model 2 we would have to introduce additional mechanisms
to solve these other phenomena, which decreases the parsimony of the model.
Although I have shown how most of the learning in model 2 occurs due to feedfor-
ward activation, the original mechanism described in model 1 is still present in model
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2, and is doing backpropagation - it is just that the addition of strong external stimuli
in model 2 swamps out this original mechanism.
So, is there a way that the strength of the external stimuli could be reduced to make
this backpropagating mechanism more prominent? Possibly, but it is questionable as
to whether work to do this would be of much value. As mentioned in the analysis of
model 1, the back propagation across the delay period that occurs in the first model is
by means of the eligibility trace, and is not due to persistent delay period activity of
neurons.
As the time of dopamine release propagates backwards, it is the patterns during the
delay period that reliably led to reward will be set in stone — be they eligibility traces
or neural activity. If we are looking for a mechanism that might explain the patterns of
neural activity in the delay period that are observed in experiments, then the memory
trace of the cue ought be stored in neural activity itself, and not eligibility traces.
3.10 Summary of findings
1. The CS can be learned as a predictor of a reward without presentation of the US,
which is in contradiction with a basic result in classical conditioning.
2. Learning in the model is too quick and occurs over a few seconds during the
course of a trial. As a result the synaptic weights cannot be said to be represent-
ing reward probabilities, as our beliefs regarding reward probabilities should not
change within the course of a trial.
3. Learning is indiscriminate — the CS becomes associated with all neurons in the
network, not just the US.
4. Reward prediction error is not propagated backwards from the reward presen-
tation to the time of the first predictive cue. This means that the interesting
delay period dynamics observed in experiments - persistent or ramping activity
— must be explained by an additional mechanism.
5. Because the reward prediction error is not being propagated backwards we are
reliant on a unrealistic depression mechanism. In this model US→VTA synapses
are depressed as a quirk of the stimulation process.
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3.11 Discussion
My initial intention when choosing this model was to build upon its success in solving
the distal reward problem. However, in the process of replicating the result I discov-
ered that the model was not working in a way that was compatible with a model of
classical conditioning. After analysing the problems in the model I concluded that it
would be easier to start a new model from scratch than to add fixes to the existing
model. While the effect of dopamine upon synapses is undoubtedly important, I am
not convinced that a model of reinforcement learning should be implemented at the
synaptic level. Following my experience with this model I would opt to implement a
model of reinforcement learning at the level of populations of neurons — a strategy I
will follow in chapter 5.
I will separate my discussion of this model into two sections, one dealing with is-
sues regarding the theoretical basis of the model, and another dealing with the practical
issues of relating it to the data.
3.11.1 Theoretical Issues
3.11.1.1 Why base the model on synapses?
I have argued in section 1.4 that when we seek to explain some phenomena we should
base it upon correlates at an appropriate spatial and temporal scale. This model is un-
usual in the way that it seeks to explain systems level behaviour (reinforcement learn-
ing) in terms of microscopic correlates changing at a much faster timescale (synaptic
plasticity). So it seems an obvious question to ask — If the author was intent on ex-
plaining a systems level effect, why did he choose to begin with a model of synaptic
dynamics? Is this choice of mechanism a purely rational one, or does it reflect a priori
assumptions that are often made in computational neuroscience?
I have argued in chapter 2 that Donald Hebb’s ideas have been highly influential in
theoretical neuroscience, and as a result many of our computational models follow him
in ascribing learning to changes in synaptic plasticity. Since Hebb published his ideas
in 1949, we have discovered many other substrates of persistent change in the brain,
yet many computational models of learning and memory still insist on implementing
abstract models of synaptic process occurring on the timescale of milliseconds to ex-
plain behavioural processes occurring at the timescale of seconds and minutes. For
these reasons I would argue that it is better to use a simpler model of dopamine’s effect
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on memory at a systems level, rather than to invoke a dopamine modulated STDP rule.
3.11.1.2 Why use STDP?
So far I have argued that some of the choices made in constructing the model reflect
theoretical assumptions in the field, but I believe there are also sociological factors
behind the choice of the model’s components. It is important to note that the author
chose not just to implement a model of synaptic plasticity, but rather opted to imple-
ment STDP. STDP is currently a popular model of synaptic plasticity, but there is no
evidence to suggest it is particularly relevant to the reinforcment learning process.
3.11.1.3 Why is STDP popular?
To take another step back in our analysis, we might wonder why is it that STDP is
popular with theorists in the first place?
In a sense, some timing-dependence of plasticity is inevitable. Spikes cause time-
dependent changes at the synapse, and so it is clear that the degree of plasticity will
somehow be dependent upon the relative timing of spikes.
When STDP was first proposed and found empirically, it was in the form whereby
presynaptic spikes before postsynaptic spikes cause potentiation, and postsynaptic
spikes before presynaptic spikes cause depression - this is often informally referred
to as “vanilla” STDP. The vanilla form of STDP was particularly appealing to theorists
(and perhaps also the reason why experimentalists went looking for it) because it im-
plied that presynapses that spike at the right time to cause postsynaptic spikes ought to
be “rewarded” (note the overlap in vocabulary here). This kind of rule is appealing, be-
cause it would appear to reinforce presynaptic spike patterns that lead to postsynaptic
spikes — an important property if we believe that information in the brain is coded in
the temporal patterns of spikes, which is a popular view in computational neuroscience
(see section 1.2.4). The vanilla STDP rule is set up in such a way as to maximally po-
tentiate causal spikes, and depress spikes which are not likely to be causal. So in a
sense, the vanilla STDP rule was favoured over other acausal rules
1. Because it is likely to support and lead to the formation of temporal codes of
spikes
2. Because it is a restatement of the basic scientific assumption of causality and
purpose. Spikes which are not causal appear as noise, while spikes which are
casual appear to have a purpose (they cause their effect).
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Figure 3.9: A graph taken from (Kampa et al., 2007) showing the diversity of STDP
curves than can be found just by measuring in different locations in the dendritic tree.
Spike timing shown on the x-axis refers to the time of the post-synaptic spike minus the
time of the pre-synaptic spike.
These properties make the vanilla STDP rule both appealing on on theoretical grounds,
and also useful in situations where a causally sensitive learning mechanism is required
to preserve causal relations in the data. But what is happening here? Are we solving
a problem using empirically discovered and motivated mechanisms, or are we merely
looking for data that fits our assumptions (vanilla STDP data), extracting generalisa-
tions from that data (the vanilla STDP rule), and reapplying these “mechanisms” to
new problems (reinforcement learning) in the hope of showing that our original as-
sumptions can also be found to be upheld in other domains? Is this process one of
objective analysis, or are we oblivious to our own biases?
Perhaps this line of argument may be controversial, but what cannot be argued
is that the assumptions of the model in question are undersupported by the data. In
particular it is known that STDP can occur in many different flavours (see Figure 3.9),
but it is the one that reinforces casuality that was first predicted and first observed. If
there are many different possible STDP curves, how can the author’s choice to use the
vanilla STDP curve be justified, particularly when the whole result is dependent upon
choosing this particular curve?
It is easy to draw the conclusion that the vanilla STDP rule was chosen because
it had properties that are desirable for a model where causal relationships are to be
reinforced — if the learning rule is rewarding causal spikes at the level of synapses,
then this is likely to be better at reinforcing causal relationships at the systems level
than an acausal learning rule would be.
This rationale is entirely hypothetical and may not reflect the process by which
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the original author came to develop the model. However, I choose to highlight it here
because I believe that some of the problems I have had with this model reflect problems
that will be found with a whole class of models that are common in computational
neuroscience.
This way of working, where mechanisms with the right kind of properties are as-
sembled to solve a problem is a suitable way to work in engineering, but not in science.
By using this kind of engineering approach it is often quite easy to “solve” the prob-
lem, much in the same way as this model solves the distal reward problem. But solving
the problem with a collection of hand-picked mechanism does not guarantee that the
model is an accurate representation of how the brain solves the problem.
If this kind of engineering approach to modelling is commonplace, how do we
avoid falling into this trap with future models? One approach would be to work with
the literature, and construct models using only mechanisms and anatomy which are
known to have strong support from the experimental data. Another approach would
go even further — to attempt to make the model as much of a one-to-one model of
the physiology as is practically possible. With these kinds of models every mechanism
and parameter setting would correspond to something which is practically measurable
by an experimentalist. Both of these methods have their advantages and shortcomings,
and will be examined in more detail in the following chapters.
3.11.2 Practical Issues
Aside from the theoretical issues with how the model was constructed, there are also
practical issues with relating to experimental data. The model makes some assump-
tions about the effect of dopamine modulation on synaptic plasticity that are not sup-
ported by any empirical data. While the the ability of the model to link distal cues and
rewards is interesting, the lack of empirical evidence does make it difficult to support
the model as a mechanistic description of how the brain implements a reinforcement
learning circuit.
The mechanisms used in the model are undersupported by the empirical data, so the
only conclusion we can draw is that these mechanisms were chosen to ensure that the
model would solve the problem. Although solving the problem does make the result
seem more impressive (see the title used for the paper), the result is only interesting to
neuroscience if it is the mechanism by which the brain solves the problem.
In this model, as is the case with many models in computational neuroscience it is
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easy to get the impression that the theory came before the data. The problem with this
is that theoretical mechanisms are rarely easy to relate to empirical data, because by
nature they are abstracted from empirical data. If we want to assess the validity of this
model our key question is — “does the solution presented in this model match what
we see when we perform experiments?”. This question can be answered most easily if
components in the model correspond to measurables.
3.12 Conclusion
Although part 1 of the model does link distal cues and rewards, the classical con-
ditioning model 2 in the second half of the paper fails to reproduce some of the basic
features of classical conditioning. While some problems with the model may be fixable
by adding new mechanisms, others seem to indicate that the way in which the model
learns must be fundamentally changed. The model makes some claims regarding the
nature of dopamine modulation which are not supported by empirical data, and as a
result it is difficult to support or refute the model with empirical data. This suggests
that future modelling work should be more empirically driven in order to be verifiable
by experiment.
Chapter 4
The effect of dopamine modulation on
a model of synaptic plasticity
4.1 Novel contribution
A computational model of the effect of dopamine modulation on synaptic plasticity
is constructed. The chapter introduces a simple model prefrontal cortex pyramidal
cell, and uses empirical data to parameterise a model of how this neuron will behave
under dopamine modulation. The computational model is used to assess the relative
contribution that dopamine modulation of firing rate and synaptic conductance has on
synaptic plasticity. The results indicate that the synaptic effects of dopamine are more
significant than the effects upon intrinsic excitability, particularly in the case of D1
receptor modulation. The results from this computational model are compared with
recent experimental results.
The chapter ends with analysis of lessons learned from developing more empiri-
cally driven computational models.
4.2 Empirical Modelling
In the previous chapter I looked at a systems level model of how dopamine modulated
STDP might implement a reinforcement learning circuit in the brain. At the end of
the chapter I concluded that the engineering-style approach that had been used to con-
struct the model made it difficult to support or refute the model with the empirical data
because it wasn’t closely linked to empirical data.
One way of guaranteeing that our models are tied to the biology and can be verified
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by experiment is to base our models purely upon empirical data and see what patterns
we observe. It is these patterns in the data which we ought to raise to the status of
causal mechanisms, and not mechanisms such as STDP which are preferred on a priori
grounds.
The aim of this chapter is to explore this approach to modelling within the bounds
of the problem at hand — the hypothesis that dopamine signals a reward prediction
error and thereby forms part of a reinforcement learning circuit in the brain. Can
we put experimental observations into a computational model, hit the “RUN” button
and expect to generate results that support or contradict the hypothesis? Or is this too
simplistic a view?
4.2.1 Investigating reinforcement learning with an empirical model
In the previous chapter, the model described in (Izhikevich, 2007) made some basic
assumptions about the effect of dopamine on synaptic plasticity, and went on to show
that these simple mechanisms could have far reaching effects. However, none of the
assumptions that were made were directly supported by empirical data — for example
the assumption that STDP occurs only in the “vanilla” STDP form, or the assumption
that dopamine acts as an across-the-board enhancer of plasticity.
The case for dopamine’s involvement in reinforcement learning is based upon the
observation that dopamine neurons exhibit phasic spikes in a similar manner as had
previously been predicted by abstract models of reinforcement learning. Beyond this
correlation between the reward prediction error of temporal differences algorithm and
the activity of dopamine neurons, we have no clear models of what phasic dopamine
release does, and how it contributes to the broader task of learning to repeat reinforced
behaviour. What does it mean to say that dopamine acts as a reward prediction error
’signal’? What does this abstract concept of a signal mean when we are talking about
the brain? How can a neuromodulator “signal” something?
If my aim in this thesis is to develop a systems level model of the role of dopamine
modulation in a reinforcement learning circuit, then I will also need a high level de-
scription of the effect of dopamine on plasticity that is empirically justifiable. In order
to do this I aim to develop an empirically based model of the effect of dopamine modu-
lation on synaptic plasticity, and use the results from this model to feed into the systems
level model.
In this chapter I will take the known electrophysiological effects of dopamine on
Chapter 4. The effect of dopamine modulation on a model of synaptic plasticity 76
prefrontal cortex pyramidal cells, and plug this data into an existing model of synaptic
plasticity.
4.2.2 Setting up a model
The aim of the model will be two-fold
1. To try out a more empirically motivated approach to modelling
2. To examine the effects of dopamine modulation on the synaptic plasticity of
prefrontal cortex pyramidal cells, and to produce observations that can be used
in a systems level model of dopamine modulated learning.
There is a large amount of electrophysiological work that has been done to char-
acterise the effects of dopamine on pyramidal cells, both in terms of changes to the
intrinsic excitability of the neurons, and also changes to the synaptic properties of the
neurons. If the hypothesis is correct (that dopamine forms part of a reinforcement
learning circuit), then the electrophysiological effects of dopamine ought to lead to an
improved ability to predict reward.
Saying that “dopamine release leads to an improved ability to predict reward” is
quite an easy statement to make, but it is practically a very difficult hypothesis to test.
How does one detect whether or not this is happening, either in an experiment, or in
a computational model? How do we know if small changes at synapses will lead to
an improved ability to predict reward without already making some assumptions about
how the brain predicts reward? If we intend to measure reward prediction, then we
must have some metric and an idea of what to measure, and this in itself constitutes a
theory.
4.2.3 Signs of successful reinforcement learning
If I aim to assess whether or not dopamine modulation of synaptic plasticity is support-
ing reinforcement learning I must have a clear idea of how this happens, and therefore
be able to determine whether or not the results support or contradict the hypothesis.
1. One mechanism which has been proposed as a key mechanism in learning to
predict reward is STDP. It has been suggested (Abbott and Blum, 1996) that
spike timing dependent plasticity offers a means for neurons to learn tempo-
rally integrated sequences of events — a property which is critical for successful
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reinforcement learning. This property is critical because at its heart, reinforce-
ment learning is a problem of learning to link temporally separated events. If
STDP allows us to do this, then as shown in the last chapter, a dopamine mod-
ulated STDP mechanism may support reinforcement learning and allow back-
propagation to occur. If dopamine modulation does form part of a reinforce-
ment learning circuit, evidence that dopamine modulation causes an enhance-
ment in the efficacy of pre before post synaptic spikes would offer some support
to the hypothesis. However, if dopamine modulation results in an enhancement
of anti-hebbian spike timing dependent plasticity, (an increased efficacy of post
before pre synaptic activity) this would suggest that at the single synapse level,
dopamine modulation tends to act against mechanisms that might aid reinforce-
ment learning. This might be used as evidence to suggest that dopamine is not
solely acting as a reward prediction signal, and that therefore the reinforcement
learning model applied directly to neurotransmitters like dopamine is too sim-
plistic.
2. Another very simple but important observation is that behavioural reward is a
very strong learning mechanism, and that if dopamine is proposed to be acting
as a signal of unexpected reward, then an increase in dopamine concentration
ought to result in an increased rate of synaptic change. Such a significant in-
crease in synaptic plasticity should be observable even using simplistic artificial
plasticity protocols. This effect ought to be substantial, and potentially of a
greater significance than changes to the timing-dependence of plasticity.
4.3 Literature review
It has been hypothesised that dopamine provides a reward prediction error signal as
part of a reinforcement learning circuit in the brain. This hypothesis is based upon the
observation that dopamine neurons fire phasically when animals encounter a difference
between predicted and actual reward (for a review, see (Schultz, 1998)). However, it
has not been explained how the neurons that are modulated by dopamine use the signal
to learn the appropriate conditioned response. One possibility is that dopamine leads
to learning of the conditioned response through persistent changes at synapses.
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4.3.1 The effect of dopamine on synaptic plasticity: Empirical work
Experimental work suggests that the primary factor which causes synapses to change
their the efficacy is calcium influx. The calcium influx that follows a postsynaptic ac-
tion potential is capable of triggering internal processes which change the sensitivity
of the synapse to further spikes. The degree of calcium influx that follows a postsynap-
tic spike is partially dependent on whether or not a back-propagating action potential
propagates from the soma to the dendrites and synapse (Spruston et al., 1995). Schiller
et al. (1998) have shown that calcium influx through NMDA receptor is amplified
following postsynaptic action potentials. These two results suggest that it is the inter-
action of the back-progating action potential and the NMDA receptor that causes the
amplification in calcium influx. If I intend to build a model of the effect of dopamine
on synaptic plasticity, then it is crucial that the simulated effects of dopamine modulate
this calcium influx mechanism.
Changes in synaptic efficacy can be quantified according to many factors - the
most commonly manipulated varibles being the rate of presynaptic stimulation, the co-
operativity of input, and the relative timing of pre and post-synaptic spikes. The degree
by which each of these factors effects plasticity outcomes has been studied in depth by
Sjöström et al. (2001) who showed that plasticity in the cortex is dependent upon both
frequency and spike-timing, and that the two factors interact to determine the change
in synaptic efficacy.
Alongside this work on plasticity in control situations, there has also been exper-
imental work done to investigate plasticity in the presence of dopamine. Otani et al.
(1998) found that the presence of dopamine facilitated LTD in slice preparations, and
can also facilitate LTP if the slice is “primed” with a stimulation before application of
high-frequency stimuli in the presence of dopamine (Blond, 2002). This priming with
dopamine was observed when dopamine was applied to the slice 30 minutes before a
paired application of dopamine and tetanic stimulation. This suggests that dopamine
triggers long-lasting changes in the prefrontal cortes that can manifest themselves in
synaptic plasticity long after the transient increase in concentration.The latency of
these effects is on timescale of minutes, suggesting that dopamine effects plasticity
both in the long-term,and in the short term via the calcium influx mechanisms de-
scribed above.
Work in the prefrontal cortex has shown that D1 receptor activation in the prefrontal
cortex facilitates LTP, and LTP in the prefrontal requires NMDA receptor activation
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Gurden et al. (2000). Together these results suggest that dopamine facilitates LTP via
the effects of D1 receptors on NMDA channels. At the behavioural level, Baldwin et al.
(2002) have shown that operant conditioning in rat requires D1 and NMDA activation
in the prefrontal cortex.
Since the modelling work in this chapter was completed there has been additional
experimental work to determine the effect of dopmine modulation on synaptic plastic-
ity. Pawlak and Kerr (2008) found that dopamine receptor activation was required to
observe spike-timing dependent plasticity at cortico striatal synapses. Also, in the stria-
tum, Shen et al. (2008) showed that D1 and D2 receptor activation has bidirectional,
timing-dependent effects on plasticity. In the prefrontal cortex Xu and Yao (2010)
found that dopamine enabled the induction of timing-dependent LTP through D1 and
D2 receptor activation. D1 receptors act via a cAMP-PKA signalling mechanism,
whilst D2 receptors facilitate LTP through their modulation of GABAergic circuits.
4.3.2 The effect of dopamine on synaptic plasticity: Computational
modelling
A number of computational models have set out to address this problem, and have tried
to create mechanistic models of how dopamine-dependent plasticity during rewarded
tasks can lead to predictions of future rewards. Many of these models have assumed
that dopamine modulation leads to reinforcement learning behaviour through it’s effect
upon STDP (Thivierge et al., 2007), (Florian, 2007), (Izhikevich, 2007). Other models,
such as that by Nakano et al. (2010) have instead examined the effect of dopamine on
plasticity via it’s effects on intracellular cascades within the synapse.
Although these models have attempted to characterise the effect of dopamine on
STDP or synaptic mechanisms, there is also more general electrophyisological data
that could be used to quantify the effects of dopamine modulation on plasticity. Sea-
mans and Durstewitz (2008) reviews data which could be used to quantify the effect
of dopamine upon synaptic conductances. In vitro work has also begun to tease apart
the effect that dopamine modulation has on activity over long and short timescales -
Lavin et al. (2005) report that in the prefrontal cortex, the response to a phasic burst
of dopamine neurons involves first inhibition, and then later a gradual potentiation of
responses that lasts for tens of minutes.
Some models have attempted to use this data to capture the effect of dopamine on
on neural excitability. Gruber et al. (2003) and Durstewitz et al. (2000b) have devel-
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oped models of the effect of dopamine modulation upon firing dynamics of neurons in
the striatum, and the prefrontal cortex respectively.
Both of these types of models have produced interesting results, but none of the
models has looked at the effect of dopamine upon BOTH the excitability of the neurons
AND the plasticity processes at the synapses. As a result it is not clear which of these
two mechanisms has the most significant effect on learning. If we are to develop an
empirical model of dopamine modulation which can be used as a basis for a systems-
level model, we need to assess the effects of both these pathways to plasticity.
4.3.3 Summary
In summary, empirical work on the effect of dopamine upon the excitability of neurons
has not yet been integrated with existing systems level models of synaptic plasticity.
In order to fill this gap in our knowledge I will use this chapter to develop an em-
pirical model that attempts to quantify the relative contribution to synaptic plasticity
of dopamine modulation of neural excitability, and dopamine modulation of synaptic
conductances.
4.4 Methods
The experimental hypothesis was tested by constructing a computational model of pre-
frontal cortex neurons and running simulated plasticity protocols under varying levels
of simulated dopamine modulation. In practise this meant that the simulation included
a model post synaptic neuron which was stimulated by a model pre-synapse in accor-
dance with an in vitro plasticity protocol. Each plasticity protocol was run three times
to simulate
1. a bath solution of 50mm SKF38393 (a D1 receptor agonist)
2. a bath solution of 10mm Quinpirole (a D2 receptor agonist)
3. a control (ie. no dopamine modulation)
In order to characterise the effect of dopamine modulation on synaptic plasticity, an
existing calcium based model of plasticity was used to calculate the change in synaptic
efficacy due to calcium concentration in the post synaptic neuron.
In this section I describe the model in four parts:
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1. The neuron model
2. The plasticity model
3. The model of dopamine modulation
4. The simulated plasticity protocols
4.4.1 The neuron model
The computational model neuron consists of a minimal set of equations required to re-
produce the spiking dynamics of a prefrontal cortex pyramidal cells. Using the meth-
ods described by Izhikevich (2006) a three-conductance model was developed and pa-
rameterised based upon in vitro data to show a similar spike shape to a regular spiking
prefrontal cortex pyramidal cell (4.1). Although the three equations are not intended to
model specific ion channels, they are loosely based upon sodium and potassium con-
ductances. The model was implemented in Matlab using Matlab’s variable timestep
ode solver. All of the parameters used in this model are included in Appendix C.
There do exist other, more detailed models of prefrontal pyramidal cells, such as the
one described by Durstewitz et al. (2000a). This model implements Hodgkin-Huxley
like conductances (based upon in vitro recordings) to recreate the spiking behaviour of
in vitro cells. However, the minimal model was chosen because it produces qualita-
tively similar spike shape whilst being orders of magnitude faster to simulate than the
morphologically detailed neurons used by Durstewitz et al. (2000a).
I chose to use a simple model neuron because I intended to reuse the results in
larger, network simulations which would run much more quickly if based upon a
computationally inexpensive neuron model. The neural model was deemed accurate
enough on the basis that the membrane potential trace closely fits traces from in vitro
recordings of prefrontal cortex pyramidal cells.
Crucially the model neuron fires from a plateau as is observed in in vitro recordings.
The choice of this simple neural model had knock-on effects which are described in
section 4.4.3. The equations specifying the model are:
dV
dt
= (Iin j− Ileak− INa− IK− IM− IAMPA− INMDA)/C (4.1)
Ileak = gL(V −EL) (4.2)
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INa = gNam∞q(V −ENa) (4.3)
IK = gKn(V −EK) (4.4)



















Here the different currents I of the neuron are represented by the subscripts leak,Na,K,
and M for the leak, sodium, potassium, and M conductances respectively. V represents
the membrane potential, and E the various reversal potentials. The terms q,n, and h
represent gating variables which are given by the following equations
m∞ = (1+ exp(VNahal f max−V )/kNa)−1 (4.9)
q∞ = (1+ exp(VNaInhal f max−V )/kNaIn)−1 (4.10)
n∞ = (1+ exp(VKhal f max−V )/kK)−1 (4.11)
h∞ = (1+ exp(VMhal f max−V )/kM)−1 (4.12)
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The values of these conductances were set by parameter fitting so that both the
membrane potential trace and the f-I curve of the neuron closely matched the experi-
mental data for the control condition. The parameter search was done using an iterative
interval bisection method, and fits were assessed according to the sum of the squared
error.
The method for parameter fitting for the conductances gL, gNa, gK , and gM was the
same as was used for fitting the dopamine modulated f-I curves, and is described in
more detail in section 4.4.3. This level of parameter fitting was considered reasonable
as for a given input the model neuron produces a spike train similar to that observed
experimentally. In our case we are interested in the spiking behaviour of the neuron,
and not necessarily the specific ion channel dynamics which can be computationally
expensive to simulate.





















Figure 4.1: An example membrane potential trace for the model neuron. Although the
neuron consists of only 3 equations, the spike shape qualitatively matches that of a real
prefrontal pyramidal cell in that the neurons spike from a plateau.
At the synapse, AMPA, NMDA, and GABA conductances were simulated as the
sum of two exponentials following Durstewitz et al. (2000a) (Figures 4.2, and 4.3). The
calcium concentration at each synapse was the product of the NMDA conductance and
the conductance of c∞, which is intended to represent the effects of a back-propagating
action potential on voltage-dependent calcium channels. The dynamics of c∞, and the
effect on calcium influx can be seen in Figures 4.5 and 4.4).
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IAMPA=gAMPAmax [ττ2/(τ2− τ1)]∗ [exp(−t/τ2)− exp(−t/τ1)] (4.13)















Figure 4.2: The current through the AMPA channel is given by the equation above. The
graph shows the AMPA current corresponding to the neuron voltage trace in Figure 4.1.
The AMPA current is characterised by a fast onset and offset, here controlled by the
two time constants τ1and τ2.
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INMDA=gNMDAmaxs∗ [ττ2/(τ2− τ1)]∗ [exp(−t/τ2)− exp(−t/τ1)]∗V1 (4.14)
s = (1+0.33exp(−0.0625V1)−1 (4.15)















Figure 4.3: The NMDA current is similar to the AMPA channel, but with a slower offset
and some voltage dependence. The slow offset of the NMDA conductance means that
calcium can continue to enter the synapse long after the spike. The voltage depen-
dence of the NMDA channel makes it sensitive to coincidences between pre and post
synaptic spikes — an ideal quality for a spike-timing dependent plasticity mechanism.
The voltage dependence of the channel comes from the membrane potential term V1
and the contribution of the voltage-dependent Magnesium block s, whose equation is
also given above. The conductance shows some artefacts where it decreases immedi-
ately after a spike. This is due to the fact that the model neuron hyperpolarises after a
spike - an unfortunate consequence of the using just three terms to model the neuron
(see Figure 4.1). Although the degree of hyperpolarisation can be changed by altering
the parameters, the qualitative shape of the curve cannot be altered without adding
terms to the neuron model. However, this may not be neccessary - the artefact is so
short-lived that it does not have a significant impact on the total conductance through
the channel after a spike.
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ICa = gCaINMDA ∗ c∞ (4.16)





















Figure 4.4: The model assumes that the main source of calcium influx at the synapse
is through the NMDA channel and voltage-dependent calcium channels (represented
by c∞). c∞ is graphed in Figure 4.5. The contributions of the NMDA channel and c∞
are multiplicative to represent the non-linear relationship between voltage and calcium
influx, and also to reflect the contribution of calcium-induced calcium release from in-
tracellular stores. This multiplication between the fast c∞and the slow INMDA is crucial,
because the slow offset of the NMDA channel makes it too slow to explain the tight
millisecond timing-dependence required for a symmetrical STDP curve. The model has
been parameterised to work with the plasticity model, so the units here are effectively
arbitrary.
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c∞ = 0.0005+0.0095∗ (1+ exp((−20−V1)/2))−1 (4.17)














Figure 4.5: A graph showing the conductance through c∞ as a function of the membrane
voltage. The parameter values were chosen so that the channel opens as the neuron
depolarises. The result of this is that the peak calcium influx will be during a spike.
The product of the NMDA current and c∞ rather than the sum was used so as
to reproduce the non-linear increase in calcium influx found experimentally during a
postsynaptic spike. The channel is added multiplicatively rather than additively not just
to produce a non-linear increase in calcium influx, but also to cause the calcium influx
to shut off more quickly after a spike than would a NMDA channel. This can be seen
in the difference in decay rates between Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4. This fast shut-off
of calcium influx is needed if the model is to reproduce the tight temporal sensitivity
thought to occur in STDP (Bi and Poo, 1998). The original plasticity model that this
model is based upon (Shouval et al., 2002) accomplishes a similar feat by introducing
a back-propagating action potential which transiently raises the membrane potential to
increase calcium influx for a short period.
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4.4.2 The plasticity model
The model of synaptic plasticity used was based upon the calcium control hypothesis
(Shouval et al., 2002), the idea that changes in synaptic plasticity are largely caused by
changes in calcium concentration, with high levels of calcium resulting in long term
potentiation of the synapse and intermediate levels of calcium resulting in synaptic
depression (see Figure 4.6).
Ω = 0.25+A∗B (4.18)
A = exp(β2 ∗ ([Ca2+]−α2))/(1+ exp(β2 ∗ ([Ca2+]−α2)))−0.25 (4.19)
B = exp(β1 ∗ ([Ca2+]−α1))/(1+ exp(β1 ∗ ([Ca2+]−α1))) (4.20)
η = 1/(P1/(P2 +[Ca2+]P3)+P4) (4.21)
dWj = η([Ca2+] j)∗ (Ω([Ca2+] j)−Wj) (4.22)
The equations above show how the change in synaptic weight Wj is calculated
from the calcium concentration. Ω represents the relationship between spine calcium
concentration and the direction of plasticity. For low levels of calcium concentration
there is no change, for moderate levels of calcium we see depression, and for high
levels of calcium there is potentiation. This relationship, given by Ω, is shown in
Figure 4.6. The term η represents an additional calcium dependence of the plasticity
— at low levels of calcium plasticity changes are weak, but as calcium levels rise,
plasticity changes occur more rapidly (see Figure 4.7). The change in synaptic weight
dWj is then given by the multiplication of these two calcium-dependent functions.
This model was chosen as the plasticity model because it was simple to implement
and widely used in the literature. Since the model was published there has been some
debate about the late LTD which appears to be predicted by this model, but has not
been observed experimentally (see Figure 4.12). It was decided to use this plasticity
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Figure 4.6: The relationship between Calcium concentration and change in synaptic
weight (Ω). At low concentrations of Calcium there is no change, at intermediate lev-
els depression, and at high concentrations there is potentiation. The green and red
lines show θd and θp respectively. θd is the calcium concentration below which there
will be no synaptic change, and above which there will be depression. Once calcium
concentration reaches θp we will begin to see potentiation.
model despite the problem as it was felt that the presence of late LTD would not effect
the questions we were asking about the relative effects of dopamine modulation. It
was believed that the magnitude and timing of the late LTD would be parameter sen-
sitive, and therefore might not always be observed in experiment. This appears to be
supported by the results in Figure 4.16 which show that the small parameter changes
brought about by dopamine modulation can mean that late LTD is not observed.
Other plasticity models were considered, such as (Rubin et al., 2005), but the model
by Shouval et al. (2002) was chosen because of it is conceptually clear - a factor which
would simplify the analysis and implementation.
4.4.3 Simulated dopamine modulation
In order to quantify the effects of dopamine on synaptic plasticity two major contribu-
tions need to be taken into account
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Figure 4.7: η controls the rate of change of synaptic weight. The effect of η is such
that there is very little synaptic weight change at low levels of calcium, and a fast rate
of weight change at high calcium concentrations.
1. the effect of dopamine on intrinsic excitability of the neuron
2. the effect of dopamine upon synaptic conductances.
To quantify both of these aspects of dopamine modulation I used data from the
PhD thesis of Ullrich Bartsch, working in the laboratory of Daniel Durstewitz.
The data consisted of the firing frequency of 30 neurons when injected with a range
of step currents in the presence of synaptic blockers. Graphs of nine of these neurons
are shown for illustration purposes in Figure 4.8. The step protocol was carried out
under three conditions — control, a bath solution of 50mm SKF38393 (a D1 recep-
tor agonist), and a bath solution of 10mm Quinpirole (a D2 receptor agonist). The
three conditions were intended to isolate the effects of D1 and D2 receptor stimula-
tion against a background of zero dopamine modulation. The firing rate of each of the
neurons was measured using an experimental protocol whereby neurons were injected
with a step current for 25 seconds. The initial 20 seconds were ignored to remove
transients, and the firing rate was calculated from the remaining 5 seconds. This was
repeated 10 times at increasing levels of current injection. Between each condition
there was a 10 minute pause to wash out the old agonist and wash in the new. The
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conditions were done in the order of control, D2 agonist, D1 agonist, as the D1 agonist
was found to cause some long-lasting changes that were not reversed by D2 activation.
A sample of the results from these experiments can be seen in Figure 4.8. The
f-I curves of the neurons showed considerable variance, but the results were similar to
those obtained by another study of Thurley et al. (2008), which used a slightly different
protocol.
The parameters for computationally simulating D1, D2, and control situations were
fitted by simulating the same protocol as had been done experimentally, and using an
automated parameter search to produce model f-I curves that closely fit the experi-
mental f-I curves shown in Figure 4.9. The parameters that were modified to simulate
dopamine modulation are shown in Table 4.1. It is important to note that this model
cannot be said to be a model of dopamine modulation itself, as the action of dopamine
is slightly more complex than merely being the sum of the effects of D1 and D2 ago-
nists.
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50uM SKF38393 (d1 agonist)
10uM Quinpirole (d2 agonist)
Figure 4.9: The experimental data — the effect of D1 and D2 agonists on firing fre-
quency for a given step current injection (nA). The results shown here represent the
mean frequency response across all neurons tested. The significance of the data was
calculated using a linear regression. D1 shows a significant difference from control with
p=0.05, whilst D2 is significant only at p>0.1. The results indicate that a D1 agonist
tends to make the neuron more excitable and lowers the rheobase.
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step current injection (nA)
control
Figure 4.10: The simulated f-I curves. The parameters of the model neurons were
modified so as to provide the best possible fit with the in vitro data.
It was not possible to produce model f-I curves that fit the experimental f-I curves
over the whole range. For most parameter values, curves that fit at high current input
resulted in neurons which failed to show any spiking at low current injections. This
is a consequence of opting to use the simple model neuron described in section 4.4.1.
This neuron is an accurate model of the membrane trace, but it was later found to be
a poor model of the f-I curve at low current injections. This is because the reduced
model relies upon a bifurcation to move from silent to spiking, and this prevents it
from demonstrating a gradual rise in spike rate as current is injected. Unfortunately
there is no choice of parameters that can change the qualitative dynamics of the neuron
without losing its ability to fit the membrane trace. The other option was to return
to the drawing board with the neuron model to implement more terms to change the
dynamics. It was decided it was not a worthwhile time investment to develop a new
neuron model to produce a better fit of one portion of the f-I curve.
This issue with the f-I curve at low current injection while significant, was not
large enough to effect the overall result. Given other, more significant weaknesses in
the model it was decided that this problem was better addressed in future work.
The difference between the experimentally measured f-I curves and the model f-
I curves obtained by parameter fitting can be seen in Figure 4.11. Below a current
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gNMDAmax gAMPAmax gM gNa
control 0.1429 0.1 19 23.3
D1 bath 0.2 0.1 10.6 21.9
D2 bath 0.0857 0.0857 18 23.3
Table 4.1: The synaptic and neural parameters changed by dopamine modulation, here
shown with their specific values under each condition.
injection of 150nA, the model neurons suddenly stop spiking. This is a consequence
of the bifurcation needed to generate the spikes.
In addition to the effect of dopamine modulation on neural excitability, we also
characterised the effect of dopamine on synaptic conductances. Based upon data ob-
tained in previous studies (Seamans and Durstewitz, 2008), we assumed that D1 mod-
ulation increased the conductance of NMDA channels by a factor of 1.4. A D2 agonist
decreased AMPA and NMDA conductances by a factor of 0.85, and 0.6 respectively.
The details of how these synaptic and excitability changes affect parameter values can
be seen in Table 4.1.
The model f-I curves used in this study represent the dopamine modulation used
in the original experiment (D1 : 50mm SKF38393, D2 : 10mm Quinpirole), and so this
model should only be considered a model of an in vitro situation, rather than in vivo,
where dopamine concentrations continuously fluctuate.
4.4.4 The plasticity protocols
In order to look at the full spectrum of effects of dopamine modulation, a selection of
plasticity protocols were simulated that would allow for the evaluation of the affect of
frequency, pairing, and relative spike timing on synaptic efficacy. The same selection
of protocols were used by a previous study, so this made it possible to compare the
results of this study with those reported by Shouval et al. (2002). The graphs for this
study can be seen in Figure 4.12.
During the course of my preliminary work it was found that the results of this
plasticity model were parameter sensitive, and that to reproduce the same results with
our model a specific set of parameters was required. However, as the results produced
with this model (such as STDP) were felt to be supported by the literature it was
decided that this level of parameterisation was acceptable, and so parameters were
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Figure 4.12: Graphs of plasticity curves reported by Shouval et al. (2002). The simu-
lated plasticity protocols used with this model are similar to the ones used in my sim-
ulations, so any difference in the results can be attributed to difference in the neuron
models and calcium influx mechanisms.
chosen so as to reproduce the basic STDP results in the control case.
The simulated plasticity protocols are designed to mimic in vitro plasticity pro-
tocols so that the results of the simulations might be comparable with experimental
results. Schematics of the three protocols are shown in figure 4.13
1. The frequency-dependent protocol used in vitro involves stimulating a bundle
of presynaptic inputs and assuming that it is a population of this bundle that
drives the postsynaptic neuron. It is not known exactly how many presynaptic
stimuli the postsynaptic neuron receives when this protocol is used, and so in
my implementation of this protocol it is estimated that the stimulus recruits nine
presynaptic neurons to spike simultaneously. This value was chosen because it
produced a response similar to what is observed in experiments. The simulated
presynaptic inputs have rise and decay dynamics of AMPA and NMDA chan-
nels and are delivered at a systematically varying frequency so as to determine
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Figure 4.13: Schematics of the three plasticity protocols. On the left is the frequency-
dependent protocol, in the centre the pairing protocol, and on the right the timing-
dependent plasticity protocol. Adapted from (Shouval, 2007)
the relationship between frequency of input spikes and the eventual plasticity
change.
2. Simulating the pairing protocol is relatively simple as the mechanisms underly-
ing the method are better understood. In the model the membrane potential of
the postsynaptic neuron is clamped at a certain value while the neuron receives
presynaptic stimulation. The membrane potential is then systematically varied
to determine the effect it has on plasticity.
3. The simulation of the spike timing-dependent protocol is relatively simple to
relate to the experimental protocol — in the experiment both presynaptic and
postsynaptic neurons are stimulated with a current injection multiple times at a
chosen frequency. This process is copied in the simulation, and the relative tim-
ing of the pre and postsynaptic stimuli are systematically varied to determine the
relationship between the timing difference and the eventual change in synaptic
efficacy.
4.5 Results
The three protocols were run and produced the results shown in Figures 4.14, 4.15, and
4.16 under simulated D1 and D2 modulation and control conditions.
The results produced by the model are broadly similar to those reported by Shouval
et al. (2002) (see the upper graphs in Figures 4.14, 4.15, and 4.16).
The model produces results which suggest that dopamine modulation of synaptic
conductances has a very strong effect on synaptic plasticity. Dopamine modulation
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Figure 4.14: A comparison of the results obtained in the frequency protocol with my
model (lower), and a previous model (Shouval et al., 2002) (upper). In my model at a
low frequency of stimulation there is a small amount of potentiation, and this increases
with the presysnaptic stimulation frequency. There is a range within which dopamine
modulation can increase or decrease the rate of weight change. Note that the y-axis
here denotes that rate of weight change rather than the actual weight change. This is
because at low frequencies the protocol takes very long, and there is therefore a much
larger time in which the plasticity can be consolidated. To make this an even playing
field I have instead plotted the rate of weight change.
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Figure 4.15: A comparison of the results obtained in the pairing protocol with my model
(lower), and a previous model (Shouval et al., 2002) (upper). In my model at low post-
synaptic voltages initially there is a depression, but as the voltage crossed a threshold,
the level of calcium in the spine enters into the LTP region of the Ω curve, and the
presynaptic stimulation results in potentiation. Again, D1 and D2 modulation serve to
shift the calcium concentration up or down, and this results in the neuron crossing into
the LTP region at a lower and higher voltage respectively.
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Figure 4.16: A comparison of the results obtained in the STDP protocol with my model
(lower), and a previous model (Shouval et al., 2002) (upper). My model reproduces
the “vanilla STDP” curve in the control case. The parameters (particularly the resting
calcium concentration) had to be set to achieve this. Interestingly the modulation of D1
and D2 agonists has unexpected results on the STDP curve. D1 modulation results in
more calcium influx, and so makes the neuron sensitive to pre and post synaptic co-
incidences over a wider temporal range AND results in an increased plasticity change.
D2 modulation on the other hand allows less calcium into the spine, and so sees only
LTD because even for pre before post spikes the calcium concentration does not push
Ω into the LTP region.
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via D1 receptors results in an increased likelihood of potentiation in almost all of the
protocols, whilst modulation via D2 receptors decreases the magnitude of potentiation.
According to the model, the primary mechanism of dopamine’s effect of synap-
tic change is due to its effect on synaptic conductances, rather than the changes in
intrinsic excitability ( Figure 4.17).
This is surprising because the effect of dopamine modulation of excitability is much
better understood than its direct effect on synapses, which is less well characterised.
This result implies that if we wish to understand the role of dopamine in learning (at
least via synaptic plasticity), we should focus more on the direct effects that dopamine
has on synapses, rather than indirect effects on neuron excitability. This is potentially
a valuable result as it suggests that we ought to focus experimental work on a different
aspect of dopamine modulation than is usually investigated.
If we compare the results with the closest existing experimental data, namely the
more recent study by Xu and Yao (2010), we find that the results are qualitatively sim-
ilar. This experimental study in the prefrontal cortex found that D1 receptor activation
facilitated timing-dependent LTP through a synaptic mechanism (cAMP and PKA) in
the presence of picrotoxin. Whilst combined D1 and D2 receptor activation broadens
the LTP window under intact inhibition. In addition D2 agonists are capable of induc-
ing timing-dependent LTP through their actions on GABAergic circuits, a mechanism
which was not included in this model.
4.6 Discussion
The results produced by the model suggest that changes at the synapse are likely to
have a more significant effect on plasticity than changes to the excitability of neurons.
However, this result is partially dependent upon the plasticity model we have used
here, so it is worth asking - “What key components of the model are responsible for
the result?”
4.6.1 The neuron model
The results reported - that synaptic effects are more significant than changes to neural
excitability - is a reflection of the relative contribution of the two effects that dopamine
has on calcium influx. Dopamine modulation of NMDA receptors increases NMDA
conductance by a factor of 1.4, whilst modulation of excitability only changes the
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rate at which the neuron spikes. In this model the primary mechanism for calcium
influx is the NMDA receptor, and so changes to the conductance of this receptor are
more effective at driving calcium input than is a slight increase in the frequency of
postsynaptic spikes. As long as the plasticity rule is calcium based, and calcium influx
occurs in this way, then we can expect this observation to hold.
However, there are two major problems with this scenario. One is that it is known
that there are other sources of calcium influx into the synapse other than the NMDA
receptor. In addition to calcium influx through the NMDA receptor, neurons also have
internal mechanisms which allow for release of calcium from intracellular stores. If we
are to verify or extend upon this result we should focus upon accurately characterising
these alternate sources of calcium. There are more detailed computational models of
calcium influx in the literature, and the findings of these models could be incoporated
into future work (Franks, 2001).
Another issue with this model is that the neuron model we have used is a model of
the membrane potential dynamics, and this does not necessarily translate into the cal-
cium dynamics of the neuron. It it not clear how realistic it is to attempt to reconstruct
intracellular calcium concentration from the membrane potential alone. In addition
to the observation that calcium dynamics and membrane dynamics may diverge, it is
also possible that dopamine modulates calcium influx independently of changes to the
membrane potential. If this was the case we would need new experiments to charac-
terise this effect.
4.6.2 The plasticity model
Aside from issues with the neuron model, the process of implementing the plasticity
model made some of its weaknesses clear. Since the development of the plasticity
model used in this study it has become more clear that the types of plasticity observed
in pyramidal cells is dependent upon the location in the dendritic tree where the obser-
vations were made (Kampa et al., 2007).
These results indicate that the dendritic morphology of the neuron has a significant
effect upon the outcome of a particular stimulation. Future work could attempt to
model the morphology of the neuron, as reconstructions of prefrontal cortex pyramidal
cells do exist. However one should be wary of attempting to add an ever-increasing
amount of biological realism to a computational model.
In the process of developing the plasticity model it became clear that in order for
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the STDP results to be produced, the calcium concentration must be at a fixed concen-
tration when the neuron is at rest - this is highlighted as point A in Figure 4.18. Given
the variation that we find in measurements of neural parameters, it is highly unlikely
that all neurons maintain this constant value of calcium concentration unless there is a
homeostatic mechanism that ensures this is the case.
Another issue that became clear when working with this plasticity model is that
there is a problem with the sensitivity to calcium. If the model is to reproduce the well
known spike-timing dependent plasticity curve, it must at rest be poised at point A in
Figure 4.18, the calcium concentration at which the neuron is exquisitely sensitive to
the difference in calcium influx that occurs due to relative timing differences of one pre
and postsynaptic pair. However, when a neuron with this kind of sensitivity is subjected
to repeated pre and postsynaptic firing, the total level of calcium influx dwarfs the
relative difference that occurs during a spike-timing protocol. So, if the neuron is to
reproduce the spike-timing results it must be sensitive to changes in calcium of the
order of 0.005mM, even though repeated spiking can drive the calcium concentration
to increase by 0.1mM. This kind of sensitivity over two different ranges suggests that
other mechanisms must be involved.
4.6.3 The methodology
The final issue that I faced when working with this model was to do with the method-
ology I set out to test at the beginning of this chapter - that of empirical modelling.
The level of complexity present in dopamine modulation of plasticity made it difficult
to construct a model which could account for all empirical observations. In practice
it is not possible to construct a model where all the parameters are based upon ob-
servables AND have the model remain ecologically valid. Both the neuron model and
the dopamine modulation model had their roots in the data, but the process of com-
bining the two models meant that new variables and mechanisms were required. As
the models had been configured to work in different regimes these parameter values
had to be set in order to get both models to work together. Unfortunately putting two
computational models together does not yield a larger, yet still accurate model. When
working with two models with uncertain data the errors propagate and the assumptions
multiply. While there are plenty of ways in which the model could be more technically
accurate, the process of developing it has led me to the viewpoint that there are prob-
lems with this style of modelling that cannot be completely resolved by adding more
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detail.
4.7 Conclusions
A model of the effect of dopamine on synaptic plasticity was constructed. The model
produced results which suggest that dopamine is a potent enhancer of synaptic plastic-
ity, particularly through the effect of dopamine upon synaptic conductances.
However, in the process I became aware of the cumulative affect of the many es-
timations and assumptions that were required to complete the model. This process of
implementing theoretically-derived models, and parameter-fitting was present in every
step of the process, despite my best attempts to base the model on firm experimental
data.
I have discussed the methodology used in this chapter and concluded that like the
engineering-style approach used in the last chapter, empirically-based modelling has
it’s weaknesses. In the next chapter I will attempt a third approach, which is described
below.
4.8 A third approach
My first attempt at answering the question posed at the beginning of this thesis failed
because the theoretical models used by what I referred to as an engineering approach
were too powerful and could be made to fit any data. Without a firm grounding in ex-
perimental data it was very difficult to translate them into experiments that can support
or refute them.
My second attempt — the empirical approach described here in this chapter — also
ran into problems because I found that it is not possible or desirable to create purely
empirical models. Even the experimental observations used to generate the models
are theory laden, and these subtle assumptions that are made along the way when
constructing experiments become explicit when we try to produce a computational
model of the experiment.
Both these attempts ran into problems because of the nature of the question I was
asking — what is the way that the brain solves the problem? - It is a conclusion of this
chapter that it is not possible to answer this question. If our observations are theory
laden, then we can never adequately verify whether a computational model is a “true
model” of what happens in the brain.
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Figure 4.18: For the model to produce depression or potentiation dependent upon the
relative timing of pre and post synaptic spikes, the calcium concentration of the neuron
must maintain a homeostatic baseline level of calcium at point A. This allows spike pairs
with positive ∆t to tip the neuron into the LTP region, whilst spike pairs with negative
∆t will lead to a net efflux of calcium, and synaptic depression. However, in our model
point A is not a stable point, and without an additional calcium homeostasis mechanism
to keep the calcium concentration at point A it is highly unlikely the neuron will stay
there by chance. Even with the addition of a calcium homeostasis mechanism there
is a problem with a plasticity rule based upon this omega function. The STDP region,
shaded in the graph above, is very narrow, meaning the synapse must be sensitive to
very small changes in calcium concentration. However, this degree of sensitivity is not
compatible with the magnitude of calcium that can enter through an NMDA channel if
the neuron is repeatedly stimulated.
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Rather than launch into a third attempt to overcome this perennial problem, my
solution is to avoid asking this problematic question of “what is really going on in the
brain?”. Instead my third approach will be to focus on providing an interpretation
or theoretical model of the data that may make some interesting predictions, but does
not claim to represent how the brain solves the problem. This method is not interested
in how the brain solves the problem, but in whether or not this conceptual model can
produce predictions that might prove to be useful. It marks a change from asking
questions about how the brain works, to asking questions about how we can make
useful tools.
Is this kind of modelling useful? Does it have a place within neuroscience? And
is it qualitatively different from the two approaches we have already examined, or do





In this chapter I construct a systems-level model of the effects of dopamine on activ-
ity in the prefrontal cortex. I show how basic assumptions about the anatomy of the
cortex and basal ganglia can lead to TD-like behaviour. The model produces the novel
observation that working memory dynamics can be seen as an emergent feature of a
reinforcement learning system.
5.2 Introduction
In the previous two chapters I have tried to address the central question of this thesis
using a computational model. So far I have looked at:
1. Chapter 3 : An engineering approach — I looked at a model which attempted
to show how an interesting theoretical mechanism might be applied to solve a
neurophysiological problem
2. Chapter 4 : An empirical approach — I attempted to construct a model based
entirely upon empirical data, that would produce quantitative predictions that
could be tested by further experiments
Both of these methods met with mixed success. The aim in this chapter is to use what
has been learned so far to produce a third model which improves upon, or offers an
109
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alternative to the previous two attempts, AND reflects upon the central question of this
thesis — “Does dopamine form part of a reinforcement learning circuit in the brain”.
In the last chapter I produced a model which was tied to experimental observations,
and therefore potentially useful in making new predictions. However, throughout the
modelling process I was forced to make approximations and assumptions as a result
of the data that was available. One response to these shortcomings, and indeed the
most common response is to try to fix the model by adding more detail... “Perhaps if
we implemented a plasticity model which was more aware of the neuron morphology
then our model may make more realistic predictions?”. The level of complexity that is
present in neuroscience almost guarantees that we will never be able to construct per-
fectly accurate models, so we should consider inaccuracies in our models as inevitable,
rather than something we can fix by adding more detail.
One issue that was discussed at the end of the last chapter was that these mod-
els both fail in the way that the models try to get at “what is really happening in the
brain”. The first approach fails because the models it produces are difficult to verify
experimentally, whilst the second approach fails because it it easy to verify and thereby
easy to demonstrate its inaccuracy at some higher level of detail. If there are problems
at either end of the scale of verification, then perhaps the problem is the process of
verification itself? If we relax our need to compare the model to every known exper-
imental observation, if we instead produce models that aim to provide a conceptual
framework for interpreting just a subset of the observations, then will the problem go
away?
Although this third approach may appear to be just a subtle, semantic difference, it
frees us up from having to match the biological data perfectly (a problem in approach
2), at the cost of being able to claim that the model represents what is really happening
in the brain (an aim of approach 1 and 2).
So the aim of this chapter is to
• Interpret the physiological data about how the brain behaves during reinforce-
ment learning tasks
• Offer a model of how dopamine might form part of a reinforcement learning
circuit in the brain
• Suggest future avenues of research
• Demonstrate a proof of concept that the mechanisms in the model can solve the
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problem
The key thing to note about this approach is that it makes no claims to represent what
is really going on in the brain. In fact it considers the very question to be ill-formed.
Instead this should be thought of as a throwaway model, which aims to explain a subset
of the experimental data, which in our case are the neurophysiological correlates of
reinforcement learning tasks.
If the model we construct is successful in solving the task, then it may prove to be
a useful conceptual framework for designing future experiments or clinical interven-
tions, but despite its usefulness it cannot be used to support any claims about what is
happening in the biology.
5.3 Aims of the model
The aim of the model in theis chapter is to show how simple assumptions about the
effect of dopamine modulation and the anatomy of the cortex and basal ganglia can
lead to TD-like behaviour.
It is not an attempt to go the other way - to show how theoretical models from
machine learning can be mapped onto the anatomy. The difference between these two
approaches is the intended audience - the former is more likely to be of interest to cog-
nitive neuroscientists, while the latter is of interest to the machine learning community.
5.4 Literature review
5.4.1 The neurophysiology of reinforcement learning
Work by Schultz (1998) suggests dopamine neurons fire phasically following an un-
expected reward. During phasic firing, dopamine is released from axons in the cor-
tex and striatum (Seamans, 2007), (Arbuthnott and Wickens, 2007). The subsequent
increase in extracellular dopamine concentrations and leads to biochemical and elec-
trophysiological changes to neurons in these target regions. The prefrontal cortex in
particular is thought to be involved in working memory (See (Goldman-Rakic, 1995)
for a review), and it is believed that the dopamine modulation plays a key role in
this. In recent years computational models of the prefrontal cortex have suggested
electrophysiological mechanisms by which dopamine might facilitate the persistent of
delay-period activity. Models by Durstewitz et al. (2000a) have suggest that dopamine
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modulation leads to a bifurcation in the membrane potential of pyramidal cells, and
this bistable state may lend properties which aid working memory circuits (Durstewitz
et al., 2000b). Another model by Tegnér et al. (2002) suggests that working mem-
ory comes about by recurrent, reverbatory activity in prefrontal circuits. Other models
have proposed that working memory comes about through the bistable dynamics of
medium spiny neurons in the striatum (Gruber et al., 2006).
Neurons in the prefrontal cortex that are modulated by dopamine project back to
the VTA (Gariano and Groves, 1988) and also to neurons in the striatum (Voorn et al.,
2004). These cortical projections which synapse in the VTA are capable of triggering
burst firing of dopamine neurons when stimulated (Gariano and Groves, 1988). These
reciprocal links off one pathway by which the reward prediction error signal from
dopamine neurons could result in future reward prediction error signals.
Projections from the cortex to the striatum converge on synapses at medium spiny
neurons - gabaergic neurons which in turn project to the substantia nigra and ventral
tegmental area (Voorn et al., 2004). Direct projections from these areas are known to
inhibit VTA neurons, and prevent phasic bursts (Diana and Tepper, 2002). The striatum
is densely innervated by dopamine axons and forms another loop by which a reward
prediction error signal can contribute to future estimates of reward prediction error. It
has been found that a proportion of these inhibitory projections carry information about
the degree of expectation of reward. In a study by Hollerman et al. (1998) 250/1500
neurons sample in the caudate nucleus, putamen, and ventral striatum showed activity
that reflected the expectation of experimenter instructions or presentation of a trigger
stimulus.
Outside of the striatum, cholinergic neurons in the PPTg project to the VTA and are
thought to relay primary sensory input of rewarding stimuli (Grace et al., 2007). These
cholinergic neurons are particularly effective at triggering phasic bursts of dopamine
neurons.
5.4.2 Existing computational models
The first model to make a connection between models of reinforcement learning and
dopamine was that by Houk et al. (1994). They proposed that circumscribed regions
of the striatum called strisomes, and neighbouring matrix regions formed the basis of a
reinforcement learning circuit in the basal ganglia. Houk et al. (1994) described their
model using the “actor-critic” terminology used in machine learning, and suggested
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the striatum was the actor, and dopamine neurons the critic. Similarly to the model by
Izhikevich (2007) described in Chapter 3, Houk et al. (1994) proposed that dopamine
reinforced biochemical eligbility traces such as CAMKII. A later model by Suri and
Schultz (1998) implemented an actor-critic model and demonstrated that it could suc-
cessfully back-propagate reward prediction error. Contreras-Vidal and Schultz (1999)
based their model on Adaptive Resonance Theory (ART) and suggested that prefrontal
cortex activity guides short and long-term processing in cortico-striatal circuits. Brown
et al. (1999) also proposed a biologically-inspired model of reinforcement learning
which they claimed offered an alternative to TD formulations. Another model by Berns
and Sejnowski (1998) provided a systems-level description of how the basal ganglia
might implement action selection. A review of biologically inspired reinforcement
learning models can be found in models can be found in (Bar-Gad et al., 2003).
5.4.3 The link between working memory and reinforcement learn-
ing
The only other article I have been able to find making a link between reinforcement
learning and working memory is by (Savin and Triesch, 2009), who also suggest that
the link has so far not been recognised.
5.4.4 The neurophysiology of reinforcement learning : key obser-
vations
As stated above, my aim is to interpret the physiological data — the key observations
I intend to build my model on are
1. When released dopamine changes the excitability and synaptic conductivity of
neurons with dopamine receptors. According to the literature, this effect of
dopamine upon cortical pyramidal cells can be separated into two timescales.
In the first 100-200ms VTA activity evokes an EPSP and inhibits spontaneous
firing (Gorelova et al., 2002), whilst over a longer time period (around 30 min-
utes) the effect of the dopamine that is released is to increased evoked spiking
(Lavin et al., 2005) and to enhance effective AMPA and NMDA synaptic con-
ductances (Seamans et al., 2001).
2. Dopaminergic neurons appear to spike in patterns that correspond to the re-
ward prediction error signal described by the temporal differences algorithm.
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(Schultz, 1998).
The central question in this thesis is about the relationship between these two observa-
tions. Is phasic dopamine the cause of reinforcement learning? How might observa-
tion 1 lead to observation 2? Is the action of dopamine on cortical and striatal neurons
enough to lead to the reward-linked patterns of spiking observed in the dopaminergic
nuclei?
5.4.5 The role of dopamine in a reinforcement learning circuit
The model I looked at in chapter 3 Izhikevich (2007) attempted to solve this problem
by expressing the action of dopamine as a change in plasticity at individual synapses.
This made the synapses more sensitive to the neuron spike rate and the relative ordering
of pre and post synaptic spikes. Izhikevich suggested that this mechanism was enough
to solve the distal reward problem. But, as we have shown in chapter 3, there are some
problems with the model.
One of the key issues that was found with this model is that it was sensitive to
changes on a very short timescale — the millisecond timescale of individual action
potentials. This is in contrast with the timescale of the behaviour that determines
whether or not there is a reward (seconds and minutes). According to the separation of
timescales argument laid out in section 1.4, if we are looking to find the proximal cause
of some effect we should start by looking for phenomena that vary on the same or a
slightly shorter timescale, before turning our attention to more distal causes. Models
which attempt to explain macroscopic phenomena using microscopic mechanisms are
jumping the gun, and are likely to run into problems similar to those we observed with
the engineering style of modelling in chapter 3 — if we are free to pick and choose
our microscopic mechanisms, then we can probably put them together in many ways to
solve the problem, none of which necessarily represent the way the biology solves the
problem.
To avoid running into this issue I intend to build a model from phenomena of a
similar temporal and spatial scale as the behaviour we are trying to explain. Thus,
rather than explain behavioural learning using millisecond phenomena at individual
synapses, I will focus upon the effect of dopamine over seconds and minutes on the
mass activity of populations of neurons.
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5.5 Constructing the model
Based upon the reasoning outlined above, the models in this chapter will be based upon
phenomena that occur at a slower timescale than the single neurons and action poten-
tials that are often the basis of models in computational neuroscience. In constructing
the model I will make a few assumptions. To make these explicit and clear they are:
1. A phasic burst of dopamine neurons that occurs after an unexpected reward
leads to a transient increase in dopamine concentration (Arbuthnott and Wick-
ens, 2007).
2. The short increase in dopamine concentration changes the state of neurons for a
period longer than the elevation in concentration (Lavin et al., 2005).
3. A brief phasic increase in dopamine concentration causes neurons to enhance
their excitability (Lavin et al., 2005), which over a long period results in en-
hanced plasticity and spine growth at the synapses of active neurons.
4. These changes lead to a greater degree of recurrent activity among neurons that
were active at the time of reward relative to those which were not active
These assumptions have been chosen for the model because they are a) fairly simple, b)
supported by the experimental data, c) offer properties that might be useful for solving
the distal reward problem. In order to show how these mechanisms might play a part in
a reinforcement learning circuit in the brain, I will construct the reinforcement learning
model in 3 steps
1. First I will show how the plasticity changes that occur after a reward can translate
into persistent delay-period activity (working memory).
2. Secondly I will show how the enhanced activity that occurs at the onset of pre-
dictive cues can be learned as an early prediction of reward
3. Finally, I will suggest how the development of an expectation of reward can
lead to a back-propagation of reward prediction error and the eventual firing of
dopamine neurons in accordance with the predictions of reinforcement learning.













Figure 5.1: A schematic of the model network showing populations of neurons during
the course of a single trial. The shading of the populations indicates their activity, so
the first population starts as highly active, and during the course of the trial its activity
diffuses to the other populations. In the simulations one population is chosen as a cue,
and starts with a correspondingly high level of activity. At the end of the trial a reward
is presented (simulated by the learning rule) if the cue was presented. In this model a
cue is presented in the first timestep (by increasing the activity of the cue population),
and during the remainder of the trial the activity is free to diffuse through the network.
The activity of the populations at the time of reward is used to update their recurrence
rates — this process is supposed to be analogous to the activity-dependent plasticity
that occurs when dopamine is released.
5.6 Learning working memory from reward
5.6.1 Method
Behavioural stimuli in reinforcement learning experiments are thought to be repre-
sented by populations of neurons rather than single units, and so my models are com-
posed of populations of neurons, rather than single neurons. In this model I am not
particularly concerned about the exact millisecond dynamics of individual neurons,
and so the activity of the population is represented as a number between 0 (no activity)
and 1 (highly active).
Populations are connected to one another by thousands of synapses – the value
assigned to these connections represents the relative number of synaptic connections.
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Following Compte et al. (2000), populations are more likely to be connected to their
neighbour than distant populations, such that the distribution of connections between










Here d is the distance between two populations when the populations are laid out
on a ring. For example, in a network with 100 populations, the distance between pop-
ulation 1 and 100 is 1. The parameter σ controls the width of the gaussian distribution.
The number of internal connections within a population is variable, and this number
is referred to as the recurrence rate (RR). At the end of each timestep in the simulation,
a fraction of the activity of each population escapes and is free to diffuse into other
populations. The fraction of activity that escapes with each timestep is 1−RR, im-
plying that populations with a larger degree of recurrence hold onto their activity for
longer. As the escaping activity merely diffuses into another part of the network, the
overall activity in the network is conserved. To simulate the process of neural diffu-
sion, for each population, two recipient populations i are chosen according to a random
weighted sample, where the weights for the sample given by the interpopulation con-
nection weights Wi j. This additional activity passed on from the jth populations to the
two recipient populations i is given by




The above rule effectively transfers the activity lost by the population j to the two
recipient populations. In this simple model I am interested in what will happen in a
simple reinforcement learning scenario, such as the one illustrated in Figure 5.1. In
this example a cue is presented at t = 0, and paired with a reward at t = treward . In this
first model, at the time of reward, a variable representing dopamine concentration is
manually increased, and I examine the effect this has on the populations that are often
active in the timesteps before the reward.
It was proposed in my assumptions that the effect of a phasic increase in dopamine
concentration is to potentiate synapses between neurons that were active at the time of
reward. In biology this is a slow process which happens in the seconds and minutes
after a reward, but one that will be approximated here by increasing the recurrence rates
of the populations that were active at the time of reward using the following formula:










Here RRn+1, j represent the value that the recurrence rate will take on the n+1th trial
due to the reward-based learning that takes place at the end of the nth trial. RRdecay
is the rate at which the recurrence of a population decays over time independently
of learning. RR j represents the recurrence rate of the jth population, and PA equals
the Population Activity. The effect of the PA term is that populations with greater
than average activity at the time of reward will see their recurrence rates increase,
whilst those lower than average will see their recurrence rates decrease. This serves
to implement some basic credit assignment. 4RR is the rate at which the recurrence
rate changes during learning. On trials where there is no reward, no explicit dopamine
release is modelled, and so only the first, decay part of the equation is relevant.
During the simulations, 15 trials were run where the cue and reward are paired,
seperated by 15 trials where there was no cue and no reward. In the model a presenta-
tion of the cue is simulated by artificially setting the activity of the randomly chosen
cue population to 1. The recurrence rate of all the populations starts at a uniform value
of 0.05.
5.6.2 Results
The results from this first phase of the model are shown in Figure 5.2. As can be
seen in the figure, the repeated pairing of cue and reward causes an increase in the
recurrence rate of the cue population. This can be seen more clearly in a plot of how
the recurrence rates change with each trial (Figure 5.3).
After 15 rewarded trials we can see that the recurrence rate of the cue popula-
tion has increased dramatically. Interestingly, the recurrence rates of the populations
neighbouring the cue population are also increased by an amount proportional to their
distance from the cue population. This property is known as generalisation, and in
most circumstances is a very useful property, particularly in situations where the re-
ward contingencies of stimuli are continuous in space - ie. a similar stimulus is more
informative than a random stimulus. Cortical columns are one example where features
are represented spatially through the cortex, and in some parts of the prefrontal cortex,
reward contingencies are also represented in a similar manner (Rao et al., 1999). One
major advantage of generalisation is that the brain is robust to the loss of individual
neurons, or even populations.
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Figure 5.3: The graph shows how the recurrence rates of populations change during
the course of the trials. The lines zig-zag because the simulation alternates between
rewarded and unrewarded trials. The figure shows how close synaptic connections be-
tween population 1 and its neighbours can lead to generalisation — the final recurrence
rates are higher for the populations closer to the rewarded cue population (population
1). These neighbourhood relations can lead to generalisation, whereby a similar cue
(such as the stimulus represented by poulation 2) can lead to a prediction of reward.
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In my simulation the recurrence rates started out with a uniform value, and so the
final ranking of recurrence rates according to distance from the cue population shows
how reward might cause cortical columns to self-organise so as to represent reward
continuums according to distance in the cortex (Rao et al., 1999). 1
Returning to the results of the simulation, we can see that after 15 cue-reward pair-
ings the recurrence rates have increased considerably. We can see in the last rewarded
trial of Figure 5.2 that the model has begun to show some sustained delay period ac-
tivity in a manner reminiscent of what is observed in working memory tests (Fuster
and Alexander, 1971). In fact, in the final state of this simulation, where the model
“knows” that when the cue appears that the reward will definitely come — this type
of behaviour is identical to working memory. Although it is not often pointed out in
the literature, following section 2.4.2 I propose that the behaviour is indistinguishable
because working memory is an emergent property of a reinforcement learning circuit.
Although in this simple model it is only the trace of the cue which is kept active during
the delay period, I propose that this same mechanism can explain how goal-dependent
motor control can be learned. In a realistic learning scenario, it is not only the trace of
the cue that would be kept active, but the whole sequence of cues and corresponding
motor commands that reliably led to reward in previous trials. It is this sequence that
would be learned and played back in precise order during the delay period.
One problem that is visible with these results is that the recurrence rate of the
cue population has become so strong by trial 15 that random activity can accumulate
during a trial such that the cue population becomes active even when the reward is not
presented. This can be seen in the last unrewarded trial of Figure 5.2, bottom right
graph, where population 1 begins to accumulate activity as the trial goes on because it
has such a strong recurrence rate. This is a problem if we assume that the activity of
these cue populations constitutes a prediction of future reward, as such activity would
count as a false positive.
1Based upon these results we might be tempted to conclude that the brain is optimally evolved for
the stimuli, but likewise it could also be the case that the stimuli are classified this way as an by-product
of this kind of self-organising wiring process. To ask whether it is the brain connectivity that causes the
stimulus statistics, or the stimulus statistic that cause the connectivity is like asking whether the chicken
or the egg came first.
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PFC
VTA
Figure 5.4: The populations in our model represent populations of neurons in the pre-
frontal cortex. A fraction of the neurons in the populations have excitatory projections
to the ventral tegmental area, and so activation of these populations is able to trigger
dopamine release, and hence learning. Because the activity of these populations can
precede and contribute to a reward, we will assume that the activity of these excitatory
projections constitutes a reward prediction.
5.7 Back propagation of predictions
In this section I build upon the model in section 5.6, but this time adding a mech-
anism to simulate the process of reward prediction more realistically. In the first
model I manually increase dopamine release at the time of reward. However, in re-
ality dopamine can be released before the arrival of the actual reward if a reward is
sufficiently strongly predicted by a cue. But how might this process of prediction occur
in the brain, and how can it cause dopamine neurons to fire earlier?
I propose that it occurs due to excitatory connections from cortical regions that act
as predictors of reward by stimulating the dopamine neurons, and thus enabling them
to fire earlier than the time of reward. It is known that there are profuse projections
from the cortex to the ventral tegmental area (Gariano and Groves, 1988), and that the
prefrontal cortex in particular represents reward contingent stimuli (Wallis and Miller,
2003). If we assume that the populations in our model are populations of neurons in
the prefrontal cortex, and that some of these neurons have excitatory projections to the
VTA, then high levels of activity in these populations ought to be able to bring about the
release of dopamine in our model. A simple schematic of this architecture, which will
be used for the next model, is shown in Figure 5.4. I will propose that strong activity
of these populations constitutes a reward prediction, and is therefore capable of
stimulating a reward prediction error (unexpected reward) and hence dopamine release.
I will incorporate these predictions in the next model by simply assuming that
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above a certain threshold, excitatory input from the cortical populations in sufficient to
trigger a phasic burst of the VTA.
Ultimately the question of exactly how these excitatory connections affect the VTA
must be answered by further investigation of the biology. The firing of dopamin-
ergic neurons is highly complex as it involves an interaction between glutamatergic
(AMPA and NMDA), gabaergic, and dopaminergic neurotransmitter, and the natural
pacemaker activity of the neuron (Grace et al., 2007). In the model the fixed, per neu-
ron threshold implies that it is primarily strong predictions that cause a phasic burst of
the VTA neurons, rather than an additive effect of many weak predictions. To show
what happens when reward predictions can trigger dopamine release, another round
of simulations was run using this new model. In this simulation, if the activity of the
strongest population exceeds the VTA threshold in the timestep before dopamine re-
lease occurs (this starts out as the timestep in which the primary reward arrives), then
the time of dopamine release is shifted backwards one timestep on the next trial. By
this mechanism it is possible for successful predictions to repeatedly backpropagate
the firing of dopaminergic neurons. An algorithm for this is given in section 5.7.1.
5.7.1 Method
In this phase the simulation will be the same as in the previous section, only this time
rather than the manual dopamine release, the timing of dopamine release will be deter-
mined by the following logic.
if max(PopulationActivity) > 0.4 AND t +1 = treward
then treward = treward−1
Where max(PopulationActivity) will return the activity of the most active popula-
tion. This will potentially allow dopamine to be release early if there is a strong reward
prediction from the cortical populations. The architecture of the network is the same
as before, only this time I am explicitly labelling the populations as prefrontal cortex
pyramidal cells with excitatory connections to the ventral tegmental area.
5.7.2 Results
The results from this second phase of simulations are shown in Figure 5.5. The graphs
indicate that the dopamine that is released at the end of each rewarded trial causes
the recurrence rates of the reward-predicting populations to rise, until their activity in
the timestep before the reward arrival is enough to trigger a phasic burst of dopamine
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Figure 5.6: On the left the activity of cortical populations and dopamine neurons in
the model is shown at the end of the learning process. On the right is what has been
observed in animals (Schultz, 1998), (Shuler and Bear, 2006). At present the cortical
activity in my model is driving dopamine neuron activity from the moment of the cue
presentation all the way until the reward. However, the experiments tell us that the
activation of dopamine neurons is transient, and occurs only at the time of cue presen-
tation. This suggests that the model requires an additional mechanism that will silence
the dopamine neurons after their initial burst.
neurons before the reward itself arrives. This process is a positive feedback loop —
the earlier the reward prediction, the greater the remaining cue trace, and therefore the
greater the increase in the recurrence rate. With each repeated trial, the time of reward
release is propagated backwards until the onset of the cue alone is enough to trigger
the release of dopamine neurons. It is this process which is predicted by reinforcement
learning, and this process which is observed in the dopamine neurons of behaving
primates.
However, the mechanism described here is still incomplete — at present the “pre-
diction”, or prefrontal activity triggered by the cue continues to excite the dopamine
neurons throughout the delay period. But, from previous experiments we know that
the phasic burst of dopamine neurons ought to be transient and only occurs at the onset
of the cue, and not after it. A schematic explaining this process is shown in Figure 5.6.
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In the next section I will address this problem with the third phase of the model.
The model has sucessfully solved the problem of backpropagation of predictions, but
not backpropagation of reward prediction error. In some sense, this can be counted
as a successful step in the modelling process — by making one’s model of the system
explicit, one often finds that the initial model is too simplistic, and another mechanism
is required. In the next section a mechanism will be added that will result in the back-
propagation of reward prediction errors, rather than just the backpropagation of reward
prediction.
5.8 Back propagation of prediction error
The previous section showed how a reward prediction could be backpropagated. How-
ever, it is known from experiments that dopamine neurons do not fire phasically after
reward prediction, but after an unexpected reward prediction (reward prediction error)
RPE = prediction− expectation+actualreward (5.3)
In this model I assume that the actual reward signal (information about the sensa-
tion of the primary, unconditioned reward) arrives via a subcortical input which has
the ability to strongly and quickly activate dopamine neurons when a primary reward
occurs. One candidate structure for this is the pendunculopontine tegmentum (PPTg),
which has cholinergic projections to the VTA which are capable of causing phasic
spikes (Grace et al., 2007).
In the formula above I have suggested that alongside the reward prediction there
is also a reward expectation which acts to inhibit the dopaminergic neurons, hence the
minus sign in equation 5.3. I am proposing this expectation term because it is known
that as an animal is repeatedly exposed to the reward it accumulates evidence that the
reward will arrive, and after this evidence has been learned, the primary reward has
a diminished ability to cause phasic dopamine release via the activity of the PPTg.
This learning-dependent inhibition of reward predictions closely mimics our everyday
concept of expectation, and so I will refer to it as such. It is this phenomenon that seems
likely to hold the key to back propagating unexpected reward predictions, rather than
just backpropagating reward predictions.
If this is the mechanism by which reward prediction error is backpropagated, then
how might this work in the brain? As I have suggested it is most likely to be the work
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Figure 5.7: Our model proposes that the reward prediction error apparently signalled by
dopaminergic nuclei is the result of two processes — a reward prediction, which comes
from the cortex, and a delayed reward expectation which comes from inhibitory neurons
in the striatum. I propose that these two processes are backpropagated in concert, so
that at the end of the learning process, the sum of the excitation and inhibition results
in a reward prediction error signal like the one shown above.
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of inhibitory synapses on dopaminergic neurons, because the effect of expectation is
to lower the likelihood of dopamine neurons from firing. Dopamine neurons receive
inhibitory projections from many sources, including autoinhibition from dopamine re-
leased from the dendrites (reviewed in section 2.7.1). One major sources of inhibitory
input is the striatum, which is composed primarily of gabaergic medium spiny neu-
rons, and is uniquely placed to integrate multi-modal sensory input due to the massive
convergence of cortical projections on the medium spiny neurons (Voorn et al., 2004).
The striatum receives much of its input from the cortex, and is known to carry informa-
tion about reward contingencies in reinforcement learning tasks (Haber et al., 2006). I
propose that neurons in the striatum take information about reward-contingent sensory
stimuli and integrate it to provide an inhibition of the dopaminergic neurons. It is this
inhibition that constitutes our expectation of reward.
Another key factor that makes the striatum a suitable source for our proposed re-
ward expectation is that it represents an indirect pathway by which sensory stimuli
represented in the cortex can inhibit dopamine neurons. The indirect pathway would
result in reward expectation arriving slightly later than the reward prediction (relative
to the timing of the stimulus), which might prove quite a useful property — the on-
set of a predictive cue would trigger a strong, direct prediction form the cortex, and
this would be followed by a slower, indirect inhibition from the striatum. This in-
hibition would serve to prevent dopamine neurons from phasically firing during the
delay period, despite the sustained activity in the cortical populations. This process is
illustrated in Figure 5.7.
One advantage of using expectation as the mechanism for backpropagation of re-
ward prediction error is that it may also explain other well known reinforcement learn-
ing observations as a side-effect. Phenomena such as the dip in dopaminergic firing
when an expected reward does not arrive, a lack of dopamine response to “blocked”
stimuli, and a negative followed by positive reward prediction error when a reward is
delayed, are all compatible with this mechanism (Schultz, 2007).
My aim in this section will be to demonstrate how the mechanism could work using
a computational model.
5.8.1 Method
An updated schematic of the anatomy that the model represents is shown in Figure 5.8.
In this third and final computational model, inhibition is modelled by taking the
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StriatumPFC
VTA
Figure 5.8: The proposed anatomy of the reinforcement learning circuit. The VTA re-
leases dopamine according to the combindation of excitatory input from the cortex, and
inhibitory input from the striatum. Populations in the striatum are driven by activity in
the cortex, and so information about reward contingent stimuli arrives slightly later than
direct information from the cortex. The subcortical sources of primary reward are not
shown here.
activity from the cortical populations at the previous timestep and multiplying it by
-0.6. The inhibition contributed by each population is subtracted from the excitation,
and if the remaining activity of any one of the populations is greater than the threshold,
a phasic spike of the dopamine neurons will occur. The value of 0.6 was chosen so that
strong inhibition will lower the activity of dopamine neurons below the threshold for
phasic spikes (0.4). Therefore a strong expectation of reward can be enough to prevent
phasic dopamine release.
A reinforcement learning task is learned more quickly if there is a shorter time
gap between the cue and the reward, or if the are many intervening cues between the
first predictive cue and the reward. To help the model learn more quickly 4 serially
ordered cues were used, with each one indicating that a reward will occur with 100%
probability. If the model is working correctly, the peak reward prediction error and
subsequent dopamine release should gradually backpropagate from the last cue to the
first.
In our network the recurrence rates are bounded at 1, whilst a separate inhibitory
weight is bounded at 2. This is to allow the inhibition to catch and eventually silence
excitatory stimulation as long as learning continues.
The simulation was run in the same way as the previous two phases of the model,
only for this model the simulation was run for 18 alternating rewarded and unrewarded
trials.
Chapter 5. Diffusion based Reinforcement Learning model 130
5.8.2 Results
The results from this final phase of modelling are shown in Figures 5.9 and 5.10. The
figures show that the mechanisms I have proposed can in principle lead to the back-
propagation of reward prediction error. I have deliberately chosen simple mechanisms
which have some grounding in the data, and showed how the interaction of these mech-
anisms can potentially account for the highly complex goal-driven behaviour we ob-
serve in animals.
5.9 Discussion
The model that has been constructed in this chapter successfully implements a rein-
forcement learning system inspired by the anatomy of the frontal cortex, dopaminergic
nuclei, and the striatum. The intention of this model was to show how in principle
these anatomical regions might combine to display the kind of complex goal-driven
behaviour we observe in animals. It should be clear however, that the parameters of
the model that was constructed were parameters that were chosen to make the model
work, and are not based upon empirical values. As a result the model is quite inflex-
ible, and is only capable of solving these toy problems in the limited parameter range
within which it was designed to work. It is not my intention to extend the model to try
to explain more data and make it more robust, but to highlight the kind of questions
that could be examined experimentally to provide support or refute the validity of this
model as a conceptual framework. As a computational modeller I want to avoid the
temptation of making the model more complex to account for a greater range of be-
haviours - this could be viewed as a wasted effort unless the basic assumptions of the
model can be justified experimentally. To make it explicit, the assumptions that were
most critical for this model are:
1. That the effect of phasic dopamine release is to selectively enhance the persistent
activity of neural populations active at the time of reward
2. That the VTA is subject to feed-forward inhibition that arrives slightly delayed
relative to the stimulus induced excitation.
3. And that it is this interaction between prediction and expectation that leads to
the back propagation of reward prediction error.
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Backpropagation of the reward prediction error
Figure 5.10: How the time of phasic dopamine release changes as learning progresses.
This illustrates the process of backpropagation of reward prediction error with each
repeated trial.
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Without any observations to support the first assumption my model of dopamine-
modulated plasticity would not be justified, and without any observations of the sec-
ond my model of reinforcement learning would not function. Aside from these major
points, there are a few other smaller questions to clear up. The question of how a com-
bination of excitation and inhibition of the VTA influence the spiking behaviour of the
VTA is a complex one, and one for which there is sparse empirical data. We have made
some quite simple assumptions about a fixed firing threshold, and a simple summation
of excitation and inhibition — the real picture is likely to be much more complex. The
VTA receives glutamatergic, gabaergic, cholinergic, and dopaminergic input, and it is
not know how these inputs overlap spatially, and how they interact to influence mem-
brane dynamics. If there is some spatial segregation of inputs, or even topographic
distribution of synapses this would have a profound influence on behaviour, and the
types of rewarded tasks that can be learned.
One other reason why I have chosen to not develop this model further is that I
have accounted for a complex behaviour while knowingly leaving out parts of the
neuroanatomy known to be involved. Although there has been a recent trend to talk
about reinforcement learning as a product of a dopaminergic learning circuit, it is clear
that many other neuromodulatory and endocrine systems such as serotonin (Nakamura
et al., 2008), noradrenaline (Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005), acetylecholine (Kobayashi
and Okada, 2007), and hypocretin (Korotkova et al., 2003), are all involved. We should
be wary of using too little anatomy to explain too much behaviour.
Despite the limitations of this model there are a couple of positive outcomes of this
model. I have shown that working memory can in principle be seen as a subset of re-
inforcement learning. The model has also made a clear prediction that it is the relative
timing of excitatory and inhibitory input that causes the backpropagation of reward
prediction error. This is a novel prediction that is potentially testable by experiment.
Since developing this model I have came across another model in the literature that
appears to solve the same problem in a similar way (Ludvig et al., 2008). The model
in this paper solves the problem by implementing the Temporal Differences algorithm
with a diffuse temporal representation of the stimuli. In this model the Temporal Dif-
ferences algorithm solves the problem of backpropagating the reward signal, whilst the
diffuse temporal representation of cue stimuli is effectively equivalent to diffusion of
the stimulus in the network in my model.
Although the two models appear to solve the same problem, both models have dif-
ferent strengths. (Ludvig et al., 2008) base their model on the Temporal Differences
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algorithm, which is well understood and gives their model a sound theoretical foun-
dation. The model I have developed in this chapter is aimed more at describing the
process of reinforcement learning in terms of the neurophysiology, and so is possibly
easier to use to interpret empirical data.
5.9.1 A review of the modelling approach
In this chapter I have tried to avoid tackling the question of what is really happening in
the brain. This proved an advantage because it made the process of modelling easier
— by side-stepping questions about how models relates to the biology, I was able to
quickly set up a model that captures how the problem might be solved at a concep-
tual level. However, the corollary of this is that it is difficult, or perhaps ill founded
to suggest that the model really represents how the biology solves the problem, rather
it is a conceptual model which may or may not be consistent with the data. The aim
with this kind of conceptual model is not to discover how the neurophysiology works,
but merely to provide a framework for interpreting results, and planning future experi-
ments or clinical interventions.
In some sense this approach has been successful in that I have been able to create a
model which can in principle solve the problem, and I can relate this conceptual model
to the brain at an anatomical level. However, the model could easily be criticised as
a box-and-arrow diagram given anatomical dressing, and to some extent this criticism
would be justified. But then one might argue that many of the best models are also
box-and-arrow diagrams — sometimes it is useful to abstract away from the biolog-
ical complexity in order to arrive at a model that is conceptually easy to understand,
and therefore useful even if quantitatively inaccurate (Shouval et al. (2002) model of
calcium-based plasticity could be seen as an example of this ).
We have repeatedly stated that this approach to modelling is different in the sense
that it is not interested in how the physiology really works, rather it aims to provide
a conceptual model which can be related to anatomical and neurophysiological data.
But is this really a novel strategy?
Taken to extremes we might wonder what value this approach has — if it makes no
claims to have a 1-1 correspondence with the biology, then what do the components of
the model correspond to? Either the model is shaped somehow by biological data, and
therefore can be falsified by it, or it is a fantasy based upon preconceived ideas about
how the brain ought to work. Some would argue that all such conceptual models have
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their roots in our preconceptions of how mental processes occur, and it is only later
that we look for evidence to support them. Perhaps the value of this approach is that
it is quite explicit about the fact that it is constructed from a preconceived model of
cognition (reinforcement learning), and therefore should not be confused with a model
which claims to be saying something about how the brain really works, which as we
have concluded in the previous chapters, is a sticky topic.
Although this third approach has offered a different method for answering the ques-
tion that motivates the overall thesis, I don’t believe it has squared the circle of finding
a problem-free method by which modelling can participate in neuroscience. As a sci-
entist it is distinctly unsatisfying to propose a model of reinforcement learning without
also being able to suggest it is the way in which the brain solves the problem. If science
is the process of understanding and predicting an objective world, then the approach
we have described in this chapter could not be classed as scientific.
5.10 Conclusion
The model has shown how simple assumptions about the effects of dopamine and
the anatomy of the basal ganglia may be enough to explain the phenomena observed
during reinforcement learning tasks. By focussing upon processes in the brain which
occur at a similar timescale to the behaviour itself, I was able to construct a model that
is conceptually simple, but can still explain the key neurophysiological phenomena
that have been observed in experiments. The units in the model are populations of
neurons, and so the model is not committed to any particular mechanisms at the level of
individual neurons (such as STDP), as is often the case in computational neuroscience.
However, there are issues that come with working at this level of detail in that it
is difficult to support or refute this “interpretation” because it does not makes strong
claims about the biology.
These issues can serve as both and advantage and a disadvantage. This model
was an attempt to provide an alternative to the two models that went before it, and
although it has succeeded in some sense, it falls short in others. If the model is focussed
towards interpreting data rather than modelling and predictive objective facts then it is
not scientific, however useful it may be conceptually.
Chapter 6
Discussion
6.1 Review of the modelling work
Before I begin the discussion I will give a quick summary of what was found in the
three chapters of modelling in this thesis
6.1.1 Model 1 : Reinforcement learning by dopamine modulated
spike-timing dependent plasticity
Model 1 was based upon an existing model of classical conditioning. Upon analysing
it, I found that the model showed behaviour that was incompatible with it being a
model of classical conditioning. Fixing the problems in the model effectively required
rebuilding a new model from scratch, so I decided against doing this until a later stage
(see Model 3). By examining what went wrong with the model I concluded that if a
model is to produce falsifiable predictions then it ought to emerge from physiological
data rather than theoretical models.
6.1.2 Model 2 : The effect of dopamine upon synaptic plasticity
In this chapter I attempted to construct an empirically-derived model that looked at the
effect of dopamine on learning and whether or not the effects support the idea that it
is implementing reinforcement learning. One result of the model was that it suggested
that the synaptic effects of dopamine modulation would have a more significant effect
upon synaptic plasticity than changes to intrinsic excitability.
In my conclusions I suggested that despite my best intentions the data in the model
was composed from so many sources and theoretical models that it was unrealistic
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to expect the model to make accurate quantitative predictions that generalise to other
regions of the brain. I found that even when sticking close to the data there are many
implicit and explicit theoretical assumptions that creep into the model and make it
difficult to relate to experiments. The experience showed me that the closer one gets to
quantifiable empirical models, the further one gets from the questions that motivated
the study in the first place
My personal conclusion was that although this model could be improved — such
as by improving the neuron model - some of the core problems found will not go away.
Abstract models don’t relate to the data, and are difficult to falsify. Purely empirical
models don’t exist — while you can get more detailed models, as you get more accurate
you lose the ability to generalise the model to other systems.
6.1.3 Model 3 : A conceptual model of physiological basis of rein-
forcement learning
In this chapter my aim was to construct a conceptually valuable, rather than focussing
upon making a model that was verifiable. The model was capable of solving the prob-
lem, and demonstrated a way of conceptualising how reinforcement learning may oc-
cur in the brain. However, the process was not satisfying on a scientific level, as it
made no claims to be being an accurate representation of processes going on in the
brain.
6.2 Discussion
This section would normally be focussed upon discussing the results of the models, but
for me the most interesting outcomes of these chapters was not the data produced by
the models, but what was learned in the process of modelling. Although the models did
provide some interesting results (and these are discussed in each modelling chapter),
on the whole the models failed to answer satisfactorily the questions I set out with at
the start of this thesis.
The primary aim of this thesis was to use computational modelling to determine
whether or not dopamine forms part of a reinforcement learning circuit in the brain. I
have tried to answer this question in three different ways, and on each occasion I have
run into methodological problems that prevented me from supporting or refuting the
hypothesis.
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When working with abstract models I found it difficult or impossible to relate them
to the biology, and when working with biological-based models I found it difficult to
relate them to a systems level theory.
My conclusion of this work is that it is not possible to develop computational or
theoretical models of psychological phenomena that are both based on low-level em-
pirical data, and are capable of making accurate predictions of new phenomena at the
same scale. Making models that relate to psychological concepts requires that they
be describable at a high level, whilst making them empirically justifiable requires that
they be in agreement with a lot of low-level observations. As yet there are no cross-
level theories of this kind in neuroscience, so in a sense it should not be surprising that
my attempts failed.
That such cross-level models are possible is an article of faith in neuroscience, but
my experience in this thesis has led me to no longer agree with this view. Physics,
which is often held up as a paradigmatic example of successful science, has never
developed successful cross-level theories. Despite the success of quantum mechanics
and general relativity in their own domain, there have never been theories that unite
both the large and small.
6.2.1 Neuromodulation and reinforcement learning as a paradigm
The discussions so far relate to the first question in my thesis as to whether or not
dopamine is part of a reinforcement learning circuit in the brain. The second question
in my thesis was whether or not reinforcement learning driven by neuromodulation
was a suitable model for understanding other phenomena in neuroscience.
It was thought originally that the case of dopamine would provide strong support
for the idea that we can understand much of behaviour in terms of a reinforcement
learning circuit. The approach was unsuccessful and so the conclusions of my mod-
elling have been that it is not possible to prove or disprove such a cross level model.
However, I also concluded that not being able to prove the model true is not necessarily
a problem, as theoretical models can have uses irrespective of their truth — this was
discussed in more detail in chapter 5.
Like the idea of neuromodulatory driven reinforcement learning, the approach of
understanding neuroscience in terms of spikes and computation is also something
which cannot be proved or disproved. Perhaps we should see these theoretical frame-
works not as something which can be true or false, but something which may or may
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not be useful depending upon the context.
6.3 Support for the neuromodulation and reinforcement
learning model
Despite my own personal conclusions regarding the mechanistic basis of the dopamin-
ergic reinforcement learning hypothesis, there are many people who make use of this
model, and believe in its validity without the need for an underlying mechanistic model
justifying it with low level empirical data. To date, the original publication proposing
the dopaminergic reinforcement learning hypothesis (Schultz et al., 1997) has been
cited 2035 times, many of which by researchers who make use of the hypothesis de-
spite its uncertain status. Why is it that some people do not feel the need for the
hypothesis to be linked with an underlying model?
Different researchers make use of this model for different reasons, and not all of
them are interested in whether or not the model is empirically justified. As I have al-
ready stated, there may be clinical situations where such a model is useful independent
of how true it is. Indeed for the more pragmatic, usefulness is an adequate measure of
truth (Hacking, 1983). But what other motives are there for people to believe in this
model as a reasonable way of relating brain and behaviour, despite the apparent lack
of evidence?
1. It provides a simple way of understanding complex human behaviour as a ratio-
nal process
2. It offers an alternative viewpoint to the more common computational paradigm.
In particular it offers a view of human behaviour as a product of our desires
(drives), rather than our desires being a product of computation.
3. Reinforcement learning is fundamentally about causality — learning what cues
cause what rewards. As such it is restating basic scientific principles, and offers
researchers a way to describe human behaviour in the scientific image.
4. Phasic dopamine release correlates with the reward prediction error signal in
reinforcement learning, and for some this is enough evidence to believe that
dopamine is sending this signal.
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If we are interested in the reasons why people have adopted reinforcement learn-
ing and neuromodulation as a basis for explaining the relationship between brain and
behaviour, then it is worth looking at the historical background of this model. As ex-
plained in section 2.3, reinforcement learning and the temporal differences algorithm
grew out of work by engineers and mathmaticians who wanted to characterise the opti-
mal way to make decisions. A correlate of this abstract framework was later discovered
in the brain. Does this tell us that:
(a) these engineers and mathmeticians had good insight into how people make deci-
sions.
(b) these engineers and mathmaticians formalised their own ideas about what kind of
decisions are optimal. Scientists also share those ideas, and so when they found
similar processes in the brain, and were able to collect and frame the evidence in
terms of the theory.
My aim is not to suggest that scientists have consciously created both the theory
and the evidence, but rather to highlight the sociological factors that can lead to a
new theory becoming popular. I believe that reinforcement learning is not a model of
behaviour which is uniquely supported by the evidence, but a subsconscious reflection
of its authors views on human behaviour.
Much of the data that is used to support reinforcement learning as a model of
behaviour is evidence that is chosen from a pool of contradictory observations. The
evidence which is chosen is that which will fit a pre-existing model of how humans
behave — a model that mirrors the way its authors behave.
If this is true there ought to be lots of observations which contradict the dopamin-
ergic reinforcement learning hypothesis, and there are. As I progressed in my thesis
I became more and more aware of evidence that appeared to contradict the hypoth-
esis. Strangely this data does not get nearly as much attention as data that supports
the model. While I still believe that the dopaminergic reinforcement learning model is
valuable, I think it is important that we are aware of evidence that contradicts it. I will
highlight some of that evidence in the next section.
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6.4 Evidence against the neuromodulation and reinforce-
ment learning model
There are good reasons for emphasising that the hypothesis is not uniquely supported
by the biological data. Despite the very strong case offered by the correlation between
the activity of dopamine neurons and a reward prediction error signal, there are cases
where these two variables cease to correlate, indicating that the hypothesis may only
be true in certain situations.
During the course of my research I found several experimental reports with evi-
dence that did not fit with the view that dopamine is signalling reward prediction error.
6.4.1 Dopamine neurons fire phasically during sleep
One particular finding is that dopamine neurons fire phasically during sleep, when there
is no reward prediction error in any meaningful sense (Dahan et al., 2006). If dopamine
neurons cease to signal reward prediction error during sleep then it is worth asking
what happens at the onset and offset of sleep to the reward system? By understanding
how dopamine neurons change from their daytime to their night time behaviour we
might gain some insight into the function of dopamine neurons in a broader context.
However, at present data regarding the firing of dopamine neurons during sleep is
sparse.
6.4.2 Dopamine is also released by noradrenaline neurons
Another interesting result is that noradrenaline neurons also synthesise and release
dopamine (Devoto et al., 2005). Dopamine is a chemical precursor of noradrenaline,
and so significant quantities of dopamine are synthesised by noradrenaline neurons
during the production of noradrenaline. Although this finding does not contradict the
observation that dopamine neurons signal reward prediction error, it does muddy the
waters a little with regard to the proposed function of dopamine. It is generally thought
that dopamine itself is the means by which dopamine neurons signal reward prediction
error to the neurons within their axon terminal field. However, if dopamine can be
coreleased by noradrenaline neurons in a way which does not correspond to reward
prediction error it does indicate that there is more to dopamine than signalling reward
prediction error.
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6.4.3 Not all behaviour can be understood in terms of reward
This point may be as much a philosophical one as an empirical one, but there are many
who would argue that it is impossible to describe some human behaviour in terms of
maximising a reward function. This debate has been ongoing for many years (Dawkins,
1990) (Okasha, 2009), and its lack of resolution indicates that this model of behaviour
will also fall short for some when it comes to describing altruistic behaviour.
6.4.4 Dopamine may be too slow for reward learning
The initial observation that drove this thesis was that dopamine appeared to be involved
in learning the causes of reward, but recent research has called that into question.
Electrophysiological studies of the effect of dopamine modulation have shown that
by itself, dopamine modulation is too slow acting to capture trace information about
the reward, and therefore cannot be the only factor in reward learning. Rewarding
stimuli in conditioning experiments may only be present for a matter of seconds, but
the major effects of dopamine occur in the minutes following phasic release (Lapish
et al., 2007). It has been suggested that the proposed reinforcement learning circuit
may in fact be dependent upon the co-release of glutamate from dopaminergic neurons
(Lavin et al., 2005). This is consistent with the observation that the initial effect in
the cortex of phasic spiking in dopamine neurons is glutamate-dependent. As we learn
more about reinforcement learning circuits in the brain we may find that they are as
much dependent upon glutamate release as they are upon dopamine.
6.5 An alternative view of dopamine modulation
Despite the popularity of the hypothesis that dopamine signals reward prediction error,
there are some who argue that this is not the whole picture. Redgrave et al. (2008) argue
that the ability of dopamine neurons to signal non-rewarding novel stimuli overlaps
with their ability to signal reward-related stimuli, such that in natural environments
what dopamine neurons respond to is an amalgamation of both signals.
The authors also argue that phasic dopamine responses are too fast to come from
sensory processing of stimuli, and can only occur as part of a pre-attentive circuit.
They propose that collicular neurons detect early visual changes, and if there is no
inhibitory input coming in to the dopaminergic nuclei, this information is deemed to
be unpredicted, and therefore worthy of further learning.
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They authors suggest that dopamine neurons do not signal reward prediction error,
but act as a reinforcement signal for the organism to learn what part of its own be-
haviour caused an unexpected event. According to this view it is agency which defines
reward, and not the other way round.
6.6 Is dopamine a unitary entity?
Since the dopaminergic reinforcement learning hypothesis was put forward, other re-
searchers have stepped in to propose new behavioural functions for additional neuro-
transmitters (Yu and Dayan, 2005), (Yu and Dayan, 2005), (Dayan and Huys, 2008),
(Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005), (Redgrave et al., 2008). In section 1.6 I argued that
this was part of a growing trend. While this approach is promising, it is also slightly
misleading. Although neuromodulators like dopamine are relatively simple chemical
signals, it is oversimplistic to treat them as unitary entities and assign them a single
function. Basing models around a neuromodulator may appear to provide a simple
explanation of behaviour, but in reality what is really does is hide the complexity else-
where - in the release, the binding, and the receptor dynamics of the modulator.
At present, our knowledge about the function of dopamine comes largely from
studies of the firing of dopamine neurons, studies of the systemic effects of dopamine
release, or studies of the acute effects of dopamine in isolated preparations. While
these experiments can tell us what processes dopamine has some influence in, none of
these situations really give us enough experimental control to determine what dopamine
does and assign it a single function. Until the day we can perform these ideal experi-
ments it is worth thinking of dopamine as having multiple roles, because it is possible
that when the effects of dopamine are better understood it may be found to fulfill-
ing many complex and contradictory roles through its family of receptors and binding
sites.
6.7 Summary
The models developed in this thesis were unable to conclusively support or contradict
the hypothesis I set out to examine. However, the process of constructing and evaluat-
ing these models did lead me to rethink my methodology, which in the end I feel, has
proved more valuable than the quantitative predictions produced by the models. My
conclusion from this work is that at present it is not possible to provide a mechanistic
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model of how or why dopamine neurons signal reward prediction error. My reasons
for reaching this conclusion is that there is simply too much relevant complexity in the
system to produce simplified models and expect them to provide accurate quantitative
predictions.
Although my models have failed to support or contradict the hypothesis, my ex-
perience in constructing these models has led me to view the overall neuromodulation
and reinforcement learning paradigm in a different way. I do not believe that this model
is born out of the empirical data, but I also do not believe this is a barrier to using the
paradigm in interesting and useful new ways.
Developing these models and trying to answer the questions in this thesis has led
me to conclude that it is not possible to develop cross-level theoretical models of what
is really happening in the brain, in fact I think the question is ill-posed. However, I
do believe that it is possible to develop theoretical models that are useful, and whose
value is not based upon their accuracy.
Much like the paradigm of computation and spikes, neuromodulation and rein-
forcement learning is not something which is true or false, but merely a framework for
interpreting biological data. As we begin to collect more data that allows us to relate
neuromodulation to behaviour, this framework is likely to prove ever more useful.
Chapter 7
Putting dopamine and reward in
context
7.1 Novel contribution
In this chapter I review the many transmitter systems that modulate dopamine neurons,
and use this as a basis for exploring the context of dopamine modulation and reward.
I suggest that defining dopamine function only in terms of reward obscures its rela-
tionship with other evolutionary critical bodily processes. In particular I examine the
function of dopamine in the context of stress, and propose a way in which dopamine
modulation can be seen as part of an extended stress response. I also relate dopamine
modulation to immune processes and suggest that there is value in looking at dopamine
as a signal of agency as much as reward.
7.2 Précis
Throughout this thesis I have described dopamine purely as a signal of reward predic-
tion error. While there is strong evidence that dopamine is involved in reward process-
ing, it is also involved in many other processes, and our current fascination with the
reward system serves to obscure these roles. As long as we choose to define dopamine
neuron activation with respect to reward, it will remain difficult to relate dopamine to
other bodily processes that are not shaped by reward.
The aim of this chapter is to provide an alternative view on dopamine modulation.
The outcome of the modelling work in this thesis has been to show that the idea that
dopamine modulation is implementing a reinforcement learning circuit in the brain is
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just one of many possible interpretations of the function of dopamine. This interpreta-
tion is useful if we are interested in the domain of goal-directed behaviour, but is not
useful if we are interested in behaviour that is not driven by a desire for reward. There
are plenty of papers that attempt to show how dopamine modulation implements some
additional facet of reward-related behaviour, but there are few which attempt to relate
dopamine modulation to other non goal-directed processes.
In this chapter I review the other transmitter systems which modulate dopamine re-
lease, and use this as a way of introducing other bodily processes which shape reward-
driven behaviour. In particular I will look at the function of dopamine in the context of
stress and immune responses.
7.3 Introduction
The observations of Schultz in the 1980s that dopamine neurons fire phasically when
an animal receives an unexpected reward has led to the widespread view that dopamine
plays a major role in the brains reward circuitry. For a review see (Schultz, 1998).
Following this discovery, it was realised that the pattern of firing of dopamine neu-
rons is reminiscent of the reward prediction error signal described by the temporal
differences algorithm (Schultz et al., 1997). This apparent correlation between the ac-
tions of neurons in the midbrain and the workings of an abstract model of learning has
led to the view that the function of dopamine circuitry in the brain is to implement
reinforcement learning - a hypothesis I will refer to as dopaminergic reinforcement
learning. This view of behaviour as driven by the action of neuromodulators rather
than ensembles of neurons, was radically new, and over the last 10 years has devel-
oped into a new paradigm. Although originally based around the actions of dopamine,
theorists were quick to propose roles for other neuromodulators (Doya, 2002). It has
since been suggested that acetylcholine signals expected uncertainty (Yu and Dayan,
2005), noradrenaline signals unexpected uncertainty (Yu and Dayan, 2005), serotonin
mediates behavioural inhibition (Dayan and Huys, 2008), and noradrenaline mediates
the exploration:exploitation trade-off (Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005). This view of
behaviour has proven popular because it has allowed theorists to talk about how mo-
tivational states, as signalled by neurotransmitters, could come to shape behaviour.
This is in contrast to the more traditional models in computational neuroscience which
have tended to explain behaviour in terms of neural coding based upon neuron action
potentials.
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But as we learn more about dopamine and neuromodulation, it is becoming clear
that this view of behaviour whilst powerful, is not the whole picture. While the
dopaminergic system is clearly involved in reward-related behaviour, it appears that
it also plays a role in more fundamental behavioural circuits.
The aim of this chapter will be to explore these circuits, particularly those origi-
nating in the neuroendocrine and immune systems. I will look at how these systems
modulate dopamine release, and describe a conceptual framework with which we can
understand how dopamine can play a role in not only reward-related behaviour, but
also behaviour which serves the more fundamental needs of the body.
What reasons do we have to believe that dopamine modulation and reward-driven
behaviour is shaped by more fundamental forces? In sections 7.3.1 and 7.3.2 I
will look at biological data and historical evidence that indicates that we need to see
dopamine modulation and reward-driven behaviour in the context of more evolutionary
critical processes.
7.3.1 The biological case
The dopaminergic reinforcement learning model as described by Doya (2002) is pow-
erful; taken literally it suggests that behaviour is a result of reward maximisation, and
within this reinforcement learning circuit dopamine signals reward prediction error and
reward value (Tobler et al., 2005).
The power of this model means that it can account for a large range of motivated
behaviour, but so far, few of the explanations of goal-directed behaviour provided by
this model relate to our explanations of other fundamental bodily processes. As yet
the dopaminergic reinforcement learning model has not been integrated with models
of basic bodily functions such as hunger, thirst, sex, and immunity, and how they come
to shape what we think of as rewarding.
In this section I will attempt to explore the context of dopamine and reward by
looking at the transmitters and peptides that modulate this proposed reinforcement
learning circuit. The aim is that by looking at the signals which shape dopamine
release, we can gain a better understanding of the function of dopamine in the context
of other more fundamental behavioural circuits.
The neurotransmitter systems in the midbrain are highly interconnected, and the
actions and concentrations of one neurotransmitter will inevitably affect others even if
there is no direct interaction. For simplicity I will focus only on the neurotransmitters
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which interact directly with the substantia nigra and ventral tegmental area.
A list of the neurotransmitter receptors known to be expressed on these dopamin-
ergic neurons is shown in Table 7.1. When any of the receptors are stimulated, the
electrophysiological properties of the dopamine neurons change. This has a knock-on
effect on the firing patterns of dopamine neurons, which in turn affect their response to
a conditioned stimulus.
To give an example of how other neurotransmitter systems can provide a context to
reward-related behaviour, we can look at the actions of the neuropeptide orexin (also
known as hypocretin). Orexin is produced in the lateral hypothalamus and perifornical
area, and is involved in the regulation of feeding and wakefulness (Harris et al., 2005),
(Willie et al., 2001). Orexin producing neurons contain projections to the substantia
nigra (amongst many other midbrain nuclei), where there are orexin receptors (Peyron
et al., 1998), (Korotkova et al., 2003).
In vitro data indicates that orexin increases the firing rate of dopaminergic neurons
in the ventral tegmental area (Korotkova et al., 2003). Taken together these lines of
evidence suggest that orexin modulation of dopamine release provides a mechanism
by which metabolic and neuroendocrine signals in the body can exert an influence on
perception and action circuits in the cortex.
This hierarchical modulation of cortical circuits via dopamine is one way in which
endocrine circuits can influence global behaviour. But given that it has been claimed
that dopamine alone signals reward prediction error, this implies that dopamine must
serve as a single common pathway for any signal that is to influence behaviour that is
shaped by reward prediction error.
The receptors listed in Table 7.1 indicates that there are a large number of transmit-
ter systems modulating dopamine release - a sign that reward prediction error is subject
to modulation by many other behavioural processes. Does this mean that modulation
of dopamine release is the only way in which these other transmitter systems shape the
perceived reward prediction error? Or do they act in parallel via many pathways?
In biology it is unusual to find a function supported by a single pathway. in con-
trast, the mechanisms we observe operate by multiple parallel pathways, making the
functions they support robust to malfunction in just one pathway.
While dopamine does appear to be a good correlate of reward prediction error
in controlled conditioning experiments, it seems unlikely that the brain is dependent
upon this single pathway for all aspects of motivated behaviour. By suggesting that
dopamine signals a general reward prediction error that alone provides the information
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Reference Region Receptors found
Johnson and North
(1992)







Di Matteo et al. (2001) VTA,
SN
5HT2C, 5HT1B






substance K, neurokinin NK3
White (1996) VTA M1, M2, and Nicotinic recep-
tors
Margolis et al. (2006) VTA kappa-opiod receptors
Westerink et al. (1996) VTA GABAA, GABAB, NMDA,
ACh
Wang et al. (2007) VTA CRF




Kalivas (1993) VTA D2, GABAA, GABAB, neu-
rotensin, CCK, EAA (NMDA
and non-NMDA), mu-opiod,
NK3, 5HT1B, 5HT1C, Nico-
tinic, M1
Ye et al. (2005) VTA IL-2
Table 7.1: The location and receptor types found on midbrain dopamine neurons
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needed to learn goal-directed tasks, we are going against the grain and proposing a
mechanism that does not sit well with what we know about biological systems.
If a reinforcement learning system does exist in the brain, it would be more robust
and accurate if it used more than one transmitter system to estimate reward prediction
error. The problem with this proposal is that if we extend the dopaminergic reinforce-
ment learning model to incorporate the actions of many transmitters then we weaken
the reductive power of the original dopamine-based model. It seems that by making
the model more realistic, we make it less powerful.
Also noticable in Table 7.1 is the diversity of transmitter systems that provide
context to dopamine modulation; classical neurotransmitters such as glutamate and
GABA (Westerink et al., 1996), neuromodulators such as NMDA, and ACh (Westerink
et al., 1996), neuroendocrine factors, such as CRH (Wang et al., 2007), and neurotensin
(Kalivas, 1993), or cytokines such as IL2 (Ye et al., 2005) which are thought to play a
role in immune and inflammatory responses.
The overlap of the reward system with neuroendocrine and immune systems is
interesting because it suggests that reward circuits must also be an integrated part of
the stress and immune responses, and our models of reward-related behaviour must
also be compatible with the conceptual framework of both of these fields. In sections
7.5 and 7.6 I will look at how these circuits affect dopamine release. I will suggest
ways in which the function of dopamine can be understood from within the conceptual
framework of both these fields. Afterwards I will look at how well these viewpoints fit
with the most recent evidence regarding the function of dopamine.
7.3.2 The historical case
The previous section outlined a biological case for why we ought to make an effort
to understand the actions of dopamine and reward in the context of other behavioural
systems. Alongside the biological case for wanting to base our models of behaviour on
something more fundamental than a desire for reward, there are also historical reasons
to believe that there is a limit to what reward-based models should be used to explain.
Questions about whether or not reward is a reasonable basis for models of be-
haviour can be traced back to the debates surrounding behaviourism in the 60s. Then,
opponents of behaviourism contested that there were some behaviours that could not
be explained as a result of reward or conditioning (Chomsky, 1959). Breland and Bre-
land (1961) famously demonstrated out that that there are some ’instinctive’ behaviours
Chapter 7. Putting dopamine and reward in context 151
which are difficult to override with reinforcement learning. They cite examples of ani-
mals choosing instinctual behaviours over those that were conditioned - chickens that
were more interested in pecking at the CS than getting the reward, and pigs that would,
over time, revert to rooting the CS rather than engaging in the rewarded behaviour.
At the time, these unconditioned behaviours were described as instinctive or innate,
but it is possible that these behaviours are observed because they are the expression of
drives and circuits not accessible by dopamine or reward. Because these drives are
more fundamental than reward, no amount of experimental reward can change them.
The story of behaviourism tells us that models of behaviour based upon purely
maximising reward have proved problematic before. To avoid repeating these mistakes
we should seek to understand the biological context of reward learning - in doing so we
might better understand the relationship of reward-seeking behaviour to other human
behaviour.
7.3.3 Summary
Dopaminergic reinforcement learning is a fascinating model for explaining goal-directed
behaviour. The development of this framework and its grounding in the biological data
marks a qualitative shift from the models of behaviour that preceded it.
However, it is clear from both the biological data (Section 7.3.1), and historical
precedents (Section 7.3.2), that there are caveats to this model. This chapter will at-
tempt to review how reward and dopamine modulation interact with other behavioural
systems. I will review how dopamine is modulated by stress and immune signals, and
what this means for a model of behaviour based on reward with dopamine as a signal.
7.4 Dopamine modulation in context
7.5 Stress
The term “stress” was first used in biology by Selye (1955), to describe the body’s
response to disturbances from homeostasis. In this chapter I will treat stress as syn-
onymous with neuroendocrine stress, and assume that ACTH release is an accurate
correlate of a stressful event having taken place.
During a stressful event, parvocellular neurons in the periventricular hypothala-
mus (PVN) release corticotropin-releasing hormone (CRH) into the anterior pituitary.
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Within 15 seconds the presence of CRH stimulates the release of adreno-corticotropin
hormone (ACTH) into circulation. A few minutes later ACTH in the adrenal cortex
stimulates the release of corticosteroids. Corticosteroids are able to cross the blood-
brain barrier into the brain where they inhibit CRH release, closing the circuit, and
effectively switching off the stress response.
7.5.0.1 Modulation of dopamine release by stress
Stress provides context to reward processing most directly through the actions of CRH,
ACTH, and corticosteroids.
In the central nervous system CRH acts primarily through volume transmission,
and alongside the CRH released in the anterior pituitary, stressful events result in an
increase in CRH concentration in the VTA. It is not known if the source of this is
volume transmission from the PVN, direct projections, or co-transmission from other
neurons (Wang et al., 2005). However, VTA application of CRF2R agonist was found
to increase dopamine release in the VTA to 160 percent of the baseline concentration
(Wang et al., 2007).
Whilst ACTH is found in the central nervous system, the ACTH that is released into
the periphery following a stressful event does not re-enter the central nervous system.
In vitro corticosterone effects dopamine release via glucocorticoid and mineralo-
corticoid receptors (Rougé-Pont et al., 1999). In vivo, blocking corticosterone secre-
tion with an adrenalectomy decreases stress-induced dopamine release in the nucleus
accumbens (Rougé-Pont et al., 1998). Also peripherally administered corticosterone
increases dopamine concentration in the nucleus accumbens, although the magnitude
of the effect is dependent upon individual differences and the dark/light cycle (Piazza
et al., 1996). Together these pieces of evidence demonstrate that the corticosteroids
released following a stressful event are a potent modulator of dopamine release.
Corticosteroids and dopamine are both neuromodulators downstream of what we
have defined as our correlate of stress - ACTH, and so in the same way as corticos-
teroids are thought of as part of the stress response, we can also think of dopamine
modulation as part of the extended stress response. In sections 7.5.2 and 7.5.3 we
will investigate what perspective it gives use to see dopamine function in the context
of a stress response.
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7.5.0.2 Modulation of stress by dopamine neurons
While the neurocorrelates of stress exert a potent effect on dopamine modulation, it is
notable that dopaminergic neurons in the ventral tegmental area and substantia nigra
do not have strong reciprocal links to the PVN. Regions that do modulate the PVN
are shown in Figure 7.1. The effects that dopamine release has on stress are likely to
be indirect, possibly through the effect of dopamine on neurons that do project to the
PVN. For example, the prefrontal cortex, which is strongly influenced by dopamine
modulation is known to indirectly modulate the PVN - for a review, see (Herman et al.,
2003).
7.5.1 Dopamine and stress : Positive and negative feedback loops
The dynamics of the stress response and the dynamics of reinforcement learning sug-
gest that we might expect to see interesting results when these two systems interact.
As described in section 7.5.0.1, CRH produces ACTH which inhibits CRH re-
lease and brings ACTH concentration back to basal levels. In this way the neuroen-
docrine stress system functions as a negative feedback loop, effectively guaranteeing
the eventual shut-off of the stress response. However, the actions of dopamine, from
the perspective of the reinforced behaviour, can be seen as a positive feedback loop.
Unexpected rewards lead to an increase in dopamine concentration, which in turn pro-
mote the learning and repetition of the behaviour which lead to the reward.
This interaction between a positive and a negative feedback loop is potentially in-
teresting. A negative feedback loop tends towards stability, whilst a positive feedback
loop leads to runaway activity. However, when a positive and negative feedback loop
interact there is a potential for complex and possibly chaotic behaviour.
The canonical example of this is the logistic map:
xn+1 = xn− x2n (7.1)
an iterated map with a positive and negative feedback term, the logistic map is
known to demonstrate chaotic oscillations (May, 1976). The properties of the logistic
map were famously studied by Lorenz (1964) and Feigenbaum (1978). It is a matter
for further investigations whether or not these chaotic dynamics also appear in the
intersection of the stress and reward systems.
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7.5.2 Dopamine as an anticipatory stress system
I have described in section 7.3 that dopamine is most often interpreted as a reward
signal. However, the evidence that dopamine both modulates and is modulated by
stress, indicates that we ought to be able to understand reward as part of the stress
response.
In the stress literature it has been suggested that stressors can be distinguished into
two categories, relating to the way in which stressful stimuli activate the PVN (Herman
et al., 2003). ’Reactive’ stressors relay an immediate homeostatic challenges directly
to the PVN. Regions that directly innervate the PVN relay primary sensory information
from the brainstem, visceral afferents, and nociceptors (see Figure 7.1). These inputs
promote a reactive corticosteroid response to environmental stressors.
’Anticipatory’ stressors on the other hand, indirectly regulate corticosteroid release
under conditions where there is no immediate threat, but a homeostatic challenge is
predicted. These anticipatory signals modulate the PVN via the projections of limbic
and cortical structures (see Figure 7.1). The signals provided by these systems may
come from innate programs, or can be learned through a process of conditioning.
As pointed out in section 7.5.0.2 dopamine neurons do not have a strong direct
influence over CRH release from the PVN. However, dopamine’s proposed role in
reinforcement learning means that the actions of the midbrain dopamine system fits
well with the idea that dopamine forms part of an anticipatory stress circuit. It is well
established that dopamine predicts the appearance of one form of stressor - reward.
It may seem perverse to describe a reward as stressful, but a rewarding stimuli
is a strong perturbation from homeostasis and is therefore a stressor. Selye himself
recognised that stressors can have both positive and negative effects, and he described
these aspects as “eustress” and “distress” (Selye, 1975).
If we think of the function of dopamine as to drive learning about the causes of
stress, then it frees us up from the debate over whether dopamine is involved in sig-
nalling rewarding or aversive events (Frank and Surmeier, 2009). From the point of
view of the stress system, both are stressors to be anticipated.
7.5.3 Dopamine as a generator of allostasis
Another concept in the stress literature which offers a fresh perspective on the function
of dopamine is the notion of allostasis and allostatic load.
Allostasis is the process of maintaining stability through change, and is an impor-
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tant counterpart to homeostasis - for a review see (McEwen, 1998). While we might
naively think that homeostasis means attempting to keep the parameters of a system
fixed, there are situations in an organisms lifespan where the set points of a system
must change to maintain overall homeostasis.
A phenomenon that has been used as an example of allostasis is the fluctuations in
blood pressure that occur during the sleep-wake cycle. When we get out of bed in the
morning our blood pressure must rise to ensure a steady supply of blood to the brain.
Although homeostatic systems tend to keep variables close to a fixed point, allostatic
systems are necessary to enact change that will maintain overall homeostasis.
Allostatic change is an important part of homeostasis, but there is a cost of this
adaptation, and this cost is known as allostatic load. Allostatic load occurs when
there is a frequent activation of allostatic systems; when there is a failure to shut off
allostatic activity after stress; or when there is an inadequate response of an allostatic
system which has negative effects on overall homeostasis (McEwen, 1998). Allostasis
has been described metaphorically as like the water used by firemen. If used sparingly
it can put out the fire, but too much and the resulting water damage can be worse than
the fire itself (Korte et al., 2005).
Allostasis and allostatic load may be important components of the stress system,
but how does this relate to dopamine and reward?
The neuroendocrine stress system as we have described it is based upon negative
feedback, and thus ensures that outside of stressful stimuli, corticosteroids are kept
within stable levels. In this way we can view the neuroendocrine stress circuit as a
homeostatic mechanism.
Dopamine however acts differently. By causing learning after the presentation of
a reward, dopamine reinforces approach behaviour to a stressor. In this sense the sig-
nificance of dopamine is that it forms an allostatic circuit, and rather than promoting
behaviour that leads the organism to homeostasis, it actually encourages the organism
to engage in behaviour that takes it away from homeostasis.
Allostasis systems are a focus of study because they underlie some of the most im-
portant behaviours in an organisms lifespan. Mating, rearing young, feeding, all take
an organism away from homeostasis, and these behaviours are necessary for develop-
ment.
Describing dopamine as an allostatic circuit makes explicit something that is rarely
recognised when in the reward learning literature - that reward-seeking behaviour car-
ries with it some penalty. Reward is generally thought of as a positive or neutral out-
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come, whereas the concept of allostatic load implies that such behaviour must con-
tribute wear and tear to the organism.
An over-reliance on reward can lead to a difficulty unlearning rewarded behaviours
and can result in a reduced behavioural repertoire, both of which play a part in the
development of obsessive-compulsive disorder. Taken to its extreme, purely reward-
seeking behaviour has similarities with psychopathy. This behavioural phenotype cor-
relates with a hyper-reactive mesolimbic dopaminergic system, and a increased risk of
developing substance use problems (Buckholtz et al., 2010).
This perspective on reward and allostatic load is particularly interesting in the con-
text of addiction. It has been suggested that addiction occurs when allostatic mecha-
nisms take control of behaviour (Koob and Le Moal, 2001). It is known that dopamin-
ergic systems are potentiated by stress, and that individuals subject to stress tend to
engage in more reward-seeking behaviour irrespective of the damage it might cause.
7.5.4 Summary
From the perspective of stress, dopamine modulation is an anticipatory stress cir-
cuit, indirectly signalling predictions to the PVN of forecoming psychological and
behavioural stressors. These stressors may be both rewarding and aversive.
Dopamine can also be thought of as an allostatic circuit, encouraging behaviour
that takes us away from homeostasis. This fits well with the role of dopamine in
feeding, sexual, and addictive behaviour. The concept of allostatic load suggests we
should look more closely at the effect of reward-seeking behaviour, and the way in
which it can impose negative consequences on the individual.
7.6 Immunity
7.6.1 Causal interactions between the immunity and reward
Immunity is another fundamental bodily process which has a strong influence over
reward-seeking behaviour. During an immune response, peripheral nerves and pro-
inflammatory cytokines send signals from the periphery which initiate what is known
as sickness behaviour - a change from exploratory behaviour to a focus upon reducing
energy loss and fighting infection (Maier and Watkins, 1998). Pro-inflammatory cy-
tokines such as IL1 are produced in the periphery and central nervous system during
an immune response (for a review see (Maier, 2003) and (Szelényi, 2001)), and when
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administered centrally, these cytokines are known to reproduce many of the features
of sickness behaviour such as decreased food intake, decreased sexual behaviour, and
decreased locomotion (Maier, 2003). Conversely, blockade of IL1 receptors in the
central nervous system is enough to blunt the sickness behaviour observed following
administration of LPS (LipoPolySaccharide) (Bluthe et al., 1992).
At the behavioural level sickness behaviour expresses itself in many ways, amongst
them is a reduction in locomotive and exploratory behaviour (Maier and Watkins,
1998). Both of these behaviours play a part in reward-seeking behaviour, and are
known to correlate with high dopamine concentrations (Spielewoy et al., 2000).
At the biological level, cytokines known to induce sickness behaviour (IL1, IL2,
IL6), also modulate the firing rate of dopamine when administered centrally (Song,
1999), (Petitto, 1997), (Ye et al., 2005).
Together both of these strands of evidence indicate that there is a functional link
between immune response and dopaminergic reinforcement learning.
In addition to the effect of an immune response on the central nervous system,
the central nervous system also exerts a strong influence on immune responses. Ader
and Cohen (1982) famously showed that immune responses could be conditioned such
that stimuli perceived in the central nervous system could come to suppress immune
responses in the periphery. In their experiment conditioned stimuli (the taste of sac-
charine) was paired with an immunosuppressant and sheep red blood cells (SRBC).
Animals later showed an aversion to saccharine, but crucially, when re-exposed to sac-
charine, they showed an attenuated anti-SRBC antibody response (Ader and Cohen,
1993). This attenuated response indicates that the taste of saccharine alone, a stimulus
usually assumed to be perceived in the central nervous system, was now capable of
suppressing the animal’s immune response.
So, if the immune system modulates brain reward systems and brain reward sys-
tems modulate immune responses, then does that mean that they form part of a single
circuit? Not necessarily - if one takes a narrow definition of the immune system, for
example defining it only in terms of antibody production, then the causal relationship
between these two systems is distant and difficult to determine.
However, it is clear that cytokines play an important role in instigating and sig-
nalling immune responses in the periphery, and that these same signalling molecules
when found in the brain have a strong effect on the brain reward systems (for a review
see (Dunn, 2006)).
This begs the question - How are we to interpret the action of these cytokine modu-
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lators when found in the brain? Are we to treat them along with other neuromodulators
as just another contingency on reward? Or do they form part of the brain’s immune
system? One perspective would be to interpret the actions of cytokines and inflam-
matory responses in the brain using the same metaphor as is used to interpret immune
responses - that of defining self and non-self.
7.6.2 Self and non-self in Immunity and reward
The self/non-self metaphor was first introduced by Macfarlane Burnet, an immunolo-
gist working around the time of the second world war (Tauber, 2010). After the war
there had been a sharp increase in the number of transplants, and as a result explain-
ing the host-versus-graft became a priority in immunology reactions that were often
observed. In some cases the patient’s immune system would tolerate the graft from
a foreign donor, but in other cases the graft would trigger an autoimmune reaction
whereby the host rejected the foreign material.
At the time the immune system was seen as a reactive defence mechanism which
was either passively silent, or actively attacking foreign invaders. Macfarlane Burnet
proposed that tolerance and autoimmunity were two sides of the same coin and that
the type of immune response that is observed depends upon whether the foreign tissue
was recognised as compatible with the immune identity (ie. self or non-self). If the
tissue was recognised as compatible with the self identity it would be tolerated, whilst
if it was incompatible it would be rejected or destroyed.
By the late 1970s, the self/non-self metaphor introduced by Macfarlane Burnet
had become the foundation for theorising in immunology, and the field had come to
describe itself as the science of the self/non-self distinction (Tauber, 2010).
Since Burnet first introduced this metaphor it has become clear that the boundaries
between self and non-self constituents are not straightforward, and the response of the
immune system to these constituents is not always predictable. Despite these issues
it is generally accepted that the self/non-self metaphor has provided fertile ground for
theorising in immunology, and has undoubtedly proved practically useful, even if not
true (Tauber, 2010).
While the self and non-self metaphor is most often applied at the level of antibod-
ies, it is equally possible to apply it to the constituents of the inflammatory response
generated by antibodies. Many of these constituents cross the blood-brain barrier
(Quan and Banks, 2007), and in many cases they are also synthesised in neural and
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Figure 7.2: The expression of cytokines and their receptors across different cell types
in the brain. Table taken from (Szelényi, 2001)
glial cells of the central nervous system (see Figure 7.2 for more details).
If the cytokines involved in defining the self and non-self in the periphery are also
constitutively expressed in the central nervous system, then can we also interpret the
actions of central cytokines in terms of self and non-self?
The reason for pursuing this line of argument is that concepts like reward and aver-
sion imply the existence of a self that is rewarded and punished, and that rewarding and
aversive circuits are themselves shaped and modulated by the products of inflammatory
reactions (Dunn, 2006).
The interactions between inflammatory responses and neural processes are not re-
stricted to reward - there is evidence that inflammatory cytokines play a constitutive
role in memory (Jankowsky et al., 2000), (Stellwagen and Malenka, 2006), (McAfoose
and Baune, 2009). Again, the blurring of these traditional boundaries between immu-
nity and cognition suggests the need for a new model (McAfoose and Baune, 2009).
The way in which inflammatory and neural processes are interlinked suggests that
we need a new metaphor to understand how and why they interact. Use of the self/non-
self metaphor would allow us to interpret the function of these two systems in terms of
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a larger network that serves to define the individual’s identity. From this perspective,
neural dynamics in the cortex can be seen as an outcome of reward learning, and in
turn, reward learning can be seen as an outcome of the process of self-definition.
7.6.3 Linking the Immune and Psychological selves
The use of the self/non-self metaphor in immunology is based upon the implicit as-
sumption that there is a biological basis to our immune identity. Likewise, in neuro-
science and psychology, we frequently talk about selves — perceptual experience and
cognitive control imply the existence of a self for there to be a perceiver or actor, whilst
in psychiatry we often talk about disordered conceptions of self. When we do this, we
usually assume that underneath all of the layers of detail there is a biological basis for
the phenomena we describe.
However, it is rarely recognised that there are two concepts of self here; the immune
self in the body, and the psychological self in the brain. One might wonder how these
two concepts of self relate to one another — is the immune self compatible with the
psychological self? If these two concepts of self interact, do the biological mechanisms
of self in both cases act to support one another, do they interfere, or do they act entirely
independently?
The purpose of this proposal to make use of the self/non-self metaphor in neuro-
science is to suggest that if they interact at all, they must work in tandem.
If the biological bases of the psychological and immune selves were to be defined
independently, then there would be cases where what is defined as beneficial for the
immune self leads to negative outcomes for the psychological self. While this may oc-
cur in pathological cases, this cannot occur in a psychologically and physically healthy
individual.
7.6.4 Dopamine and reward as a self(ish) circuit
We have reviewed in section 7.3 how dopamine is commonly described as a reward
signal. It is most often assumed that dopamine neurons distinguish between the reward
of oneself and reward of another, and so by associating dopamine with reward we are
also stating that dopamine effectively distinguishes self and non-self.
In this sense we can characterise dopamine modulation as a self(ish) behavioural
circuit. This would be in contrast with other systems which may motivate altruistic
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actions - mirror neurons in the pre-motor cortex indicate that such concepts as "other"
are already represented neurally (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004).
The hypothesis that dopamine neurons serve to define self does raise some inter-
esting predictions. It is not clear if it has been experimentally verified that dopamine
neurons are more responsive to the reward of self than other - evidence in the affirma-
tive would not be surprising, but would serve to support the hypothesis.
But there may be other, more subtle ways of ascertaining whether or not dopamine
neurons help define the organism’s sense of self. It would be an intriguing test whether
or not the cognitive sense of selfhood that is extended to objects (ie. one’s own prop-
erty) would be reflected in the firing of dopamine neurons. For example, we might ask:
is being rewarded with one’s own property as effective at causing dopamine neurons
to burst than when one is rewarded with property belonging to another?
The proposal in this chapter is not the first time a link has been made between
the firing of dopamine neurons and agency. Redgrave et al. (2008) have proposed that
dopamine neurons do not signal unexpected reward, but agency — they have suggested
that dopamine neurons highlight unexpected events for which the organism itself was
responsible.
This is an interesting proposal, because it is compatible not only with the view
of dopamine as signalling reward, but also fits in with dopamine’s proposed role in
defining a cognitive sense of self.
7.6.5 Summary
In summary, applying the self/non-self metaphor to the study of the central nervous
system may offer a new perspective on processes like dopamine modulation.
Not only does the self/non-self metaphor give us a means to formulate and answer
important questions about the neural basis of our sense of self, but it also makes the
links between immunity and the brain more transparent.
Drawing analogies between immunity and neuroscience is valuable whether or not
there is strong evidence for direct causal interactions between the two systems. An
analogy between the two systems is valuable because theorists working in both fields
have already developed models of learning and memory which can be applied to either
domain. For very little cost we can take what has been learned in one domain and
apply it to another.
Jerne (1974)’s idiotypic model of immunity can be used in neuroscience as a non-
Chapter 7. Putting dopamine and reward in context 163
neural model of learning and memory - a model that may become increasingly neces-
sary as we come to recognise the ubiquity of non-neural memory systems (Kim and
Linden, 2007). Quantitative examples of the workings of such a memory model can be
found in Perelson and Weisbuch (1997).
Likewise, models in neuroscience may have a lot to offer immunology - reinforce-
ment learning could be used as a model to explain how cytokines drive learning of the
appropriate anti-body repertoire in the same way that dopamine drives learning of the
appropriate neural response.
This would not be the first time models from immunology have made their way into
neuroscience - Burnet’s Clonal Selection theory and Edelman’s Neural Darwinism bear
some remarkable similarities.
One criticism that has been levelled at the self/non-self metaphor is that it is dif-
ficult to pin down, and this is an ongoing source of debate in immunology (Tauber,
2010). However, the difficulty we have in defining constituents of selfhood can be
seen as analogous to the difficulty of defining the constituents of computation in the
nervous system.
Foundational metaphors must be loosely defined if they are to be broadly appli-
cable. Even critics of the paradigm in immunology concede that the self/non-self
metaphor has proved useful (Tauber, 2000).
7.7 Dopamine: reward, wanting, or agency?
In conclusion, we have now looked at dopamine and reward in the context of two other
fundamental behavioural circuits - stress and immunity. By looking at the actions of
dopamine using the theoretical models of these different fields we have gained a new
perspective on the role of dopamine.
When we look at the actions of dopamine from the perspective of stress we can see
that dopamine forms part of an anticipatory stress circuit. Also, dopamine can be seen
as an allostatic mechanism driving the organism to engage in behaviour that takes it
away from homeostasis. The notion of dopamine as an anticipatory stress circuit, and
reward as a stressor free us from the confusion over whether dopamine is involved in
rewarding or aversive processing, or both.
Another view on the function of dopamine modulation comes from Berridge et al.
(2009), who argue that liking and wanting can be dissociated, and that dopamine is
involved in only the “wanting” component of a reward, rather than “liking” which is
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mediated by opiod and endocannabinoid circuits.
Recent results support this - a study by Flagel et al. (2011) suggests that dopamine
is signalling incentive salience rather than solely signalling reward prediction error.
Other authors have suggested that dopamine neurons exist in two distinct populations
which can encode motivational value or motivational salience (Bromberg-Martin et al.,
2010).
The idea that dopamine is signalling wanting rather than liking would go some way
to explaining why, when under stress, dopaminergic circuits can drive an individual
to engage in behaviour they no longer gain pleasure from, a phenomenon which is
common in addiction (Berridge et al., 2009). In fact it has been proposed that the
priming of allostatic circuits by stress, and the consequent accumulation of allostatic
load, forms the basis of addictive behaviour (Koob and Le Moal, 2001).
In addition to the context on reward offered by stress, we have also looked at
dopamine function from the perspective of the self/non-self metaphor used in im-
munology. In this context it was suggested that dopamine can also be interpreted as
signalling agency, and in the process of this, distinguishing self from non-self. This
view fits well with the arguments made by Redgrave et al. (2008), who have suggested
that the function of phasic dopamine is to trigger learning about changes in the envi-
ronment for which the organism itself may have been responsible.
In summary the value of putting dopamine modulation and reward in context is that
it allows us to see how reward-seeking behaviour can be shaped by other evolutionary
critical processes going on in the body. By understanding dopamine function in the
context of other systems it will be easier to explain how these systems interact on a
mechanistic level. And on the behavioural level, a recognition of the context of reward-
seeking behaviour will help us better understand how an individual’s self-interested
drive for reward relates to and is shaped by other aspects of human behaviour.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
8.1 Summary of findings
In this thesis I have taken an interesting new model in neuroscience and tried to verify
it using computational models. I was unable to support or contradict the hypothesis
with my simulations, but in the process of constructing and analysing the models I
have learned a great deal about the difficulties of linking computational models with
empirical data.
My conclusions have been
1. That it is not possible to develop cross-level models in neuroscience that can
accurately relate high-level concepts to low-level empirical observations.
2. That high-level models can be useful even if they are not supported by and un-
derlying mechanistic model.
3. That metaphors like computation, reinforcement learning, or self/non-self must
be loosely defined if they are to be generic enough to explain many different
phenomena.
I have also described other potential models and metaphors in neuroscience —
such as stress, allostasis, and the self/non-self metaphor in chapter 7 — and argued
that these models may be useful for understanding phenomena in which both the brain
and body are involved.
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8.2 How we can compare models
In the first of my conclusions above I have argued that is not possible to determine the
truth of a theoretical framework in so far that it cannot be uniquely justified by empir-
ical data. This should not be mistaken for saying that all models are as good as one
another. The second question in this thesis asked whether or not neuromodulation and
reinforcement was a better model for explaining behaviour when compared with neural
computation. How can we judge which is a better model if neither can be verified by
empirical data? In this thesis I have argued that alongside empirical arguments, there
are also a priori factors that can make one model more suitable than another. A good
model should:
1. Explain phenomena using variables of a similar timescale
2. Use a metaphor which is appropriate for the target domain (in section 1.3.2 I
argued that this was one of the reasons computation was a poor metaphor for
describing emotion and motivational states).
For these reasons I would still argue that neuromodulation and reinforcement learn-
ing is a more appropriate model for relating brain and behaviour, primarily because
the release and effect of neuromodulation manifests itself at a timescale closer to the
behaviour we are interested in. It is also more interesting from a psychological per-
spective because it attempts to describe our behaviour in terms of desire rather than
purely mechanistic responses.
8.3 Relating brain processes to human psychology
After spending several years working on this topic I feel I have a better understanding
of my motivations for pursuing this thesis. In hindsight, one of the reasons why I
have been interested in neuromodulation and reinforcement learning as a model may
be because it offers a description of neuroscience in which the behaviour of human
beings is governed by drives and desires. I have followed this path in reaction to a
model which describes humans as agents with internal representations, but no internal
motivational states. The growing trend I have described, of researchers moving from
explanations based upon neural computation to explanations based upon reinforcement
learning represents a need on the part of researchers to put our desire at the centre of our
behaviour. On the other hand, the metaphor of selfhood which I proposed in chapter 7
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represents a need to put our identity, self-preservation, and our need assert our identity
as the core of our behaviour.
Now, at the end of this thesis I believe that it is not a question of which metaphor
is correct, but which metaphor a) suits the needs of the research community, or b) suits
the needs of society as a whole. I would argue for the value of model pluralism, rather
than a choice of one metaphor over another. Where there is a choice of models one
should be free to choose the model that is most effective, or most appropriate.
8.4 Hiding the world in the brain
At the start of this thesis I set out with questions about how the brain works. My
attempts to answer these questions were unsuccessful, and I have spent some time
trying to understand why these models failed. With the benefit of time it now seems
strange that I ever thought the models could succeed. Why is it so difficult to relate the
brain and behaviour?
It may be because when we do neuroscience we make the assumption that we can
relate our perception and behaviour to correlates in the brain. But by making this
assumption we commit ourself to the view that all things which we can perceive or act
upon (ie. all things in the world), must also have a correlate in the brain. Neuroscience
must then explain how it is that the brain can contain not only all the things that exist
in the world, but also all the relationships between all the things that exist in the world.
When seen this way, that we are trying to hide the world in the brain, it becomes clear
why our task is so difficult.
Appendix A
Chapter 3 model parameters
a z
Regular spiking neurons 0.02 1
Fast spiking interneurons 0.1 2
Table A.1: Parameter values for the two neuron types in the network.
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Parameter Parameter use value
τc Eligibility trace time constant 1.05
τd Dopamine decay time constant 1.005
Table A.2: Parameter values for the model described in chapter 3.
Appendix B
Chapter 4 model code
1 / / S p i k i n g n e u r a l ne twork w i t h ax on a l c o n d u c t i o n d e l a y s , STDP and
dopamine
2 / / Crea ted by Eugene M. I z h i k e v i c h , S e p t 23 , 2005 , San Diego , CA
3 / / Loads v a l u e s from i n i t i a l 3 6 0 0 . d a t and i m p l e m e n t s s e c o n d a r y
c o n d i t i o n i n g .
4 / / Saves s p i k i n g da ta each second i n f i l e s p i k e s . d a t
5 / / To p l o t s p i k e s , use MATLAB code : load s p i k e s . d a t ; p l o t ( s p i k e s ( : , 1 )
, s p i k e s ( : , 2 ) , ’ . ’ ) ;
6
7 / / A d d i t i o n a l v a r i a b l e s f o r a n a l y s i s added by R obe r t Kyle , 2007 ,
Edinburgh , UK
8
9 # i n c l u d e < i o s t r e a m . h>
10 # i n c l u d e <math . h>
11 # i n c l u d e < s t d i o . h>
12 # i n c l u d e < s t d l i b . h>
13
14 # d e f i n e ge t random ( max1 ) ( ( r and ( ) (int ( ( max1 ) ) ) ) / / random i n t e g e r
be tween 0 and max−1
15 # d e f i n e T ( 7 0 0 0 ) / / d u r a t i o n o f s i m u l a t i o n
16 i n t r a n d _ s e e d =0;
17
18 c o n s t i n t Ne = 800 ; / / e x c i t a t o r y neurons
19 c o n s t i n t Ni = 200 ; / / i n h i b i t o r y neurons
20 c o n s t i n t N = Ne+Ni ; / / t o t a l number o f neurons
21 c o n s t i n t M = 100 ; / / t h e number o f s y n a p s e s per neuron
22 c o n s t i n t D = 1 ; / / maximal ax on a l c o n d u c t i o n d e l a y
23 f l o a t sm = 4 . 0 ; / / maximal s y n a p t i c s t r e n g t h
24 i n t p o s t [N] [M] ; / / i n d e c e s o f p o s t s y n a p t i c neurons
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25 f l o a t s [N] [M] , sd [N] [M] ; / / m a t r i x o f s y n a p t i c w e i g h t s and t h e i r
d e r i v a t i v e s
26 s h o r t d e l a y s _ l e n g t h [N] [D ] ; / / d i s t r i b u t i o n o f d e l a y s
27 s h o r t d e l a y s [N] [D] [M] ; / / a r rangemen t o f d e l a y s
28 i n t N_pre [N] , I _ p r e [N] [ 3 *M] , D_pre [N] [ 3 *M] ; / / p r e s y n a p t i c
i n f o r m a t i o n
29 f l o a t * s _ p r e [N] [ 3 *M] , * s d _ p r e [N] [ 3 *M] ; / / p r e s y n a p t i c w e i g h t s
30 f l o a t LTP [N] [1001+D] , LTD[N ] ; / / STDP f u n c t i o n s
31 f l o a t a [N] , d [N ] ; / / n e u r o n a l dynamics p a r a m e t e r s
32 f l o a t v [N] , u [N ] ; / / a c t i v i t y v a r i a b l e s
33 i n t N _ f i r i n g s ; / / t h e number o f f i r e d neurons
34 c o n s t i n t N_f i r i ngs_max =100*N; / / upper l i m i t on t h e number o f
f i r e d neurons per s e c
35 i n t f i r i n g s [ N_f i r i ngs_max ] [ 2 ] ; / / i n d e c e s and t i m i n g s o f s p i k e s
36
37
38 / / Parame ter s f o r t h e s e c o n d a r y c o n d i t i o n i n g
39 # d e f i n e VTA ( 1 0 0 ) / / neurons p r o j e c t i n g t o VAT , 0 . . VTA−1
40 # d e f i n e US0 ( 1 0 0 )
41 # d e f i n e US1 ( 2 0 0 ) / / Neurons US0 . . US1−1 are s t i m u l a t e d by t h e
u n c o n d i t i o n a l s t i m u l u s ( US )
42 # d e f i n e CSA0 ( 2 0 0 )
43 # d e f i n e CSA1 ( 3 0 0 ) / / Neurons CSA0 . . CSA1−1 are s t i m u l a t e d by t h e
c o n d i t i o n a l s t i m u l u s A
44 # d e f i n e CSB0 ( 3 0 0 )
45 # d e f i n e CSB1 ( 4 0 0 ) / / Neurons CSB0 . . CSB1−1 are s t i m u l a t e d by t h e
c o n d i t i o n a l s t i m u l u s B
46 # d e f i n e Tst immin ( 1 0 ) / / Minimal p e r i o d ( s e c ) o f t i m e be tween random
t r i a l s
47 # d e f i n e Tstimmax ( 3 0 ) / / Maximal p e r i o d ( s e c ) o f t i m e be tween random
t r i a l s
48 i n t Tst im =10; / / The s c h e d u l e d t i m e o f s t i m u l a t i o n
49 # d e f i n e C S A j i t t e r ( 2 5 0 ) / / J i t t e r ( ms ) o f p r e s e n t a t i o n o f CSA . (
t_CSA = t_US−1s e c +C S A j i t )
50 i n t CSAj i t =0 ; / / S c h e d u l e d j i t t e r f o r t h e n e x t t r i a l
51 # d e f i n e C S B j i t t e r ( 2 5 0 ) / / J i t t e r ( ms ) o f p r e s e n t a t i o n o f CSB . (
t_CSB = t_US−2s e c +C S B j i t )
52 i n t CSBj i t =0 ; / / S c h e d u l e d j i t t e r f o r t h e n e x t t r i a l
53
54 # d e f i n e S t a r t U S ( 0 )
55 # d e f i n e StopUS ( T )
56 # d e f i n e S t a r t A ( 2 0 0 0 )
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57 # d e f i n e StopA ( T )
58 # d e f i n e S t a r t B ( 4 0 0 0 )
59 # d e f i n e StopB ( T )
60
61 # d e f i n e DAamp ( 0 . 0 0 5 ) / / t h e a m p l i t u d e o f t h e reward per each s p i k e
o f VTA neurons
62 f l o a t DA= 0 . 0 ; / / c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f e x t r a c e l l u l a r DA
63 f l o a t US2US , US2VTA, US2other , US2CSa , US2CSb , US2inh ;
64 f l o a t VTA2US, VTA2VTA, VTA2other , VTA2CSa , VTA2CSb , VTA2inh ;
65 f l o a t other2US , other2VTA , o t h e r 2 o t h e r , o ther2CSa , other2CSb ,
o t h e r 2 i n h ;
66 f l o a t CSa2US , CSa2VTA , CSa2other , CSa2CSa , CSa2CSb , CSa2inh ;
67 f l o a t CSb2US , CSb2VTA , CSb2other , CSb2CSa , CSb2CSb , CSb2inh ;
68
69 i n t countUS2US =0 , countUS2VTA =0 , coun tUS2o the r =0 , countUS2CSa =0 ,
countUS2CSb =0 , countUS2inh =0;
70 i n t countVTA2US =0 , countVTA2VTA =0 , countVTA2other =0 , countVTA2CSa =0 ,
countVTA2CSb =0 , countVTA2inh =0;
71 i n t coun to the r2US =0 , countother2VTA =0 , c o u n t o t h e r 2 o t h e r =0 ,
c o u n t o t h e r 2 C S a =0 , c o u n t o t h e r 2 C S b =0 , c o u n t o t h e r 2 i n h =0;
72 i n t countCSa2US =0 , countCSa2VTA =0 , c o u n t C S a 2 o t h e r =0 , countCSa2CSa =0 ,
countCSa2CSb =0 , coun tCSa2 inh =0;
73 i n t countCSb2US =0 , countCSb2VTA =0 , c o u n t C S b 2 o t h e r =0 , countCSb2CSa =0 ,




77 void i n i t i a l i z e ( )
78 { i n t i , j , k , j j , dd , e x i s t s , r ;
79 f o r ( i =0 ; i <Ne ; i ++) a [ i ] = 0 . 0 2 ; / / RS t y p e
80 f o r ( i =Ne ; i <N; i ++) a [ i ] = 0 . 1 ; / / FS t y p e
81
82 f o r ( i =0 ; i <Ne ; i ++) d [ i ] = 8 . 0 ; / / RS t y p e
83 f o r ( i =Ne ; i <N; i ++) d [ i ] = 2 . 0 ; / / FS t y p e
84
85 f o r ( i =0 ; i <N; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
86 {
87 do{
88 e x i s t s = 0 ; / / a v o i d m u l t i p l e s y n a p s e s
89 i f ( i <Ne ) r = ge t random (N) ;
90 e l s e r = ge t random ( Ne ) ; / / i n h −> exc o n l y
91 i f ( r == i ) e x i s t s =1 ; / / no s e l f −s y n a p s e s
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92 f o r ( k =0; k< j ; k ++) i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ k ]== r ) e x i s t s = 1 ; / / s y n a p s e
a l r e a d y e x i s t s
93 } whi le ( e x i s t s == 1) ;
94 p o s t [ i ] [ j ]= r ;
95 }
96 f o r ( i =0 ; i <Ne ; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++) s [ i ] [ j ] = 1 . 0 ; / / i n i t i a l exc
. s y n a p t i c w e i g h t s
97 f o r ( i =Ne ; i <N; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++) s [ i ] [ j ]=−1.0 ; / / i n h i b i t o r y
s y n a p t i c w e i g h t s
98 f o r ( i =0 ; i <N; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++) sd [ i ] [ j ] = 0 . 0 ; / / s y n a p t i c
d e r i v a t i v e s
99 f o r ( i =0 ; i <N; i ++)
100 {
101 s h o r t i n d =0;
102 i f ( i <Ne )
103 {
104 f o r ( j =0 ; j <D; j ++)
105 { d e l a y s _ l e n g t h [ i ] [ j ]=M/D; / / u n i f o r m d i s t r i b u t i o n o f exc .
s y n a p t i c d e l a y s
106 f o r ( k =0; k< d e l a y s _ l e n g t h [ i ] [ j ] ; k ++)
107 d e l a y s [ i ] [ j ] [ k ]= i n d ++;
108 }
109 }
110 e l s e
111 {
112 f o r ( j =0 ; j <D; j ++) d e l a y s _ l e n g t h [ i ] [ j ] = 0 ;
113 d e l a y s _ l e n g t h [ i ] [ 0 ] =M; / / a l l i n h i b i t o r y d e l a y s are 1 ms
114 f o r ( k =0; k< d e l a y s _ l e n g t h [ i ] [ 0 ] ; k ++)




119 f o r ( i =0 ; i <N; i ++)
120 {
121 N_pre [ i ] = 0 ;
122 f o r ( j =0 ; j <Ne ; j ++)
123 f o r ( k =0; k<M; k ++)
124 i f ( p o s t [ j ] [ k ] == i ) / / f i n d a l l p r e s y n a p t i c neurons
125 {
126 I _ p r e [ i ] [ N_pre [ i ] ] = j ; / / add t h i s neuron t o t h e l i s t
127 f o r ( dd =0; dd<D; dd ++) / / f i n d t h e d e l a y
128 f o r ( j j =0 ; j j < d e l a y s _ l e n g t h [ j ] [ dd ] ; j j ++)
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129 i f ( p o s t [ j ] [ d e l a y s [ j ] [ dd ] [ j j ] ]== i ) D_pre [ i ] [ N_pre [ i ] ] = dd ;
130 s _ p r e [ i ] [ N_pre [ i ]]=& s [ j ] [ k ] ; / / p o i n t e r t o t h e s y n a p t i c
w e i g h t




135 f o r ( i =0 ; i <N; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <1+D; j ++) LTP [ i ] [ j ] = 0 . 0 ;
136 f o r ( i =0 ; i <N; i ++) LTD[ i ] = 0 . 0 ;
137 f o r ( i =0 ; i <N; i ++) v [ i ]=−65.0 ; / / i n i t i a l v a l u e s f o r v
138 f o r ( i =0 ; i <N; i ++) u [ i ] = 0 . 2 * v [ i ] ; / / i n i t i a l v a l u e s f o r u
139
140 N _ f i r i n g s =1; / / s p i k e t i m i n g s
141 f i r i n g s [0] [0]=−D; / / p u t a dummy s p i k e a t −D f o r s i m u l a t i o n
e f f i c i e n c y
142 f i r i n g s [ 0 ] [ 1 ] = 0 ; / / i n d e x o f t h e dummy s p i k e
143 }
144
145 void s ave ( char fname [ 3 0 ] )
146 {
147 FILE * f ;
148 f = fopen ( fname , "wb" ) ;
149 f w r i t e (& rand_seed , s i z e o f ( i n t ) , 1 , f ) ;
150 f w r i t e ( v , s i z e o f ( f l o a t ) ,N, f ) ;
151 f w r i t e ( u , s i z e o f ( f l o a t ) ,N, f ) ;
152 f w r i t e ( s , s i z e o f ( f l o a t ) ,N*M, f ) ;
153 f w r i t e ( sd , s i z e o f ( f l o a t ) ,N*M, f ) ;
154 f w r i t e ( LTP , s i z e o f ( f l o a t ) ,N*(1001+D) , f ) ;
155 f w r i t e (LTD, s i z e o f ( f l o a t ) ,N, f ) ;
156 f w r i t e (& N _ f i r i n g s , s i z e o f ( i n t ) , 1 , f ) ;
157 f w r i t e ( f i r i n g s , s i z e o f ( i n t ) , N_f i r i ngs_max *2 , f ) ;
158 f c l o s e ( f ) ;
159 }
160 void l o a d ( char fname [ 3 0 ] )
161 {
162 FILE * f ;
163 f = fopen ( fname , " rb " ) ;
164 f r e a d (& rand_seed , s i z e o f ( i n t ) , 1 , f ) ;
165 s r a n d ( r a n d _ s e e d ) ;
166 i n i t i a l i z e ( ) ; / / a s s i g n c o n n e c t i o n s t h e same way as i n i n i t i a l 3 6 0 0
. cpp / / Ah−Ha ! becuase random seed i s t h e same , ne twork w i l l
be t h e same
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167 f r e a d ( v , s i z e o f ( f l o a t ) ,N, f ) ;
168 f r e a d ( u , s i z e o f ( f l o a t ) ,N, f ) ;
169 f r e a d ( s , s i z e o f ( f l o a t ) ,N*M, f ) ;
170 f r e a d ( sd , s i z e o f ( f l o a t ) ,N*M, f ) ;
171 f r e a d ( LTP , s i z e o f ( f l o a t ) ,N*(1001+D) , f ) ;
172 f r e a d (LTD, s i z e o f ( f l o a t ) ,N, f ) ;
173 f r e a d (& N _ f i r i n g s , s i z e o f ( i n t ) , 1 , f ) ;
174 f r e a d ( f i r i n g s , s i z e o f ( i n t ) , N_f i r i ngs_max *2 , f ) ;




179 i n t main ( )
180 {
181 i n t i , j , k , sec , t ;
182 f l o a t I [N ] ;
183 FILE * f s ;
184
185 l o a d ( " i n i t i a l 3 6 0 0 . d a t " ) ; / / u se i n i t i a l 3 6 0 0 . cpp t o g e n e r a t e
t h e f i l e
186
187 remove ( " d a t a . d a t " ) ;
188 remove ( " sp ikesUS . d a t " ) ;
189 remove ( " sp ikesA . d a t " ) ;
190 remove ( " s p i k e s B . d a t " ) ;
191
192 / / US f i r s t
193 f o r ( i =US0 ; i <US1 ; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
194 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <US1 && p o s t [ i ] [ j ] >=US0 ) countUS2US ++; / / US
t a r g e t
195 f o r ( i =US0 ; i <US1 ; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
196 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <VTA) countUS2VTA ++; / / VTA t a r g e t
197 f o r ( i =US0 ; i <US1 ; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
198 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <Ne && p o s t [ i ] [ j ] >=CSB1 ) coun tUS2o the r ++; / /
non−reward c o n t i n g e n t t a r g e t
199 f o r ( i =US0 ; i <US1 ; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
200 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <CSA1 && p o s t [ i ] [ j ] >=CSA0) countUS2CSa ++; / /
CSa t a r g e t
201 f o r ( i =US0 ; i <US1 ; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
202 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <CSB1 && p o s t [ i ] [ j ] >=CSB0 ) countUS2CSb ++; / /
CSb t a r g e t
203 f o r ( i =US0 ; i <US1 ; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
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204 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <N && p o s t [ i ] [ j ] >=Ne ) countUS2inh ++; / / i n h
t a r g e t
205
206 / / t h e n VTA
207 f o r ( i =0 ; i <VTA; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
208 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <US1 && p o s t [ i ] [ j ] >=US0 ) countVTA2US ++; / / US
t a r g e t
209 f o r ( i =0 ; i <VTA; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
210 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <VTA) countVTA2VTA ++; / / VTA t a r g e t
211 f o r ( i =0 ; i <VTA; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
212 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <Ne && p o s t [ i ] [ j ] >=CSB1 ) countVTA2other ++; / /
non−reward c o n t i n g e n t t a r g e t
213 f o r ( i =0 ; i <VTA; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
214 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <CSA1 && p o s t [ i ] [ j ] >=CSA0) countVTA2CSa ++; / /
CSa t a r g e t
215 f o r ( i =0 ; i <VTA; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
216 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <CSB1 && p o s t [ i ] [ j ] >=CSB0 ) countVTA2CSb ++; / /
CSb t a r g e t
217 f o r ( i =0 ; i <VTA; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
218 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <N && p o s t [ i ] [ j ] >=Ne ) countVTA2inh ++; / / i n h
t a r g e t
219
220 / / t h e n o t h e r
221 f o r ( i =CSB1 ; i <Ne ; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
222 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <US1 && p o s t [ i ] [ j ] >=US0 ) coun to the r2US ++; / /
US t a r g e t
223 f o r ( i =CSB1 ; i <Ne ; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
224 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <VTA) countother2VTA ++; / / VTA t a r g e t
225 f o r ( i =CSB1 ; i <Ne ; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
226 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <Ne && p o s t [ i ] [ j ] >=CSB1 ) c o u n t o t h e r 2 o t h e r ++;
/ / non−reward c o n t i n g e n t t a r g e t
227 f o r ( i =CSB1 ; i <Ne ; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
228 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <CSA1 && p o s t [ i ] [ j ] >=CSA0) c o u n t o t h e r 2 C S a ++;
/ / CSa t a r g e t
229 f o r ( i =CSB1 ; i <Ne ; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
230 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <CSB1 && p o s t [ i ] [ j ] >=CSB0 ) c o u n t o t h e r 2 C S b ++;
/ / CSb t a r g e t
231 f o r ( i =CSB1 ; i <Ne ; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
232 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <N && p o s t [ i ] [ j ] >=Ne ) c o u n t o t h e r 2 i n h ++; / / i n h
t a r g e t
233
234 / / t h e n CSa
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235 f o r ( i =CSA0 ; i <CSA1 ; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
236 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <US1 && p o s t [ i ] [ j ] >=US0 ) countCSa2US ++; / / US
t a r g e t
237 f o r ( i =CSA0 ; i <CSA1 ; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
238 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <VTA) countCSa2VTA ++; / / VTA t a r g e t
239 f o r ( i =CSA0 ; i <CSA1 ; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
240 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <Ne && p o s t [ i ] [ j ] >=CSB1 ) c o u n t C S a 2 o t h e r ++; / /
non−reward c o n t i n g e n t t a r g e t
241 f o r ( i =CSA0 ; i <CSA1 ; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
242 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <CSA1 && p o s t [ i ] [ j ] >=CSA0) countCSa2CSa ++; / /
CSa t a r g e t
243 f o r ( i =CSA0 ; i <CSA1 ; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
244 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <CSB1 && p o s t [ i ] [ j ] >=CSB0 ) countCSa2CSb ++; / /
CSb t a r g e t
245 f o r ( i =CSA0 ; i <CSA1 ; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
246 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <N && p o s t [ i ] [ j ] >=Ne ) coun tCSa2 inh ++; / / i n h
t a r g e t
247
248 / / CSb
249 f o r ( i =CSB0 ; i <CSB1 ; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
250 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <US1 && p o s t [ i ] [ j ] >=US0 ) countCSb2US ++; / / US
t a r g e t
251 f o r ( i =CSB0 ; i <CSB1 ; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
252 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <VTA) countCSb2VTA ++; / / VTA t a r g e t
253 f o r ( i =CSB0 ; i <CSB1 ; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
254 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <Ne && p o s t [ i ] [ j ] >=CSB1 ) c o u n t C S b 2 o t h e r ++; / /
non−reward c o n t i n g e n t t a r g e t
255 f o r ( i =CSB0 ; i <CSB1 ; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
256 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <CSA1 && p o s t [ i ] [ j ] >=CSA0) countCSb2CSa ++; / /
CSa t a r g e t
257 f o r ( i =CSB0 ; i <CSB1 ; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
258 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <CSB1 && p o s t [ i ] [ j ] >=CSB0 ) countCSb2CSb ++; / /
CSb t a r g e t
259 f o r ( i =CSB0 ; i <CSB1 ; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
260 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <N && p o s t [ i ] [ j ] >=Ne ) countCSb2inh ++; / / i n h
t a r g e t
261
262
263 f s = fopen ( " d a t a . d a t " , " a " ) ;
264 f p r i n t f ( f s , " d fprintf(fs," fprintf(fs," fprintf(fs," fprintf(fs," fclose(fs ;
265
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266 f o r ( i =US0 ; i <US1 ; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++) i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <VTA) s [ i ] [ j
] = 0 . 7 5 * sm ; / / u n c o n d i t i o n e d reward / / US−>VTA s e t t o 3 , n o t 4
267
268 f o r ( s e c =0; sec <T ; s e c ++)
269 {
270 f o r ( t =0 ; t <1000; t ++) / / s i m u l a t i o n o f 1 s e c
271 {
272 f o r ( i =0 ; i <N; i ++) I [ i ] = 1 3 . 0 * ( ge t random ( 1 0 0 0 ) / 1 0 0 0 . 0 −0 . 5 ) ; / /
r e s e t t h e i n p u t
273
274 / / The f o l l o w i n g code does : US , CSa+US , and CSb+CSa+US .
275
276 i f ( ( s e c ==Tstim −2) & ( t ==500+ CS Bj i t ) & ( sec > S t a r t B ) & ( sec <=
StopB ) ) / / s t i m u l a t i o n o f CSB
277 {
278 f o r ( i =CSB0 ; i <CSB1 ; i ++) I [ i ] = 2 0 . 0 ;
279 }
280 i f ( ( s e c ==Tstim −1) & ( t ==500+ CSAj i t ) & ( sec > S t a r t A ) & ( sec <=
StopA ) ) / / s t i m u l a t i o n o f CSA
281 {
282 f o r ( i =CSA0 ; i <CSA1 ; i ++) I [ i ] = 2 0 . 0 ;
283 }
284 i f ( ( s e c == Tst im ) & ( t ==500) & ( sec > S t a r t U S ) & ( sec <=StopUS ) )
/ / s t i m u l a t i o n o f US
285 {
286 f o r ( i =US0 ; i <US1 ; i ++) I [ i ] = 2 0 . 0 ; / / s u p e r t h r e s h o l d
c u r r e n t s t i m u l a t i o n
287 }
288
289 f o r ( i =0 ; i <N; i ++)
290 i f ( v [ i ] >=30) / / d i d i t f i r e ?
291 {
292
293 i f ( i <VTA) DA+=DAamp ; / / Add 0 .005 p e r VTA s p i k e
294
295 v [ i ] = −65.0; / / v o l t a g e r e s e t
296 u [ i ]+= d [ i ] ; / / r e c o v e r y v a r i a b l e r e s e t
297 LTP [ i ] [ t +D]= 0 . 1 ;
298 LTD[ i ] = 0 . 1 5 ;
299 f o r ( j =0 ; j <N_pre [ i ] ; j ++) * s d _ p r e [ i ] [ j ]+=LTP [ I _ p r e [ i ] [ j ] ] [ t +D
−D_pre [ i ] [ j ] − 1 ] ; / / t h i s s p i k e was a f t e r pre−s y n a p t i c
s p i k e s
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300 f i r i n g s [ N _ f i r i n g s ] [ 0 ] = t ;
301 f i r i n g s [ N _ f i r i n g s + + ] [ 1 ] = i ;
302 i f ( N _ f i r i n g s == N_f i r i ngs_max ) { c o u t << "Two many s p i k e s a t
t =" << t << " ( i g n o r i n g a l l ) " ; N _ f i r i n g s =1;}
303 }
304 k= N _ f i r i n g s ;
305 w h i l e ( t− f i r i n g s [−−k ] [ 0 ] <D)
306 {
307 f o r ( j =0 ; j < d e l a y s _ l e n g t h [ f i r i n g s [ k ] [ 1 ] ] [ t− f i r i n g s [ k ] [ 0 ] ] ;
j ++)
308 {
309 i = p o s t [ f i r i n g s [ k ] [ 1 ] ] [ d e l a y s [ f i r i n g s [ k ] [ 1 ] ] [ t− f i r i n g s [ k
] [ 0 ] ] [ j ] ] ;
310 I [ i ]+= s [ f i r i n g s [ k ] [ 1 ] ] [ d e l a y s [ f i r i n g s [ k ] [ 1 ] ] [ t− f i r i n g s [ k
] [ 0 ] ] [ j ] ] ;
311 i f ( f i r i n g s [ k ] [ 1 ] <Ne ) / / t h i s s p i k e i s b e f o r e
p o s t s y n a p t i c s p i k e s
312 sd [ f i r i n g s [ k ] [ 1 ] ] [ d e l a y s [ f i r i n g s [ k ] [ 1 ] ] [ t− f i r i n g s [ k
] [ 0 ] ] [ j ]]−=LTD[ i ] ;
313 }
314 }
315 f o r ( i =0 ; i <N; i ++)
316 {
317 v [ i ] + = 0 . 5 * ( ( 0 . 0 4 * v [ i ] + 5 ) *v [ i ]+140−u [ i ]+ I [ i ] ) ; / / f o r
n u m e r i c a l s t a b i l i t y
318 v [ i ] + = 0 . 5 * ( ( 0 . 0 4 * v [ i ] + 5 ) *v [ i ]+140−u [ i ]+ I [ i ] ) ; / / t ime s t e p
i s 0 . 5 ms
319 u [ i ]+= a [ i ] * ( 0 . 2 * v [ i ]−u [ i ] ) ;
320 LTP [ i ] [ t +D+1]=0 .95*LTP [ i ] [ t +D ] ;
321 LTD[ i ] * = 0 . 9 5 ;
322 }
323
324 DA* = 0 . 9 9 5 ;
325
326 i f ( t 10==0 / / do e v e r y 10 t h ms f o r s i m u l a t i o n e f f i c i e n c y
327 {
328 f o r ( i =0 ; i <Ne ; i ++) / / modify on ly exc c o n n e c t i o n s
329 f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
330 {
331 s [ i ] [ j ]+= sd [ i ] [ j ] * ( 0 . 0 0 +DA) ; / / No ad−hoc t o n i c DA t h i s
t ime
332 i f ( s [ i ] [ j ] >sm ) s [ i ] [ j ]=sm ;
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333 i f ( s [ i ] [ j ] <0) s [ i ] [ j ] = 0 . 0 ;
334 }
335 f o r ( i =0 ; i <Ne ; i ++)
336 f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)




341 i n t N _ f i r _ e x c =0 , N _ f i r _ i n h =0;
342 f o r ( i =1 ; i < N _ f i r i n g s ; i ++)
343 i f ( f i r i n g s [ i ] [ 1 ] <Ne ) N _ f i r _ e x c ++; e l s e N _ f i r _ i n h ++;
344 f p r i n t f ( s t d e r r , " s e c =d, exc.frate=US2US=0.0; US2VTA=0.0; US2other=0.0;
US2CSa=0.0; US2CSb=0.0; US2inh=0.0;VTA2US=0.0; VTA2VTA=0.0; VTA2other=0.0;
VTA2CSa=0.0; VTA2CSb=0.0; VTA2inh=0.0;other2US=0.0; other2VTA=0.0;
other2other=0.0; other2CSa=0.0; other2CSb=0.0; other2inh=0.0;CSa2US=0.0;
CSa2VTA=0.0; CSa2other=0.0; CSa2CSa=0.0; CSa2CSb=0.0; CSa2inh=0.0;CSb2US=0.0;
CSb2VTA=0.0; CSb2other=0.0; CSb2CSa=0.0; CSb2CSb=0.0; CSb2inh=0.0;// US firstfor
(i=US0;i<US1;i++ f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
345 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <US1 && p o s t [ i ] [ j ] >=US0 ) US2US+= s [ i ] [ j ] ; / /
US t a r g e t
346 f o r ( i =US0 ; i <US1 ; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
347 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <VTA) US2VTA+= s [ i ] [ j ] ; / / VTA t a r g e t
348 f o r ( i =US0 ; i <US1 ; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
349 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <Ne && p o s t [ i ] [ j ] >=CSB1 ) US2other += s [ i ] [ j ] ; / /
non−reward c o n t i n g e n t t a r g e t
350 f o r ( i =US0 ; i <US1 ; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
351 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <CSA1 && p o s t [ i ] [ j ] >=CSA0) US2CSa+= s [ i ] [ j ] ; / /
CSa t a r g e t
352 f o r ( i =US0 ; i <US1 ; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
353 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <CSB1 && p o s t [ i ] [ j ] >=CSB0 ) US2CSb+= s [ i ] [ j ] ; / /
CSb t a r g e t
354 f o r ( i =US0 ; i <US1 ; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
355 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <N && p o s t [ i ] [ j ] >=Ne ) US2inh+= s [ i ] [ j ] ; / / i n h
t a r g e t
356
357 / / t h e n VTA
358 f o r ( i =0 ; i <VTA; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
359 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <US1 && p o s t [ i ] [ j ] >=US0 ) VTA2US+= s [ i ] [ j ] ; / /
US t a r g e t
360 f o r ( i =0 ; i <VTA; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
361 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <VTA) VTA2VTA+= s [ i ] [ j ] ; / / VTA t a r g e t
362 f o r ( i =0 ; i <VTA; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
363 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <Ne && p o s t [ i ] [ j ] >=CSB1 ) VTA2other+= s [ i ] [ j ] ;
/ / non−reward c o n t i n g e n t t a r g e t
364 f o r ( i =0 ; i <VTA; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
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365 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <CSA1 && p o s t [ i ] [ j ] >=CSA0) VTA2CSa+= s [ i ] [ j ] ;
/ / CSa t a r g e t
366 f o r ( i =0 ; i <VTA; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
367 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <CSB1 && p o s t [ i ] [ j ] >=CSB0 ) VTA2CSb+= s [ i ] [ j ] ;
/ / CSb t a r g e t
368 f o r ( i =0 ; i <VTA; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
369 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <N && p o s t [ i ] [ j ] >=Ne ) VTA2inh+= s [ i ] [ j ] ; / / i n h
t a r g e t
370
371 / / t h e n o t h e r
372 f o r ( i =CSB1 ; i <Ne ; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
373 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <US1 && p o s t [ i ] [ j ] >=US0 ) other2US += s [ i ] [ j ] ; / /
US t a r g e t
374 f o r ( i =CSB1 ; i <Ne ; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
375 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <VTA) other2VTA+= s [ i ] [ j ] ; / / VTA
t a r g e t
376 f o r ( i =CSB1 ; i <Ne ; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
377 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <Ne && p o s t [ i ] [ j ] >=CSB1 ) o t h e r 2 o t h e r += s [ i ] [ j ] ;
/ / non−reward c o n t i n g e n t t a r g e t
378 f o r ( i =CSB1 ; i <Ne ; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
379 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <CSA1 && p o s t [ i ] [ j ] >=CSA0) o the r2CSa += s [ i ] [ j ] ;
/ / CSa t a r g e t
380 f o r ( i =CSB1 ; i <Ne ; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
381 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <CSB1 && p o s t [ i ] [ j ] >=CSB0 ) other2CSb += s [ i ] [ j ] ;
/ / CSb t a r g e t
382 f o r ( i =CSB1 ; i <Ne ; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
383 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <N && p o s t [ i ] [ j ] >=Ne ) o t h e r 2 i n h += s [ i ] [ j ] ; / /
i n h t a r g e t
384
385 / / t h e n CSa
386 f o r ( i =CSA0 ; i <CSA1 ; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
387 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <US1 && p o s t [ i ] [ j ] >=US0 ) CSa2US+= s [ i ] [ j ] ; / /
US t a r g e t
388 f o r ( i =CSA0 ; i <CSA1 ; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
389 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <VTA) CSa2VTA+= s [ i ] [ j ] ; / / VTA t a r g e t
390 f o r ( i =CSA0 ; i <CSA1 ; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
391 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <Ne && p o s t [ i ] [ j ] >=CSB1 ) CSa2o the r += s [ i ] [ j ] ;
/ / non−reward c o n t i n g e n t t a r g e t
392 f o r ( i =CSA0 ; i <CSA1 ; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
393 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <CSA1 && p o s t [ i ] [ j ] >=CSA0) CSa2CSa+= s [ i ] [ j ] ;
/ / CSa t a r g e t
394 f o r ( i =CSA0 ; i <CSA1 ; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
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395 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <CSB1 && p o s t [ i ] [ j ] >=CSB0 ) CSa2CSb+= s [ i ] [ j ] ;
/ / CSb t a r g e t
396 f o r ( i =CSA0 ; i <CSA1 ; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
397 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <N && p o s t [ i ] [ j ] >=Ne ) CSa2inh+= s [ i ] [ j ] ; / / i n h
t a r g e t
398
399 / / CSb
400 f o r ( i =CSB0 ; i <CSB1 ; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
401 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <US1 && p o s t [ i ] [ j ] >=US0 ) CSb2US+= s [ i ] [ j ] ; / /
US t a r g e t
402 f o r ( i =CSB0 ; i <CSB1 ; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
403 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <VTA) CSb2VTA+= s [ i ] [ j ] ; / / VTA t a r g e t
404 f o r ( i =CSB0 ; i <CSB1 ; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
405 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <Ne && p o s t [ i ] [ j ] >=CSB1 ) CSb2other += s [ i ] [ j ] ;
/ / non−reward c o n t i n g e n t t a r g e t
406 f o r ( i =CSB0 ; i <CSB1 ; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
407 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <CSA1 && p o s t [ i ] [ j ] >=CSA0) CSb2CSa+= s [ i ] [ j ] ;
/ / CSa t a r g e t
408 f o r ( i =CSB0 ; i <CSB1 ; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
409 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <CSB1 && p o s t [ i ] [ j ] >=CSB0 ) CSb2CSb+= s [ i ] [ j ] ;
/ / CSb t a r g e t
410 f o r ( i =CSB0 ; i <CSB1 ; i ++) f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
411 i f ( p o s t [ i ] [ j ] <N && p o s t [ i ] [ j ] >=Ne ) CSb2inh+= s [ i ] [ j ] ; / / i n h
t a r g e t
412
413 f s = fopen ( " d a t a . d a t " , " a " ) ;
414 f p r i n t f ( f s , " f fprintf(fs," fprintf(fs," fprintf(fs," fprintf(fs," fclose(fs ;
415
416 f s = fopen ( " s p i k e s . d a t " , "w" ) ;
417 f o r ( i =1 ; i < N _ f i r i n g s ; i ++)
418 i f ( f i r i n g s [ i ] [ 0 ] >=0)
419 f p r i n t f ( f s , "d fclose(fs ;
420
421 i f ( s e c ==Tstim −2) / / CSB
422 {
423 f s = fopen ( " s p i k e s B . d a t " , " a " ) ;
424 f o r ( i =1 ; i < N _ f i r i n g s ; i ++)
425 i f ( abs ( f i r i n g s [ i ] [0]− (500+ CSB j i t ) ) <= 500−C S B j i t t e r ) / / I f
s p i k e o c c u r r e d 250ms b e f o r e or a f t e r CSB ?
426 f p r i n t f ( f s , "d fclose(fs ;
427 }
428 i f ( s e c ==Tstim −1) / / CSA
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429 {
430 f s = fopen ( " sp ikesA . d a t " , " a " ) ;
431 f o r ( i =1 ; i < N _ f i r i n g s ; i ++)
432 i f ( abs ( f i r i n g s [ i ] [0]− (500+ CSAj i t ) ) <= 500−C S A j i t t e r )
433 f p r i n t f ( f s , "d fclose(fs ;
434 }
435 i f ( s e c == Tst im ) / / US
436 {
437 f s = fopen ( " sp ikesUS . d a t " , " a " ) ;
438 f o r ( i =1 ; i < N _ f i r i n g s ; i ++)
439 i f ( f i r i n g s [ i ] [ 0 ] > = 0 )
440 f p r i n t f ( f s , "d fclose(fs ;
441 Tst im +=Tst immin+ get random ( Tstimmax−Tst immin ) ; / / S e t t ime f o r
n e x t s t i m u l a t i o n
442 CSAj i t = ge t random (2* C S A j i t t e r )−C S A j i t t e r ;




447 f o r ( i =0 ; i <N; i ++) / / p r e p a r e f o r t h e n e x t s e c
448 f o r ( j =0 ; j <D+1; j ++)
449 LTP [ i ] [ j ]=LTP [ i ] [1000+ j ] ;
450 k= N _ f i r i n g s −1;
451 w h i l e (1000− f i r i n g s [ k ] [ 0 ] <D) k−−; / / Get l a s t D t i m e s t e p s t o t h e
s t a r t o f t h e ma t r i x , and c o u n t o f f t h e number o f f i r i n g s = k
452 f o r ( i =1 ; i < N _ f i r i n g s−k ; i ++)
453 {
454 f i r i n g s [ i ] [ 0 ] = f i r i n g s [ k+ i ] [0 ] −1000 ;
455 f i r i n g s [ i ] [ 1 ] = f i r i n g s [ k+ i ] [ 1 ] ;
456 }
457 N _ f i r i n g s = N _ f i r i n g s−k ; / / Number o f f i r i n g s = Number o f
f i r i n g s i n f i n a l t i m e s t e p
458 }
459
460 f s = fopen ( " s y n a p s e s . d a t " , "w" ) ;
461 f o r ( i =0 ; i <N; i ++)
462 f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
463 f p r i n t f ( f s , "f,",s[i][j] ;
464 f p r i n t f ( f s , " \ n " ) ;
465 f c l o s e ( f s ) ;
466
467 f s = fopen ( " c o n n e c t i v i t y . d a t " , "w" ) ;
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468 f o r ( i =0 ; i <N; i ++)
469 f o r ( j =0 ; j <M; j ++)
470 f p r i n t f ( f s , "f,",post[i][j] ;
471 f p r i n t f ( f s , " \ n " ) ;
472 f c l o s e ( f s ) ;
473
474 save ( " s c h u l t z _ e n d . d a t " ) ;
475 r e t u r n 0 ;
476 }
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Parameter Parameter use value
gL Leak channel maximum conductance 8.06mS
EL Leak channel reversal potential -80mV
gNa Sodium-like channel maximum conductance 23mS
ENa Sodium channel reversal potential 60mV
gK Potassium-like channel maximum conductance 13mS
EK Potassium channel reversal potential -90mV
gM M channel maximum conductance 19mS
EM M channel reversal potential -90mV
VNaInhal f max half the maximal conductance of the Sodium-like channel -54.1
kNaIn rate constant for voltage-gating of the Sodium-like channel -1
VKhal f max half the maximal conductance of the Potassium-like channel -25
kK rate constant for voltage-gating of the Potassium-like channel 5
VMhal f max half the maximal conductance of the M channel -20
kM rate constant for voltage-gating of the M channel 15
τNaIn time constant for gating variable on the sodium-like channel 500
τK time constant for gating variable on the potassium-like channel 1
τM time constant for gating variable on the M channel 200
Table C.1: Parameter values for the neuron model described in chapter 4.
Parameter Parameter use value
τ1,AMPA AMPA channel opening time constant 1
τ2,AMPA AMPA channel closing time constant 5
τ1,NMDA NMDA channel opening time constant 2
τ2,NMDA NMDA channel closing time constant 80
gAMPAmax AMPA channel maximum conductance 0.1mS
gNMDAmax NMDA channel maximum conductance 0.01mS
gCa Calcium channel maximum conductance 1
Table C.2: Parameter values for the synapses described in chapter 4.
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Parameter Parameter use value
α1 Parameter specifying the plasticity curve Ω 0.35
β1 Parameter specifying the plasticity curve Ω 80
α2 Parameter specifying the plasticity curve Ω 0.55
β2 Parameter specifying the plasticity curve Ω 80
P1 Parameter defining the rate of plasticity change η 0.1
P2 Parameter defining the rate of plasticity change η 0.00001
P3 Parameter defining the rate of plasticity change η 3
P4 Parameter defining the rate of plasticity change η 1
Table C.3: Parameter values for the plasticity model described in chapter 4.
Appendix D
Parameters used in preliminary
dopamine diffusion and re-uptake
model
Each dopamine terminal shown in Figure 2.6 acts as a point source of dopamine. The
resulting dopamine concentration is the sum of the concentration from each point
source. The concentration from a point source at distance r at time t after release










Where C(r, t) is the extra cellular dopamine concentration following one spike as
a function of distance r, and time t after release. Release is assumed to be instanta-
neous from a vesicle with a fill concentration of C f . Diffusion of dopamine molecules
is governed by the local extracellular volume fraction α, and the tortuosity of the ex-
tracellular media λ. Tortuosity decreases the diffusion coefficient to D∗ (D∗ = Dλ2).
The re-uptake of dopamine via DATs and oxidisation via MAOs is incorporated by the
uptake constant k′.
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Parameter Parameter use value
C f Fill concentration of one vesicle 1.6274e-20M
α striatal extracellular volume fraction 0.21
λ Tortuosity of extracellular medium 1.54cm−1
D Diffusion coefficient 7.63e-6s−1
k′ Dopamine re-uptake time constant 20
fpacemaking firing rate of pacemaking dopamine neurons 5Hz
fburst firing rate of dopamine neurons during phasic spike 80Hz
burst fraction fraction of dopamine neurons that fire during a phasic spike 0.8
DAterminals dopamine terminal density in striatum 0.104µm−3
Table D.1: Parameter values for the preliminary dopamine diffusion and re-uptake
model.
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